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Criminological research and forensic intelligence are often based on crime data registered in police 
or court records. However, such data only includes information on crimes that have been detected or 
reported. Moreover, only a small proportion of these crimes are cleared, and research suggests that 
offenders who are not arrested have different features from those who are. For instance, they may be 
more specialized, have more co-offenders, or spread their crimes over a larger geographical or temporal 
area. These two elements – a high number of unknown offenders and the possibility that these offenders 
may not randomly be missing from official crime statistics – pose a major challenge for criminological 
research. Several authors have already questioned the generalizability and applicability of research 
findings based on (known offenders registered in) official crime data and the consequential implications 
for theory and policy.
The development of DNA profiling techniques at the end of the 20th century was promising in light of these 
difficulties, since this resulted in the establishment of national forensic DNA databases in many countries. 
The significant added value of DNA and DNA databases for specific operational police investigations soon 
became clear. Forensic DNA databases also contain unique opportunities for criminological research, as 
they can extend current forensic intelligence to unknown offenders registered in police databases. After 
all, DNA databases not only store profiles from known offenders (e.g., convicted offenders), but also 
contain profiles obtained from DNA samples found at crime scenes that can differentiate offenders that 
have not (yet) been arrested. These DNA profiles from unknown offenders can be linked to different 
crime scenes, or to other co-offenders. This makes it possible to study unknown offenders’ serial and co-
offending behaviour, which cannot be done using police-recorded crime data, for example. 
To date, very little criminological research has been carried out using DNA databases, and their validity 
as a data source has largely been unexplored. The present dissertation aims to fill this research gap. In 
particular, it reviews the specific weakness and strength of DNA databases as a source of criminological 
research, respectively the selectivity of the source (only a proportion of all registered crimes is stored 
in the DNA database) and whether it allows the (links between) unknown offenders and their offending 
behaviour to be studied. To answer these research questions, four separate studies were conducted.
First, the different actors and factors that could impact the selectivity of the Belgian National Genetic 
Database are identified via a review of legislation and literature. Observations are also made on the 
actors involved in the process that a DNA trace profile passes through before it reaches the database. 
It was found that only a minority of all registered crimes is represented in the DNA database. This 
representation is mainly influenced by the type of crime (e.g., contact crimes where the offender makes 
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physical contact with the victim or with an object at the crime scene are more likely to be present in the 
DNA database) and by local DNA retention policies (e.g., judicial districts can opt to examine the crime 
scene of only certain types of crime for DNA traces).
Second, the validity of the DNA database as a ‘sample’ of all police-recorded crime data is further 
evaluated in an empirical study. More specific, DNA data from the Belgian National Genetic Database 
and police-recorded crime data from the Belgian General Police Database were compared regarding 
the concentration and spread of unsolved crimes across the different Belgian judicial districts. The 
findings suggest that the DNA database is representative of the police-recorded crime data. However, 
some limitations were found. First, crime is concentrated in different districts in each dataset. Second, 
the similarity of the spatial pattern for violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences, but not for 
aggravated burglary, is caused in several districts by a low crime count in the police-recorded crime data 
and a zero crime count in the DNA data. In other words, in these districts no unsolved crimes or unknown 
offenders are registered in the DNA database, which precludes carrying out further analyses. Therefore, 
only using DNA data may limit the possibilities for criminological research. However, the selectivity of 
the DNA data should not be overstated – this study only uses a restricted dataset consisting of crimes 
committed in 2014, and the added value of DNA databases lies in combining them with police databases.
Third, network analysis is used in an empirical study to investigate the advantages of using an integrated 
dataset, combining police-recorded crime data (i.e., crimes committed by known offenders) and DNA 
data (i.e., crimes committed by unknown offenders). In the first network study, performed at the crime 
level, the prevalence and characteristics of serial co-offences obtained from the integrated dataset are 
compared to those obtained from the police-recorded crime data. In the integrated dataset, the number 
of crime networks is higher and their size and spatial and temporal distributions are larger than in the 
police dataset. Such findings could, for instance, place research and theory on offender mobility in a 
different perspective.
Finally, in a second network study, performed at the offender level, the difference between known and 
unknown offenders is assessed. Networks in the integrated dataset, combining known and unknown 
offenders, are larger. Thus, more co-offenders can be identified in the integrated dataset compared to the 
police-recorded crime data. These networks also have a different structure than networks only including 
known offenders. For example, unknown offenders are more peripheral nodes in the offender network. 
With respect to criminological research, using integrated datasets can therefore extend the knowledge 
on roles and structures within criminal networks.
In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates that a DNA database is a valuable source for criminological 
research when its selectivity is taken into account. Arguments are provided that support the concern about 
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the generalizability and applicability of research findings that are only based on known offenders’ criminal 
behaviour. Both the network studies emphasize the importance of integrating unknown offenders and 
their crimes in criminological research. Disregarding unknown offenders and their offending behaviour is 
found to have a considerable impact on the insights into crime and criminal behaviour. The dissertation 




Binnen criminologisch onderzoek maakt men vaak gebruik van data uit politiedatabanken of gerechtelijke 
dossiers. Dergelijke gegevens omvatten echter alleen informatie over gedetecteerde of aangegeven 
misdrijven. Bovendien wordt slechts een klein deel van deze misdrijven opgehelderd. Daarnaast suggereert 
onderzoek dat daders die niet worden gevat andere kenmerken hebben dan daders die wel worden 
gevat, zoals meer specialisatie, meer mededaders, of een grotere temporele en ruimtelijke spreiding 
van hun misdrijven. Deze twee elementen - een groot aantal ongekende daders en de mogelijkheid dat 
deze daders niet toevallig ontbreken in de officiële criminaliteitsgegevens - vormen een grote uitdaging 
voor criminologisch onderzoek. Verschillende onderzoekers hebben de generaliseerbaarheid en 
toepasbaarheid van onderzoeksbevindingen gebaseerd op (gekende daders van) officieel geregistreerde 
misdrijven en de daaruit voortvloeiende implicaties voor theorie en beleid al in vraag gesteld.
De ontwikkeling van DNA-profileringstechnieken aan het einde van de 20ste eeuw was veelbelovend in 
het licht van het hierboven geschetst probleem. In veel landen resulteerde dit immers in de oprichting 
van een nationale forensische DNA-databank. De meerwaarde van DNA en DNA-databanken voor 
politioneel en gerechtelijk onderzoek werd al snel duidelijk. Ook voor criminologisch onderzoek bieden 
forensische DNA-databanken echter unieke mogelijkheden. DNA-databanken kunnen bijvoorbeeld de 
huidige inzichten die enkel gebaseerd zijn op gekende daders uitbreiden. In DNA-databanken worden 
immers niet alleen DNA-profielen van gekende daders (zoals veroordeelden) opgeslagen, maar ook 
profielen verkregen uit sporen die werden aangetroffen op plaatsen delict. Aan de hand van deze 
sporenprofielen kunnen (nog) niet gearresteerde daders onderscheiden worden en kunnen hun DNA-
profielen gekoppeld worden aan meerdere plaatsen delict of mededaders. Dit maakt het mogelijk om het 
veelplegen en mededaderschap van ongekende daders te bestuderen, wat niet mogelijk is met data uit 
politiedatabanken.
Tot op heden wordt in criminologisch onderzoek weinig gebruik gemaakt van DNA-databanken. 
Bovendien werd de validiteit van DNA-databanken als databron nauwelijks onderzocht. Het huidige 
proefschrift beoogt deze lacune op te vullen. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt als volgt: Hoe kunnen 
DNA-databanken bijdragen aan de studie van ongekende daders en hun crimineel gedrag? Daartoe 
werden de specifieke zwakte en sterkte van DNA-databanken als bron voor criminologisch onderzoek 
bestudeerd. Aangezien slechts een deel van alle geregistreerde misdrijven wordt opgeslagen in de DNA-
databank, is de selectiviteit van de DNA-databank een potentieel nadeel voor criminologisch onderzoek. 
Het kenmerkende voordeel van de databank is dat er (linken tussen) ongekende daders en hun crimineel 
gedrag bestudeerd kunnen worden. Om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, werden vier afzonderlijke 
studies uitgevoerd.
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In een eerste studie werden verschillende actoren en factoren geïdentificeerd die van invloed kunnen 
zijn op de selectiviteit van de Belgische nationale DNA-gegevensbank. Daartoe werden wetgeving en 
literatuur bestudeerd, alsook observaties uitgevoerd bij de verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn in het 
proces dat een DNA-sporenprofiel doorloopt vooraleer het de databank bereikt. Er werd vastgesteld dat 
slechts een minderheid van alle geregistreerde misdrijven is vertegenwoordigd in de DNA-databank. Deze 
selectiviteit wordt voornamelijk beïnvloed door het type misdrijf. Bijvoorbeeld, contactmisdrijven waarbij 
de dader fysiek contact met het slachtoffer of met een object op de plaats delict maakt, worden vaker 
in de DNA-databank opgeslagen dan bijvoorbeeld internetfraude waarbij geen duidelijke plaats delict is. 
Ook het DNA-beleid speelt een belangrijk rol. Zo kunnen gerechtelijke arrondissementen bijvoorbeeld 
opteren om enkel de plaatsen delict van bepaalde misdrijftypes op DNA-sporen te onderzoeken.
In een tweede studie werd de validiteit van de DNA-databank, als zijnde een ‘steekproef’ van alle 
misdrijven opgeslagen in de politiedatabank, empirisch geëvalueerd. De concentratie van onopgehelderde 
misdrijven opgeslagen in de nationale DNA-gegevensbank in de verschillende Belgische gerechtelijke 
arrondissementen, en de spreiding van deze misdrijven over deze arrondissementen heen, werden 
vergeleken met deze in de Algemene Nationale Gegevensbank van de politie. De bevindingen suggereren 
dat de DNA-data representatief zijn voor de politiedata. Hierbij dienen echter enkele kanttekeningen 
geplaatst te worden. Vooreerst verschillen de beide datasets op het vlak van de arrondissementen 
waarin de onopgehelderde misdrijven geconcentreerd zijn. Daarnaast is het gelijkaardig ruimtelijke 
patroon in meerdere arrondissementen veroorzaakt door een laag aantal misdrijven in de politiedataset 
en een afwezigheid van misdrijven in de DNA-dataset. Dit werd vastgesteld voor diefstal met geweld, 
levensdelicten en zedendelicten, maar niet voor zware diefstallen. Met andere woorden, de DNA-dataset 
bevatte geen onopgehelderde misdrijven of onbekende daders in deze arrondissementen, wat verdere 
analyses onmogelijk maakt. Dit kan uiteraard het gebruik van DNA-databanken voor criminologisch 
onderzoek naar onopgehelderde misdrijven beperken. De selectiviteit van de DNA-data kan hier echter 
overschat zijn, aangezien in dit onderzoek gebruik werd gemaakt van een dataset die enkel bestaat uit 
misdrijven gepleegd in 2014. Bovendien ligt de toegevoegde waarde van DNA-databanken in de integratie 
ervan met de politiedatabank.
In de derde studie werd een netwerkanalyse uitgevoerd om de voordelen van een geïntegreerde dataset, 
waarin politiedata (i.e., misdrijven gepleegd door gekende daders) en DNA-data (i.e., misdrijven gepleegd 
door ongekende daders) werden gecombineerd, te onderzoeken. In deze netwerkstudie, uitgevoerd op 
het niveau van het misdrijf, werden de prevalentie en kenmerken van netwerken van feiten gepleegd 
door veelplegers in groep uit de geïntegreerde dataset vergeleken met deze uit de politiedata. In de 
geïntegreerde dataset is het aantal en de omvang van deze netwerken hoger dan in de politiedata, evenals 
hun ruimtelijke en temporele spreiding. DNA-databanken kunnen zodus het criminologisch onderzoek 
naar, en theorievorming over bijvoorbeeld de mobiliteit van daders van nieuwe perspectieven voorzien.
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Ten slotte werd een tweede netwerkstudie, op het niveau van de dader, uitgevoerd om het verschil 
tussen gekende en ongekende daders te bestuderen. Netwerken in de geïntegreerde dataset bestaande 
uit zowel gekende als ongekende daders zijn groter dan deze uit de politiedataset enkel bestaande 
uit gekende daders. Er blijken met andere woorden meer mededaders te zijn dan men op basis van de 
politiedataset met enkel gekende daders kan afleiden. Netwerken bestaande uit gekende en ongekende 
daders hebben bovendien een andere structuur dan de netwerken die alleen gekende daders omvatten. 
Ongekende daders blijken bijvoorbeeld eerder perifere actoren in het dadernetwerk te zijn. Het gebruik 
van een geïntegreerde dataset heeft bijgevolg belangrijke implicaties voor criminologisch onderzoek 
aangezien ze de kennis over daderrollen en structuren binnen criminele netwerken kunnen vergroten.
Concluderend toont dit proefschrift aan dat een DNA-databank een waardevolle bron is voor 
criminologisch onderzoek indien rekening gehouden wordt met de selectiviteit ervan. Het proefschrift 
biedt argumenten die aantonen dat de generaliseerbaarheid en toepasbaarheid van onderzoeksresultaten 
die enkel gebaseerd zijn op gekende daders uit politiedatabanken beperkt zijn. Beide netwerkstudies 
benadrukken het belang van het betrekken van DNA-data betreffende ongekende daders en hun misdrijven 
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PART 1:  
INTRODUCTION
The introduction to this dissertation starts with an explanation of the background to the study, and reviews 
why and how the research was conducted. The concepts of forensic science and forensic intelligence are 
introduced, and the research questions are defined. The data and the methods used are then presented. 
The structure of the remaining parts of the dissertation is given at the end of this introduction.
— 2 —
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Background
The vast majority of criminological research is based on recorded crime data from police or court records 
(e.g., Bernasco, 2006; Felson, 2003; Reiss, 1988; Weerman, 2001, 2003). It seems logical to use such data, 
since they provide a rich source of information about crimes, offenders, modus operandi, etc., and are 
continuously updated. Much of our knowledge about crimes, offenders and their behaviour is therefore 
based on the data stored in police databases. However, police-recorded crime data only include 
information on detected or reported crimes. As a result, they may underestimate the true magnitude of 
crime. Many crimes are not reported by victims or members of the public, or are not detected or recorded 
by the police. In scientific literature, this unrecorded proportion of all crimes is described as the ‘dark 
number’ (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). In addition, only a small proportion of all registered crime are cleared 
– about 20% in most Western countries (De Wree, Vermeulen, & Christiaens, 2006; Lammers & Bernasco, 
2013), and not all co-offenders of a crime are identified. In fact, the police are not always aware of the 
existence of co-offenders. The identification of one offender or even several offenders does not imply 
that there were no other offenders involved in the crime, and it seems unlikely that every offender will 
spontaneously inform on all his co-offenders (Alarid, Burton Jr., & Hochstetler, 2009) or confess to their 
other offences (Kocsis & Irwin, 1998). Kocsis & Irwin (1998, p. 199) state that as “some serial criminals have 
committed more offences than those for which they are charged, it would be inappropriate to assume that a 
person found guilty of only a single offence could not be a serial offender”. As a result, undetected crimes by 
known offenders, and unknown offenders and their crimes, remain out of reach if recorded crimes are the 
sole data source when studying offending behaviour. 
Researchers who use police-recorded crime data to study offenders’ criminal behaviour often generalize 
their findings to ‘offender behaviour’, although clearly the data on which they base their study do not 
include all offenders (e.g., Townsley & Sidebottom, 2010). Researchers usually mention as a limitation the 
fact that only information about (offenders of) (solved) recorded crime was available (e.g., Vandeviver, 
Neutens, Van Daele, Geurts, & Vander Beken, 2015). Also, very few studies mention the possibility that 
there could be differences in the behaviour and characteristics between known and unknown offenders. 
Are known and unknown offenders alike? Do they display the same behaviour? If the answer to these 
questions is yes, it would not be necessary to study unknown offenders and their crimes, as including 
data about unknown offenders in research would only yield ‘more of the same’ results. The conclusions 
would be the same, regardless of whether known or unknown offenders were studied. The only exception 
to this would be estimates of the size of the offender population; these would require information about 
both known and unknown offenders. However, if the answer to the above questions is no, then both 
known and unknown offenders and their crimes must be included in the study in order to be able to make 
valid statements about the general offender population and their crimes. This also implies that current 
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research gives a distorted picture of offenders and their crimes, since it is (mainly) based on known 
offenders registered in police-recorded crime data. 
Several authors have already expressed concern about the generalizability and applicability of research 
findings based on registered crime data, and the implications this has for both theory and policy (Lammers, 
2013, p. 2). It is possible that the effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives and law enforcement deployment 
strategies could be compromised if they are based solely on analysing known offenders’ offending behaviour. 
Arguably, prioritizing law enforcement strategies that target known offenders is lowering detection and 
clearance rates, and making unknown offenders invisible again. It is therefore important that the offending 
behaviour of unknown offenders is also understood, in order to develop new and inclusive prevention and 
law enforcement strategies (De Moor, Vandeviver, & Vander Beken, 2018b). However, empirical research 
into unknown offenders is still limited, precisely because of the difficulty of studying these offenders. 
How, then, can the unknown offenders responsible for a large number of crimes in police-recorded crime 
data be studied? Forensic DNA databases offer opportunities here. Generally, there are two types of DNA 
profiles in forensic DNA analysis: ‘unknown’ forensic profiles obtained from samples gathered at crime 
scenes (e.g., saliva or drops of blood), and ‘known’ reference profiles obtained from samples taken directly 
from a person (e.g., a buccal swab from an offender, suspect or victim) (Jeuniaux, Duboccage, Renard, 
Van Renterghem, & Vanvooren, 2016). These forensic profiles are very interesting when considering a 
study of unknown offenders. First, an unknown offender can be differentiated from another known or 
unknown offender using a DNA profile from the crime scene. Second, various crimes can be linked to the 
same offender by means of a DNA profile that is found at various crime scenes, even if this offender is 
(as yet) unknown. Similarly, third, different offenders can be linked to one crime, even though they are 
unknown, by means of their (different) DNA profiles found at the crime scene. This enables the serial 
and co-offending behaviour of unknown offenders to be studied. Fourth, DNA databases can supplement 
the police database with information about unknown offenders, and this for each individual crime. 
Figure 1 illustrates these four advantages. The figure presents eight crimes that were committed between 
2011 and 2015 by a total of five different offenders (A, B, C, D and E). It shows information about the 
eight crimes that is stored in both the police database and the DNA database. Offenders A, B and E are 
unknown offenders stored in the DNA database, offenders C and D are known offenders stored in the 
police database. The DNA profile of offender B, for example, was found at the crime scene of a theft in 
Ghent in 2011 (crime 2), a theft in Ghent in 2013 (crime 3) and finally a theft in Liège in 2014 (crime 5). 
Moreover, for two of the three thefts, this unknown offender B was accompanied by one or more co-
offenders known to the police. In other words, integrating a police database with a DNA database makes 
it possible to study the serial co-offending behaviour of the eight offenders, regardless of whether they 
are known or not. Using only police-recorded crime data would only give a partial image of the total 
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Known offender stored in police-recorded crime data
Unknown offender stored in DNA database
Figure 1: Fictitious example of eight recorded crimes
In theory, therefore, a DNA database is an ideal data source for studying the criminal behaviour of 
unknown offenders. But is that really the case? Can DNA databases be used as a meaningful source for 
criminological research, or are there disadvantages that would restrict or even prevent their use?
In contrast to the extensive research on the use of DNA to solve specific crimes, very little criminological 
research has made use of DNA databases. In addition, and more importantly, the validity of the data 
source has been largely unexplored. This dissertation therefore assesses the use of forensic DNA 
databases in the study of unknown offenders and their offending behaviour. The dissertation is of both 
of methodological and theoretical importance – methodological in the sense that a DNA database is 
evaluated as an alternative data source for criminological research; and theoretical in the sense that, by 
evaluating a DNA database, some substantive issues regarding unknown offenders are dealt with.
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2. Forensic intelligence
Forensic DNA is a well-known and widely used form of evidence within police research. In this context, 
the use of DNA belongs to the field of forensic science, which is “the application of scientific techniques 
and principles to provide evidence to legal or related investigations and determinations” (Tilstone, Savage, & 
Clark, 2006, p. 1). In this dissertation, forensic DNA is used for forensic intelligence, which transcends 
the level of individual crime cases. A further explanation of both concepts is given below, and it will 
become clear that the boundary between the two is not strictly defined. The various sources that can 
be used for forensic intelligence, and their potential for studying unknown offenders, are evaluated, and 
existing scientific research using DNA databases is discussed. Once again, conscious attention is paid to 
the role that unknown offenders take in this research. This chapter on forensic intelligence is a further 
elaboration of De Moor, Vander Beken, and Van Daele (2017).
2.1. Forensic science versus forensic intelligence
DNA has a significant added value in specific police investigations (Martin, 2004; McCartney, Wilson, 
& Williams, 2011; Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et al., 2010; Ribaux & Margot, 2003). The underlying principle is 
that matches can be made between different (unknown) crime scene samples mutually or between an 
unknown crime scene sample and a reference profile retrieved from a known offender. This comparative 
DNA analysis is intended to identify, directly or indirectly, offenders or to relate distinct cases. In addition 
to the purely reactive role of DNA profiles in confirming the evidence gathered by traditional investigative 
methods, DNA can also have a more proactive role (Williams & Johnson, 2005) as it sometimes provides 
the necessary evidence to solve a crime when the police have no leads and traditional investigative 
methods have failed to identify any (known) suspects (Doleac, 2016; Song, Patil, Murphy, & Slatkin, 2009; 
Tracy & Morgan, 2000; Weedn & Hicks, 1997; Wilson, Weisburd, & McClure, 2011). There are numerous 
anecdotal reports of success in matching a DNA profile from a crime-scene sample and a profile in a 
DNA database (i.e., cold hits), thereby identifying a formerly unknown potential suspect, and of the 
exoneration of wrongly convicted individuals on the basis of DNA evidence (Song et al., 2009; Weedn & 
Hicks, 1997). This exoneration may take place during the police investigation itself, as DNA analysis can 
help to eliminate innocent suspects. Of course, the mere presence (or absence) of a DNA profile from 
person X at a crime scene is not a sufficient condition to convict (or exonerate) person X. Further forensic 
casework research will have to evaluate the hypothesis.
In other words, DNA is used in specific police investigations to detect crime, and is criminal law driven 
(Burrows & Tarling, 2004; Jobling & Gill, 2004; Leary & Pease, 2003; Legrand & Vogel, 2012; Ribaux, Baylon, 
Roux, et al., 2010; Roux, Talbot-Wright, Robertson, Crispino, & Ribaux, 2015). This operational function of 
DNA traces (and other traces such as shoe marks, ear marks, tool marks, ballistics and fingerprints) is 
often referred to as ‘forensic research’ or ‘forensic science’. Forensic science can therefore be defined as 
— 7 —
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
the study of unique crimes and the traces these crimes generate (Ribaux & Talbot Wright, 2014; Roux, 
Crispino, & Ribaux, 2012). DNA can also be helpful at a more strategic level. Beyond identifying individuals 
or relating cases to each other, the results of forensic research can also provide important information 
about the size, characteristics and evolution of different crime types. DNA databases are then seen as 
a tool to learn more about different types of crime (Bernasco, June 25 2014). Consequently, policy and 
other decision-making processes can be based on the retrieved information (Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et 
al., 2010; Rossy, Ioset, Dessimoz, & Ribaux, 2013). This proactive approach to DNA databases is called 
‘forensic intelligence’. As in forensic research, in addition to DNA, other traces such as fingerprints, shoe 
marks, ear marks, tool marks and ballistics can contribute to forensic intelligence (Legrand & Vogel, 2014; 
Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et al., 2010).
Both ‘forensic science’ and ‘forensic intelligence’ refer to specific aspects of the use of DNA traces and 
databases, although there is some confusion over the terminology used in practice. According to Ribaux, 
Baylon, Roux, et al. (2010), the concept of forensic intelligence is often wrongly used in the context of a 
forensic police investigation. The use of DNA sweeps in police investigations to confirm the identity of an 
offender (i.e., forensic science), for example, does not per se imply an intelligence-led perspective. This 
confusion may be reinforced by the many existing alternative concepts referring to the operational and 
strategic use of forensic DNA: ‘forensic investigation’ versus ‘forensic analysis’, ‘database-led policing’ 
versus ‘intelligence-led policing’ (Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et al., 2010), ‘crime analysis’ versus ‘criminal 
intelligence’ (Ratcliffe, 2007) and ‘tactical crime analysis’ versus ‘strategic crime analysis’ (R. B. Santos, 
2013, p. 61). However, forensic science and forensic intelligence are not completely distinct disciplines. 
On the contrary, both reinforce each other. On the one hand, information retrieved from a specific case 
by using forensic science (for example, via DNA sweeps) can be a source for forensic intelligence as it 
enables a better understanding of general crime patterns of offenders (i.e., the broader criminal context). 
On the other hand, patterns obtained from forensic intelligence can provide concrete guidance on how 
to find DNA and which traces should be looked for at different crime scenes (Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et 
al., 2010). Without mentioning the two disciplines, Staley (2005, p. 38) clearly describes the interaction 
between forensic intelligence and forensic science as follows: “A database that includes the people who 
are most likely to reoffend might help to … catch them if they do reoffend. This would require the NDNAD [the 
UK National DNA Database] to reflect a better understanding of the crime patterns of offenders and their 
likelihood of reoffending”.
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Table 1 summarizes the specific features of forensic science and forensic intelligence (Almog, 2014; Bieber, 
2006; Burrows & Tarling, 2004; Cope, 2004; Harrison, 2006; Jamieson, 2004; Jobling & Gill, 2004; Leary 
& Pease, 2003; Legrand & Vogel, 2012, 2014; Morelato et al., 2014; Morelato et al., 2013; Ratcliffe, 2007; 
Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et al., 2010; Ribaux, Crispino, & Roux, 2014; Ribaux et al., 2003; Ribaux & Margot, 
2003; Ribaux & Talbot Wright, 2014; Robert, 2012; Rossy et al., 2013; Roux et al., 2012; Sheptycki, 2004; 
Tilley & Townsley, 2009).
Table 1: Forensic science versus forensic intelligence 
Forensic science Forensic intelligence
Operational Strategic
Deductive Inductive
What is happening / what happened? Why it is happening / why did it happen? 
Reactive, post-crime Proactive
Crime detection Crime prevention, reduction and control
Short term Long term
Study of traces at crime scene Study of series, patterns and case linking
Contextual and grounded De-contextualized and de-personalized
Micro experiences Macro picture
Single case approach Broader criminal context
Particular offender(s)/offence(s) General picture of characteristics of types of offend-er(s)/offence(s)
Technology and laboratory processes Social science
Criminal investigation Criminological research
Identification, attribution and arrest of offender(s) Support decision-making and criminal policy
Criminal law driven Life course and environmental criminology
Attempts represent less serious offences than commit-
ted offences
Attempts and committed offences both provide valu-
able information 
2.2. Sources of forensic intelligence
Two types of data sources are generally used for assessing criminal behaviour in scientific research: (1) 
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recorded crime data (e.g., police-recorded crime data or conviction data); and (2) victimization surveys 
and self-report crime surveys 1 (D. S. Kirk, 2006; Maxfield, Luntz Weiler, & Spatz Widom, 2000; Thornberry 
& Krohn, 2000). With forensic DNA databases now established in many countries, a third instrument for 
‘forensic intelligence’ is now available. 
Recorded crime data, crime surveys and DNA databases have their own specific benefits and drawbacks 
as data sources. Numerous authors have studied the methodological aspects of data sources, although 
forensic DNA databases are hardly mentioned in their evaluations. Lammers and colleagues are the 
only authors to have comprehensively reviewed forensic DNA databases as a source for the study of 
criminal behaviour (Lammers, 2013, 2014a; Lammers & Bernasco, 2013; Lammers, Bernasco, & Elffers, 
2012; Lammers, Bernasco, & van de Beek, 2011). Table 2 presents an overview of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different sources of information for criminological research. The first impression 
is that DNA databases will not be useful, since they have more disadvantages than advantages, and the 
same number of weaknesses as, or more than, the two other data sources. However, the discussion that 
follows suggests that the benefits DNA databases offer for the study of offending behaviour outweigh 
their drawbacks.
Recorded crime data 
Official recorded crime data have two significant drawbacks when used as a data source for criminological 
research: selectivity of the registered data, and the fact that it relates to secondary data. Different 
elements are involved in the selectivity of recorded crime data. First, crimes must have been detected 
by the police (i.e., proactive activity of the police) or reported to the police by the public or by victims 
(i.e., reactive activity of the police) before they can be registered. However, the police only know about 
a small proportion of all crimes (Grapendaal & van Tilburg, 2002). Willingness to report a crime seems 
to depend on different factors concerning the victim, the crime and the social context (Goudriaan, 
Lynch, & Nieuwbeerta, 2003). Skogan identifies a variety of factors that influence reporting behaviour, 
including the seriousness of the offence, insurance payments, attitudes toward the police, feelings of 
guilt or culpability, and victim–offender relationships (Carcach, 1997; Skogan, 1984). The most consistent 
finding is that the seriousness of crimes has the greatest influence on reporting. Consequently, serious 
crimes that result in substantial financial or physical damage are generally reported more than petty 
crimes (Goudriaan et al., 2003; Skogan, 1984). Feelings of shame, guilt and a close relationship between 
the offender and the victim may also hinder the reporting of crimes. For example, sex crimes such as 
1 The term ‘self-report surveys’ usually refers to ‘self-report offending surveys’ (Tilley & Townsley, 2009, p. 15); however, it 
is also sometimes used in the context of ‘self-report surveys of victimization’ (Cantor & Lynch, 2000). Thus, offending and 
victimization measures may be surveyed using common methodological features (Goethals, Ponsaers, Beyens, Pauwels, & 
Devroe, 2002). In this dissertation the two types of survey will therefore be discussed together, but with any differences 
highlighted.
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child sexual abuse, rape and prostitution are definitely under-reported by the public, although incidents 
of prostitution are often discovered by the police themselves (R. B. Santos, 2013). Similarly, domestic 
violence is reported much less than violence by strangers, although the difference in the willingness 
to report such crimes has reduced due to an increase in the public’s awareness of the crime (Gartner & 
Macmillan, 1995). Victims with a lower social-economic status are less likely to report a crime than those 
with a higher status (Wittebrood, 2005). Younger victims and people who have been the victim of multiple 
crimes are also less willing to report offences to the police (Carcach, 1997). However, even if a crime 
is detected or reported, the offender often remains unidentified. In many Western countries clearance 
rates are low (De Wree et al., 2006; Lammers & Bernasco, 2013). The US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)’s 2016 annual report mentions clearance rates of 45.6% for violent crimes and 18.3% for property 
crimes, for example (FBI, 2017). The second issue regarding selectivity is that not all crimes are officially 
recorded, even if they have been detected by the police or reported by the public. The police often have 
discretionary power to decide whether or not to register an offence (Brooks, 2015; Gilleir, 2013). Third, 
recorded crime data also reflect the priorities of the police. For example, the Belgian National Security 
Plan defines the police’s principal security concerns over a timespan of four years. Radicalization, violent 
extremism and terrorism, smuggling and trafficking in human beings and drugs are the top three (of ten) 
priorities for the period 2016 to 2019 (Ministerraad, 2016). This is not an exhaustive list of the crimes that 
the police respond to; however, it obviously has an impact on the official crime rates. Fourth, several 
researchers claim that minorities are over-represented in recorded crime data, and consequently also in 
DNA databases (Greely, Riordan, Garrison, & Mountain, 2006; M. E. Smith, 2006). According to critics, 
this form of discrimination represents a broader social issue where minorities are targeted more often by 
the police (Rothstein & Talbott, 2006). To conclude, selectivity can lead to a substantial over- and under-
reporting of certain criminal behaviours and offenders in recorded crime data.
The second significant drawback of recorded crime data and DNA databases is that both databases 
contain secondary data. The data are not collected by the researchers themselves (Boslaugh, 2010) 
– the databases are set up to serve the judicial system and the police in their operational research. 
Criminological research may require different or additional information than that gathered to solve 
specific crimes. Furthermore, they will have different stakeholders and will be set up using their own 
type of database, have different registration methods, etc. This makes the exchange or aggregation of the 
information stored in the two databases more complex. Thorough data preparation and data-cleaning 
procedures are needed to exclude cases with missing, invalid or incongruent information from further 
analysis.
Self-reports and victimization surveys
Self-reports and victimization surveys such as the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) have been 
introduced in an attempt to obtain more information on the relatively large number of unreported 
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crimes (Coleman & Moynihan, 1996). Indeed, according to the results of the fourth ICVS conducted in 
2000, only about 50% of six offence types (theft from cars, car vandalism, bicycle theft, burglary with 
entry, attempted burglary and theft of personal property) were reported to the police in 17 industrialized 
countries, including Belgium (van Kesteren, Mayhew, & Nieuwbeerta, 2000). However, crime surveys 
have significant drawbacks, too. Self-report and victimization studies remain an infrequent registration, in 
contrast with recorded crime databases and DNA databases, which are based on more regular, permanent 
documentation (Devroe, Beyens, & Enhus, 2006). Self-report studies and victimization surveys of criminal 
events also share the same pitfalls as any other questionnaire on any topic, with the reliability and validity 
of the surveys’ methodology the main concern. The sensitive topics of crime and victimization cause 
additional difficulties, such as respondents providing socially desirable answers.2 Nevertheless, there 
is an important difference between the two types of surveys where criminal behaviour is concerned. In 
contrast to victimization surveys, self-report surveys are more focused on minor offences and often do 
not include many of the more serious crimes for which people are arrested. This may lead to inconsistent 
results between victimization, self-report and recorded crime data, as Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1979) 
discovered when comparing the characteristics of offenders (sex, race and social class) based on these 
three data sources (see also Thornberry & Krohn, 2000). Related to this finding, Babinski, Hartsough, 
and Lambert (2001) concluded that several high-frequency but less serious crimes such as vandalism 
and some low-frequency but serious crimes such as assault were less evident in the self-reports than 
in recorded crime data. On the other hand, a substantial number of individuals reported that they had 
committed crimes without being arrested, particularly public disorder crimes such as drug crimes or 
carrying a weapon.
The types of crime being studied and the target population of a survey both have an impact on the 
study’s validity. Respondents must be willing to reveal a crime honestly and accurately, as the offender 
or as the victim (Haen Marschall, 1996). Their motivation and the overall balance of perceived costs 
(e.g., loss of time, disapproval, etc.) and benefits (e.g., incentive, appreciation, etc.) of completing the 
survey will influence their inclination to accurately and truthfully participate in a self-report survey. The 
perceived costs and rewards differ between diverse social groups (Haen Marschall, 1996). Hindelang, 
Hirschi, and Weis (1981, p. 213) stated that “the self-report method can produce reliable and valid results 
within the populations to which it is generally applied”, referring in their case to white, in school and 
generally not seriously delinquent groups. Thirty years later, Kivivuori (2011, p. 3) seemed to come to 
a similar conclusion, referring to the large amount of methodological literature on self-report crime 
surveys: “self-report surveys are a reliable and fairly valid means of measuring the prevalence and incidence of 
crime especially in juvenile and young adult populations”.
2 For a detailed discussion of the problems typical of survey research, see Gideon (2012), de Leeuw, Hox & Dillman (2008) 
and Dillman, Smyth & Christian (2014). 
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Hindelang et al. (1981, p. 16) stated that the fact that “the findings of research based on official data are 
consistent with the predictions of traditional theories of delinquency” is one of the reasons for preferring 
recorded crime data to self-report data. However, this could be interpreted as a self-confirming theory, 
as policy-makers often rely on recorded crime data based on known offenders, and the priorities of the 
police are a derivate of the policy, which has repercussions for the data. On the other hand, these authors 
also stated that researchers interested in the aetiology of criminal behaviour prefer self-report studies 
as “the findings of self-report research are clearly more consistent with modern theories, many of which were 
actually formulated before the results of self-report research became available” (Hindelang et al., 1981, p. 15). 
Self-report surveys allow information to be collected on a broad range of personal and environmental 
factors that can be linked to crime and the criminal career: income, personal attributes and personality, 
social roles, socialization contexts (e.g., school, work, family and peers), etc. Recorded crime data such as 
police records generally do not include this kind of information (Huizinga, Esbensen, & Weiher, 1991; van 
Kesteren et al., 2000).
DNA databases
While many of the restrictions that are applicable to official police or judicial data are also (partially) 
valid when using DNA traces (Lammers et al., 2011), DNA has a significant added value for scientific 
research in the field of criminology. The four advantages mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
are repeated and further explained here. First and foremost, DNA traces enable crimes carried out by 
unidentified offenders to be studied: an anonymous DNA profile is all that is required. In addition, DNA 
traces involving the same offender found at different crime scenes, and at different points in time (i.e., a 
serial offender), can be linked even if this offender has not previously been arrested or has not confessed 
to all their offences. This second advantage of forensic DNA is very important in the light of the firmly 
established characteristic of criminal behaviour that only a relatively small proportion of offenders 
are responsible for a large share of all crimes (Everson, 2003; Farrington et al., 2006; Farrington et al., 
2003; Ferwerda, 2013; Grapendaal & van Tilburg, 2002; Home Office, 2004; Staley, 2005; Struijk, 2009; 
Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Versteegh, Janssen, & Bernasco, 2003). The size of this ‘small proportion’ 
and ‘large share’ depend, inter alia, on the research method used, the definition of chronic offenders, 
the crimes taken into account and the population under study (Grapendaal & van Tilburg, 2002; Meijer, 
van Panhuis, Siero, & Smit, 2002). According to a 2004 report from the UK Home Office, for example, 
every year around 100,000 offenders are responsible for 50% of all offences in England and Wales (with a 
total population of more than 52 million people) and only 5,000 people commit around 9% of all crimes, 
accounting for about a million offences in total (Home Office, 2004). The third advantage of forensic 
DNA is that DNA traces involving different offenders found at one single crime scene can be linked even 
if these offenders have not previously been arrested. Moreover, it is also possible to identify networks of 
(unknown) co-offenders by relations of transitivity (Legrand & Vogel, 2014; Ribaux, Baylon, Roux, et al., 
— 13 —
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
2010; Ribaux, Walsh, & Margot, 2006). For example, if person A shares case 1 with person B, and if person 
B shares case 2 with person C, then persons A, B and C are part of the same ‘network’. Fourth, a DNA 
database can add further information about unknown offenders to crimes stored in the police database. 
This allows links to be made between unknown offenders and known offenders in each of the databases 
separately, and also between known and unknown offenders mutually. 
Thornberry and Krohn (2000) cited Thorsten Sellin when they stressed the advantage of self-report 
studies in obtaining information as close to the source of criminal behaviour as possible: “the value of a 
crime rate for index purposes decreases as the distance from the crime itself in terms of procedure increases” 
(1931, p. 346). Although at the time of Sellin’s publication in 1931 the structure of DNA had not even been 
discovered, his observation may be even more relevant when using DNA as a data source because DNA is 
collected at the crime scene itself and does not rely on information from victims or witnesses. However, 
DNA techniques are not infallible. Many researches have questioned the uniqueness of DNA profiles 
and the match probability.3 The fact that DNA profiles are extremely rare does not make them unique. 
The problem of false positive matches (i.e., a match is found where no match should be found), and even 
false negative matches (i.e., a match that should be found, is not found), fits in this context. The number 
of false positive matches can be reduced by increasing the number of required matching loci (van der 
Beek, 2011) (see 6.1). Also, DNA matching may be impeded by mixed profiles (from offender(s), victims 
and persons not of interest), the availability of only small amounts of DNA, and contamination at the 
crime scene and/or later on (Balding, 1999; Bramley, 2009; Jobling & Gill, 2004; Lee, Lee, Park, & Hwang, 
2001; Meulenbroek, 2009; National DNA Database, 2004; Penacino, Sala, & Corach, 2003; Staley, 2005). 
Of course, the problem of mismatches, either positive or negative, is more significant when DNA is used 
as evidence than when it is used to study criminal behaviour.
In addition to the fact that DNA databases only store registered crimes, they may also suffer from 
another form of selectivity. DNA profiles can only be obtained at a minority of crime scenes. Offenders 
who do not shed DNA easily (i.e., ‘bad’ shedders), or crimes without a real crime scene, such as money 
laundering, may limit or prevent the retrieval of suitable DNA profiles, for example. Moreover, DNA 
profiles are not always collected at crime scenes, even if they are likely to be present. Different elements 
influencing this selectivity are further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation.
3 Match probability refers to the chance of two unrelated people sharing the same DNA profile.
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- Extensive geographical area covered
- Extensive time period covered: no 
reference period
- Data recorded regularly
- Instrument validity: consistent crime 
categories within juridical districts
- Findings are consistent with  
traditional theories of delinquency 
- Absence of responder bias
- Crime must be reported to/detected 
by the police
- Higher-frequency or more serious 
crimes are more likely to involve 
police contact and registration
- Rely on accurate and consistent 
record keeping
- Reflect the working of the official 
agencies instead of the actual crimes 
being committed in society
- Changes to laws or crime categories 
may impede temporal comparisons





- Ability to study unreported/undetect-
ed crimes
- Ability to study the circumstances, 
motives and aetiology of the offence: 
information on individual, familial, 
environmental and other aspects can 
be explored 
- As the general population is usually 
the target population, a random  
sample from home addresses, schools, 
National Insurance numbers/Social 
Security numbers, etc. gives easy 
access to the target population
- Findings are consistent with modern 
theories of delinquency 
- International crime surveys make 
comparisons between nations possi-
ble, by transcending national  
differences in criminal law and  
recording practices
- Ability to work with longitudinal 
designs
- Measurement error caused by incor-
rect responses to survey questions: 
a) Dependent on the individual’s 
willingness to truthfully/accu-
rately report criminal activity/
victimization
b) Socially desirable responding
c) Memory decay and telescoping
d) Respondents’ errors in  
classification of the delinquency 
items
- Sample design and selection (i.e., 
sampling error and non-coverage 
error)
- Participation and response rate (i.e., 
non-response error)
- Validity/reliability of survey  
instrument
- Survey content:
a) Not always clear what ‘crime/ 
delinquency’ represents
b) Too few types of crime are  
covered by questions
c) Victimless crimes like drug abuse 
and economic or organizational 
crimes are not surveyed  
(victimization survey)
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- Generally low comparability of surveys 
(with other surveys and recorded crime 
data): 
a) No standard of delinquency items 
that are surveyed
b) Varying reference period
- No permanent registration
- Expensive and time-consuming data 
collection method
DNA database - Extensive time period covered: no 
reference period
- Data recorded regularly
- Ability to detect unknown offenders
- Ability to study the criminal career 
of unknown offenders (i.e., serial 
offending)
- Ability to link unknown offenders 
with (un)known offenders (i.e., 
co-offending)
- Ability to compare identified  
offenders/networks with  
unidentified offenders/networks
- DNA data are collected early in the 
investigative process and therefore 
suffer less attrition
- DNA data are ‘objective’ 
- Crime must be reported to/detected by 
the police
- DNA can only be obtained at a minority 
of crime scenes: 
• Not always an obvious crime scene
• Useable DNA not always left at 
crime scenes
• Offenders can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
DNA shedders 
• Interval between leaving DNA 
behind and recovery of DNA 
- DNA not always collected at crime 
scenes, even if available in all  
probability 
- Not all DNA samples collected at crime 
scenes are analysed (i.e., no DNA  
profile available)
- Reflects the working of the official 
agencies instead of the actual crimes 
being committed in society
- Uniqueness of profile and match  
probability, false positives/negatives 
(e.g., mixed samples, contamination, 
etc.)
- Is the retrieved DNA from the offender 
or from another person?
- Offender characteristics cannot be 
studied (e.g., age etc.)
- Forensic awareness amongst offenders 
may lead to fewer DNA traces at crime 
scenes
- Restricted access to the data
- Retention period of DNA profiles stored 
in the database is limited
(Source: Babinski et al., 2001; Balding, 1999; Beauregard & Bouchard, 2010; Beaver, 2014; Bernasco, 2008; Bramley, 2009; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Cantor & Lynch, 2000; Dillman, 1991, 2000; Eck & Weisburd, 1995; Farrington, 2001; 
Farrington & Ttofi, 2014; Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, 2005; GeneWatch UK, 2006; Goethals et al., 2002; Gottfredson 
& Hindelang, 1977; Hindelang et al., 1981; Jobling & Gill, 2004; Johnson, 2013; Junger-Tas & Haen Marshall, 1999; Kazemian, 
Pease, & Farrington, 2011; D. S. Kirk, 2006; Kivivuori, 2011; Lammers, 2013; Lammers et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2001; Lovell et al., 
2017; Maxfield et al., 2000; McGloin, Sullivan, Piquero, & Pratt, 2007; Meulenbroek, 2009; National DNA Database, 2004; 
Nazaretian & Merolla, 2013; Penacino et al., 2003; Raymond, van Oorschot, Gunn, Walsh, & Roux, 2004; Roman et al., 2008; 
Thornberry & Krohn, 2000, 2003; Tilley & Townsley, 2009; Townsley, Smith, & Pease, 2006; van Kesteren et al., 2000; van 
Kesteren, van Dijk, & Mayhew, 2014; Wallace, 2006; Wiles & Costello, 2000)
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From the analysis above it should be clear that every data collection method has its own qualities and 
specifications. Whatever data source is used, keeping its individual drawbacks in mind during the research 
process remains a critical research approach. The choice of a specific data source must be weighted in 
the context of the research goal. Self-report studies seem to be more appropriate for the study of the 
aetiology of crime, whereas DNA databases seem to be extremely suitable for the study of unknown 
serial co-offenders. Of course, self-report surveys can also reveal information on offenders of registered 
but unsolved crimes stored in the police database. As a researcher, however, you have no assurance that 
these crimes are actually registered (and under which qualification). Moreover, this information cannot 
be linked to the specific crime registered in a police database. These are disadvantages that do not apply 
to DNA databases. 
2.3. Forensic intelligence research based on DNA data
There are four types of scientific research that use DNA as a data source or as a research topic:
(1) Studies on the technique of DNA: loci, PCR, DNA reports (e.g., Malsch, Taverne, Elffers, de 
Keijser, & Kranendonk, 2013); different sampling techniques (e.g., Barash, Reshef, & Brauner, 2010); 
match probability and false positives (e.g., Kloosterman, Sjerps, & Quak, 2014; Meulenbroek, 2009; 
Penacino et al., 2003; Thompson, 2008); mixed profiles (e.g., J.-A. Bright, Curran, & Buckleton, 
2014); etc.
(2) Studies on the legal and ethical issues surrounding the use and exchange of DNA: privacy, 
legitimacy, protection of human rights, prevention of misuse, function creep, civil liberties, criteria 
for inclusion, social and ethical costs (e.g., Bramley, 2009; De Gorgey, 1990; Forensic Genetics 
Policy Initiative; GeneWatch UK, 2006; Levitt, 2007; McCartney, 2004; McCartney et al., 2011; 
Prainsack & Toom, 2013; Staley, 2005; Tracy & Morgan, 2000; Voultsos, Njau, Tairis, Psaroulis, & 
Kovatsi, 2011; Wallace, 2006; Wallace, Jackson, & Thibedeau, 2014; Williams & Johnson, 2004, 2005); 
public attitudes (e.g., Hochschild & Sen, 2012; Machado & Silva, 2014; McCartney et al., 2011); etc.
(3) Studies on forensic science: the use of DNA at case level compared to other more traditional 
forms of investigation, to learn more about resolving specific cases, clearance rates and (cost-)
effectiveness (e.g., Bond, 2007; Burrows & Tarling, 2004; Doleac, 2016; Martin, 2004; Ribaux, 
Baylon, Lock, et al., 2010; Ribaux & Margot, 2003; Roman et al., 2008; Rossy et al., 2013; Townsley, 
Smith, & Pease, 2005; Tracy & Morgan, 2000; Wilson et al., 2011); hit rates (e.g., Campbell, Pierce, 
Sharma, Feeney, & Fehler-Cabral, 2016); etc
(4) Studies on forensic intelligence: the use of DNA for criminological research to learn more 
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about criminal behaviour and the broader criminal context.4
In this dissertation, category (4) is of specific interest. A review of the scientific literature reveals that 
there is not much research available that uses a DNA database to study crime and offending behaviour. 
Below, three studies that can be seen as the beginnings of DNA-based criminological research are 
discussed. The three studies made use of the UK National DNA Database (NDNAD), which was set up 
in 1995 and was the first national forensic DNA database in the world. Only five years later, Wiles and 
Costello (2000) published the first study (partially) based on data from the NDNAD.
• Research on offender mobility
Wiles and Costello (Costello & Wiles, 2001; Wiles & Costello, 2000) integrated three different data 
sources in their study of the mobility of high-volume offenders in and around Sheffield: geocoded 
police-recorded crime data, the NDNAD, and offender interviews. They explained the use of the 
NDNAD to study the travel patterns of offenders, irrespective of whether they are known to the 
police or not. The main finding of the researchers was that most offender movements are relatively 
short.
• Research on criminal careers
Leary and Pease (2003) used data from the NDNAD over a 19-month period from one police force 
area (West Midlands) to study criminal careers. They stated that the number of crime scene samples 
submitted to the NDNAD increased in that period, whereas the number of resulting matches with 
offenders already in the database stagnated. They concluded from this that the population of active 
offenders is a fast-evolving group. Many offenders recorded in the NDNAD no longer offended, 
whereas many of the active offenders may have been ‘newcomers’ not yet present in the database.
Taking this finding a step further and integrating the criminal career literature stating that offenders 
are more generalists than specialists, implications for DNA retention policies arise, according to 
Leary and Pease: in a fast-changing, versatile offender population, DNA sampling from offenders 
as well as from crime scenes should not only be expanded to a wide range of offences but should 
be taken at the first available opportunity. Subsequent studies by Tseloni and Pease (2011) and 
Kazemian et al. (2011) also focused on DNA retention. These authors did not use a DNA database 
to study criminal behaviour as such; instead, they used findings from criminal career research to 
devise an evidence-based policy on DNA profile retention. 
4 Although the study of how (certain types of) criminal behaviour could be influenced by a person’s genes is part of the 
fourth type of research, the study of the genetic links to criminal behaviour is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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• Research on offender specialization
Townsley, Smith and Pease (Townsley et al., 2005, 2006) used the NDNAD to study the criminal 
careers of offenders, and more specifically offender specialization. A central research question 
is ‘What other types of crime do offenders committing a serious offence also commit?’ For this 
purpose they compared crime scene samples from all solved serious cases ((attempted) murder, 
manslaughter, sexual offences, rapes, and various types of burglary) within the Metropolitan Police 
Service jurisdiction for the year 2003 with all profiles in the NDNAD. Eleven per cent generated 
a match with an offender already stored in the NDNAD, indicating offender versatility that is in 
accordance with criminal career research.
It is notable that other researchers referring to (one of) these studies have paid little (e.g., Fox, 2010) or 
no (e.g., Westerberg, Grant, & Bond, 2007) attention to the fact that the researchers used DNA profiles 
as a data source. In all probability, this is due to the fact that the researchers making use of the NDNAD 
studied the entire offender population, without making a specific distinction between known and unknown 
offenders. The use of DNA had no impact on the interpretation of the results, as the researchers made 
statements about the entire offender population. Two other studies do make this distinction: Lammers 
and colleagues (Lammers, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Lammers & Bernasco, 2013; Lammers et al., 2012), who 
used the Dutch DNA database; and Jeuniaux and colleagues (Jeuniaux et al., 2018; Jeuniaux et al., 2016), 
who used the Belgian National Genetic database (NGDB). These researchers highlighted the specific 
‘added value’ that DNA databases can bring to a study of unknown offenders, and its importance for 
criminological research.
• Research on probability of arrest
Using the Dutch DNA database to compare arrested and non-arrested offenders, Lammers 
and colleagues (Lammers, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Lammers & Bernasco, 2013; Lammers et al., 2012) 
studied the characteristics of offending behaviour that could influence the probability of being 
arrested. Five crime types were analysed: violent crimes, sex offences, burglary, theft and theft of/
from a car. The researchers concluded that: “The more crimes an offender commits, the greater the 
probability that he will be arrested, specialized offenders have a smaller probability of being arrested 
than generalists, and as the number of police regions in which an offender commits his crimes increases 
his probability of being arrested decreases” (Lammers, 2013, p 98).
• Research on co-offending networks
Jeuniaux et al. (2016) used the NGDB to study co-offending networks. They performed a network 
analysis on the more than 60,000 genetic profiles stored in the database in 2014. Both the forensic 
profiles and the reference profiles were integrated in the analysis. A total of 445 networks were 
identified and described in terms of the number of people, the judicial district and the types 
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of crime involved. The operational use of network intelligence is also discussed. Networks of 
particular interest are those that are neither completely identified (i.e., only containing reference 
profiles of identified suspects or offenders) nor completely unidentified (i.e., only containing 
forensic profiles), because the likelihood of identifying unknown offenders is increased when they 
are linked to known offenders.
In other research based on the NGDB, Jeuniaux et al. (2018) studied the criminal career of 7,535 
offenders. In total 17,887 crimes were involved. Again, both the unknown forensic profiles and the 
known reference profiles were integrated in the analysis. Although the researchers acknowledged 
in both studies the selectivity of the DNA data and suggested that future research should make 
a comparison with other data such as police-recorded crime data, they clearly emphasized the 
unique feature of DNA databases – that both known and unknown offenders can be studied.
The empirical studies conducted for this dissertation – on the validity of DNA databases (De Moor, 
Vandeviver, & Vander Beken, 2018a), on serial co-offending behaviour (De Moor et al., 2018b) and 
on missing data in offender networks – also belong in this overview. These three studies will be 
extensively discussed later in this dissertation.
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3. Research objective and research questions
Forensic DNA databases offer the opportunity to extend forensic intelligence to unknown offenders of 
crimes registered in police databases. In the previously mentioned study by Wiles and Costello (Costello 
& Wiles, 2001; Wiles & Costello, 2000) forensic DNA data was used to supplement other (police) data. The 
researchers used both reference profiles of known offenders and forensic profiles of unknown offenders. 
They did not distinguish between the two types of profile. The researchers therefore made statements 
about the entire offender population, without being able to prove any difference between known and 
unknown offenders. Lammers (2013) explicitly made this distinction, and in her research on probability 
of arrest found a (limited) difference between known and unknown offenders. However, she only used 
DNA data to make statements about both known and unknown offenders. DNA data represent only 
a proportion of all offenders, whether known or unknown, because not every crime registered in the 
police database provides DNA profiles that are stored in DNA databases. Therefore, DNA databases only 
contain data on certain crimes, and thus do not include all offenders. Using only a DNA database to study 
offenders and their offending behaviour can therefore give a distorted picture.
In the (limited) research that has so far used a DNA database as data source, too little attention has been 
paid to the question of whether such databases are suitable for criminological research. The selectivity 
of the data source is usually mentioned, but not examined further. However, it is important to establish 
which unknown offenders and which crimes are actually stored in a DNA database, before starting 
research that examines the difference between the behaviour and characteristics of known and unknown 
offenders.
This brings us seamlessly to the goal of this dissertation, which is to assess the usability of DNA databases 
as a data source for criminological research. The resulting central research question is:
How can DNA databases contribute to the study of unknown offenders and  
their criminal behaviour?
The research question is operationalized by evaluating the specific characteristic weakness and strength 
of DNA databases as a source of criminological research: the selectivity of the source versus the ability 
to study (links between) unknown offenders and their offending behaviour. This results in four research 
questions that are explained below and are schematically presented in Table 3.
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3.1. Selectivity
Generally, all the crimes in a DNA database are also included in police-recorded crime data. Conversely, 
however, this is not the case. As already mentioned, only a minority of all registered crimes is represented 
in a DNA database, as not every crime scene is swabbed for DNA, and not every crime type provides 
suitable DNA profiles. Crimes such as money laundering, for example, are generally not represented in 
DNA databases. Before a DNA profile can be stored in a DNA database, it must pass various selection 
processes. The answers to the first research question provide an overview of these selection processes.
Q 1: Which actors and factors have an impact on the selectivity of DNA databases?
Because of its selectivity, a DNA database is only a ‘sample’ of all crimes stored in a police dataset. 
Before a DNA database can be used as a criminological data source, it is therefore important to question 
the representativeness of this sample. Criminologists frequently use police-recorded crime data and, 
although it is also selective, researchers generally regard it as a valid data source. Therefore, the second 
research question weighs the validity of DNA databases against the validity of police-recorded crime 
data. Since the potential of DNA databases lies specifically in the study of unknown offenders and their 
behaviour, the research question is limited to unsolved crimes.
Q 2: Are DNA databases less valid than police-recorded crime databases  
for the study of unsolved crimes?
Both of these research questions are answered in the second part of this dissertation. The first chapter, 
which reviews legislation, literature and information on the actors involved, explores which actors and 
factors have an impact on the selectivity of the DNA database used in this study (i.e., the Belgian National 
Genetic Database). In the subsequent chapter these findings are tested in an empirical study in which the 
validity of this DNA database is evaluated by comparing the spatial distribution of unsolved crimes in the 
DNA data with police-recorded crime data from the Belgian General Police Database. 
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3.2. Networks of unknown offenders and their crimes
Although DNA data contain fewer crimes than police-recorded crime data, DNA databases have specific 
advantages that can make a fundamental contribution to the study of crime and criminal behaviour: 
the ability to study unknown offenders and their (serial and co-)offending behaviour. Moreover, by 
integrating police-recorded crime data and DNA data, links between known and unknown offenders can 
be identified, which is not possible with any other data source. This also offers new research possibilities, 
as it is very unlikely that known and unknown offenders are two completely separate groups.
The question that arises from these opportunities is whether a different picture of crime emerges if 
the study is based on both police-recorded crime data and DNA data compared to the crime picture 
only arising from police-recorded crime data. As these two types of database store information on both 
crimes and offenders, the picture can be studied on both these levels, resulting in two different research 
questions:
Q 3: To what extent does the crime picture change when unsolved crimes  
are included in a network analysis?
Q 4: To what extent does the offender profile change when unknown offenders 
are included in a network analysis?
These two research questions are answered in the third part of this dissertation, using an integrated 
dataset in which police-recorded crime data are supplemented with DNA data. Both research questions 
are answered using a network analysis of two case studies, at the level of the crime and the level of the 
offender.
— 23 —
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 










Which actors and 
factors have an 
impact on the 
selectivity of DNA 
databases?
Are DNA databases 
less valid than 
police-recorded 
crime databases 
for the study of 
unsolved crimes?
To what extent 




included in a 
network analysis?





are included in a 
network analysis?
Unit of analysis Registered crime: Unsolved crimes
Registered crime:










DNA data and 
police-recorded 
crime data
DNA data and 
police-recorded 
crime data









Validity of DNA as 








crime data as a 
standard against 
which the validity of 
DNA is weighed
Police-recorded 
crime data are 
supplemented with 
information from 
the DNA database 
that is only available 
in the DNA 
database
Police-recorded 
crime data are 
supplemented with 
information from 
the DNA database 
that is only available 
in the DNA 
database
Part of dissertation Part 2 – Chapter 6 Part 2 – Chapter 7 Part 3 – Chapter 9 Part 3 – Chapter 10
— 24 —
4. Data and methods
Two types of databases are used in this dissertation: police-recorded crime data and DNA data. The 
police-recorded crime data are extracted from the Belgian General Police Database (ANG – in Dutch: 
Algemene Nationale Gegevensbank). This database is the main source of nationwide crime statistics 
in Belgium (Van Daele & Vander Beken, 2011). All reported and detected crimes are registered in this 
database. The Belgian General Police Database contains, inter alia, information on crimes, offenders, 
modus operandi and victims. The DNA data are extracted from the Belgian National Genetic Database 
(NGDB), and includes a proportion of all crimes stored in the Belgian General Police Database. The NGDB 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
4.1. Data collection approval
The fulfilment of this dissertation relied on access to both the NGDB and the Belgian General Police 
Database. Requests to obtain and analyse DNA data and police-recorded crime data were submitted to 
the relevant judicial authorities, the federal police, and to the DNA Index System service (DIS) of the 
National Institute for Forensic Science and Criminology (NICC/INCC – in Dutch: Nationaal Instituut voor 
Criminalistiek en Criminologie), which manages the NGDB. 
The 1999 DNA Law5 requires the DIS service to comply with strict data access control of the NGDB. 
Because of this, and in order to comply with the law of 8 December 1992 on the protection of privacy, 
the advice of the Belgian Commission for the Protection of Privacy (CPP) was sought. An authorization 
application to the Sectoral Committee for the Federal Government did not appear to apply. A charter 
of trust between Ghent University (UGent) as receiver of the data and the NICC/INCC as provider of 
the data was drawn up in which the UGent declared it would use the provided DNA data only in the 
framework of the Be-Gen project and in the context of this dissertation that falls within the bounds of 
the Be-Gen project. The DIS staff extracted all crimes that met the selection criteria, which are presented 
in the next section.
Regarding the police-recorded crime data, a declaration of subsequent processing of coded personal 
data was submitted at the CPP. Permission was received from the General Commissioner of the Federal 
Police to access the Belgian General Police Database. The Directorate of Police information and ICT 
resources (in Dutch: DRI – Directie van de politionele informatie en de ICT-middelen) defined the practical 
modalities of the data access. An internship at the Central Directorate of the Fight Against Serious and 
5 Belgian DNA law of 1999, discussed in Chapter 6.
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Organized Crime (in Dutch: DGJ-DJSOC – Directie van de bestrijding van de zware en georganiseerde 
criminaliteit) was completed during the period 1 October 2015 to 31 January 2016. The internship offered 
the opportunity to obtain insight into the content and structure of the Belgian General Police Database. 
The Directorate’s staff extracted all the crimes that met our selection criteria (see 4.2.1).
Before the data from the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database was handed over to the 
researcher in the first half of 2016, an agreement between DIS and DGJ–DJSOC was made to provide the 
data in a coded manner. All crimes have a unique number (in Dutch: PV-nummer), and are registered in 
the NGDB and/or in the Belgian General Police Database by means of this unique number. The same key 
was used to encode this number in both datasets. This ensured that, although encoded, the information 
on a crime registered in both the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database could be combined. 




The same selection criteria were used for both the DNA data and the police-recorded crime data. 
Although both crimes and offenders are studied in this dissertation, the initial selection of data was 
based on registered crimes. Both the datasets used in this research link offenders to crimes, and each 
crime is registered using a specific PV number.
The crimes (i.e., PV numbers) selected for this study were committed in Belgium and registered in one 
of 27 judicial districts.6 Two important selection criteria were applied: the year in which the crime was 
committed (i.e., the year it was registered, derived from the PV number) and the type of crime. The 
NGDB was established in Belgium in 2002, and of course police-recorded crime data have been available 
for much longer, but this study was limited to crimes registered in 2010 to 2015 inclusive.
In the context of this dissertation, crime types were selected according to whether DNA traces could be 
found at the crime scene. Crimes such as, for example, money laundering or libel were not included, as 
they don’t produce DNA traces and therefore would not add value to this study. Four crime types were 
selected from the list of 90 official prevention codes used to register crimes in Belgium: aggravated 
burglary, violent theft, sexual offences and lethal violence Table 4. They were chosen because they were 
four of the top five most frequently occurring crimes in the national DNA database (representing, 
6 Until the reform of the judicial landscape in 2014, Belgium had 27 judicial districts. An increase in scale then reduced the 
number of districts from 27 to 12. In this dissertation, the old structure is used.
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respectively, numbers 1, 2, 3 and 57) at the time of the data request (Figure 2). Most of the profiles that 
are stored in relation to crimes with the prevention code 11 and 37 are of convicted offenders; while 
prevention codes 17 and 30 are mainly crime scene profiles (Duboccage, 2008; Jeuniaux et al., 2016).
Figure 2: Proportion of the four selected crime types in the NGDB (Jeuniaux, 2014)
7 Number 4 contains the group ‘unknown’.
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Table 4: Description of the four selected prevention codes
Prevention code Description
11 Violent theft:
Theft through violence or threats





Theft through burglary, climbing in or false keys
Theft through burglary of domestic residence 
Attempted theft through burglary, climbing in or false keys
Car theft through breaking in, climbing in or false keys
Theft of bicycle or motorbike through burglary, climbing in or false keys
Theft from garage
Raid




Manslaughter to facilitate theft
Attempted murder or attempted manslaughter
Genocide law – law of universal jurisdiction
Poisoning (Articles 392, 394 and 397 of the Belgian Criminal Code)
Intentional administration of harmful substances resulting in accidental death 











Obscene movies, prints, objects or books
Paedophilia
Trafficking in human beings – sexual exploitation (Article 433quinquies §1, 1 ° SWB)
Pimping of minors
Child pornography




The DNA data and the police-recorded crime data were used to answer three of the four research 
questions (Q 2–4). A specific data selection was made for each research question, and these are explained 
in more detail in Parts 2 and 3. This section provides a general overview of the available data, after data 
cleaning. The DNA dataset and the police-recorded crime dataset (hereafter ‘police dataset’) described 
below contain all recorded crimes between 2010 and 2015 for the four selected crime types. In other 
words, no distinction was made between solved and unsolved crimes and the offenders involved.
4.2.2. The DNA dataset 
The provided DNA dataset contains 25,492 crimes. The crime rate in 2015 appears to be notably lower 
than in the other years in both datasets. Although there was a generally determined crime drop in most 
advanced countries in that year (Aebi & Linde, 2010; Farrell, Tilley, & Tseloni, 2014), another explanation 
for this phenomenon is that, at the time of the data extraction in March 2016, not all of the 2015 crimes 
had been processed by the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database. 
Aggravated burglary is by far the most common category in the DNA dataset (62.36%). The second, much 
smaller, category is violent theft (22.26%), followed by sexual offences (11.51%) and lethal violence (3.87%) 
(Table 5).
Table 5: Number of registered crimes, per year and per crime type, in the DNA dataset
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total %
11 1,160 1,235 1,255 957 745 323 5,675 22.26
17 2,410 3,160 3,807 3,255 2,190 1,076 15,898 62.36
30 166 224 160 187 159 90 986 3.87
37 670 676 613 513 322 139 2,933 11.51
Total 4,406 5,295 5,835 4,912 3,416 1,628 25,492
% 17.28 20.77 22.89 19.27 13.40 6.39 100
There is a big difference between judicial districts in terms of the crime level. Hasselt has the highest 
crime level at 17.10% and Arlon the lowest at 0.26% (mean = 3.70, standard deviation (S.D.) = 4.42). Hasselt 
(17.10%), Antwerp (15.19%), and Brussels (11.51%) are the only judicial districts in the DNA dataset with a 
crime rate of at least 10%. Verviers, Ypres, Veurne, Eupen, Neufchâteau, Dinant, Marche-en-Famenne and 
Arlon each account for less than 1% of the total crime count in the DNA dataset (Figure 3).
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4.2.3. Police dataset
The police dataset contains far more crimes (N = 1,186,061) than the DNA dataset (N = 25,492) (Table 6). As 
in the DNA dataset, the crime rate in 2015 appears to be notably lower than in the other years.
Aggravated burglary is also the biggest crime category (83.07%) in this dataset, followed by violent theft 
(11.43%) and sexual offences (5.02%). Lethal violence accounts for only 0.48% of all registered crimes. 
Table 6: Number of registered crimes, per year and per crime type, in the police dataset
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total %
11 22,892 26,442 25,395 22,218 21,008 17,555 135,510 11.43
17 173,229 182,127 179,742 169,549 163,892 116,770 985,309 83.07
30 904 995 988 951 980 849 5,667 0.48
37 10,236 10,651 10,098 10,679 10,459 7,452 59,575 5.02
Total 207,261 220,215 216,223 203,397 196,339 142,626 1,186,061
% 17.47 18.57 18.23 17.15 16.55 12.03 100
As in the DNA dataset, there is a big variance between the crime rates in the different judicial districts. 
The highest crime level is 26.39% (Brussels) and the lowest is 0.33% (Eupen) (mean = 3.70, S.D. = 5.32). 
Brussels (26.39%) and Antwerp (10.90%) are the only judicial districts with a crime rate of at least 10%. 
Oudenaarde, Arlon, Marche-en-Famenne, Neufchâteau, Ypres, Veurne and Eupen each account for less 
than 1% of the total crime count (Figure 3). There is also a difference in ranking between the crime rates in 
the different districts in the DNA dataset and the police-recorded crime dataset. This difference will be 












































































































Figure 3: Percentage of registered crimes per judicial district in the DNA dataset and police dataset
4.3. Data limitations
As discussed above (see 2.2), each type of data source has particular advantages and disadvantages. 
However, there are also other restrictions that apply specifically to the data used in this dissertation.
First, the available data has a high degree of aggregation on two levels, which can be attributed 
to the fact that the research is based on secondary data. The first level applies to the temporal and 
spatial aggregation of the data. Partly because information about the location and the time of a crime 
is not important for the operation of the NGDB, the information stored about these features is limited 
(Jeuniaux et al., 2018). The NGDB only stores the year and judicial district in which the crime was 
registered. The Belgian General Police Database stores much more detailed spatiotemporal information, 
often referring to the exact time and location of the crime. However, due to privacy concerns, only 
aggregated spatiotemporal information was received from the Belgian General Police Database: the year 
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and the judicial district8 in which the crime was registered. Criminological research has demonstrated 
that the same dataset aggregated at a different spatial and/or temporal level can lead to different results 
(Linning, Andresen, & Brantingham, 2016; Ratcliffe, 2004b; Steenbeek & Weisburd, 2015). Especially high 
aggregated levels, as applied in our research, may hide variation between months or census tracts, for 
example. At the spatial level, this is called the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) (Openshaw, 1984; 
Ratcliffe, 2004b), which can be interpreted as a geographic manifestation of the ecological fallacy (Waller 
& Gotway, 2004, p. 104). However, the aggregated data may not be an issue in this dissertation for two 
reasons. First, this study focuses on the spatiotemporal variation between, rather than within, the DNA 
and police datasets – i.e. the potential difference between the two datasets, irrespective of the level of 
aggregation, rather than the spatiotemporal distribution of crime. Second, the judicial district level is a 
particularly suitable spatial unit of analysis as DNA retention policies and police priorities are (partly) 
made at this level. This will become clear in the next part.
A large degree of aggregation also applies at the level of the crime types being studied. Not all of the 
crimes that fall under a selected prevention code are eligible for inclusion in the DNA database. For 
example, the category of ‘sexual offences’ includes voyeurism or offensive films, prints, objects or books. 
Therefore, the relative importance of DNA may be underestimated, as several crimes may be integrated 
in the analyses for which no DNA profiles can exists.
Second, our analysis is restricted to a small number of crime types, albeit these are the four most 
frequently recorded crime types in the NGDB. Expanding the research to all crime types included in 
the NGDB, such as drug-related crimes, could reveal other results. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, 
the crimes stored in the NGDB are limited to particular types. Crimes without a real crime scene (e.g., 
financial or internet crimes) or obvious crime scene (e.g., crimes in public places, such as shoplifting), for 
example, cannot be represented in a DNA database. This third limitation is in the same line as the second 
limitation mentioned here. Both point to the selectivity of the DNA database, the impact of which is 
studied in the second part of this dissertation.
The networks that are identified may have been even larger and more dispersed if other crime types, such 
as drug use or organized crime, had been integrated into the analysis. This seems likely, as most offenders 
are generalists and do not limit themselves to committing only one type of crime (Leary & Pease, 2003; 
Nieuwbeerta, Blokland, Piquero, & Sweeten, 2011; Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003).
Third, DNA profiles extracted from crime scene samples are stored in the NGDB on the assumption 
that the DNA profile comes from (one of) the offender(s). However, it is not inconceivable that some 
8 One of the 27 former judicial districts.
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crime scene samples come from third parties, such as the victim or individuals who have entered the 
crime scene (e.g., police, medical personnel, etc.). However, police officers are trained in crime scene 
awareness and skills, and will collect only relevant DNA samples and prevent contamination (Lammers, 
2013; UNODC, 2009). Moreover, when searching for crime scene samples, the police make use of their 
knowledge and experience in order to reconstruct a crime (i.e., crime scene reconstruction or CSR). 
In CSR the central question is not what traces are present, but what could have happened. Different 
scenarios are taken into consideration that guide the police in their search for traces of the offender(s). 
Taking a reference sample from a third party in order to differentiate any traces of this non-suspect from 
those of the alleged offender(s) is expressly provided for in the Belgian DNA Law  of 2011 (Art. 44sexies 
SV, Belgisch Staatsblad, 2011a), although only limited use is made of this facility. In this dissertation, 
an extra measure against this limitation was taken by studying serial offending (Jeuniaux et al., 2016; 
Lammers, 2013). The probability that a person’s DNA profile is found at multiple crime locations, without 
this person being the offender, is very small indeed.
Finally, throughout this dissertation, the individuals stored in the NGDB and the Belgian General 
Police Database are systematically referred to as ‘offenders’. Except for the reference profiles stored 
in the NGDB, however, their status is ‘suspect’, since at the time of registration they will not have been 
convicted. Some may never be convicted because they are not proven guilty (i.e., individuals stored in the 
Belgian General Police Database) or because they are never caught and their guilt cannot be proved or 
disproved (i.e., individuals stored in the NGDB). However, this limitation is not unique to this dissertation 
and is shared by a lot of other criminological research into offenders and their offending behaviour based 
on police-recorded crime data.
Despite the weaknesses and uncertainties surrounding the (DNA) data, the use of both databases 
provides a unique opportunity not only to study offending patterns of both known and unknown 
offenders, but also to make links between the offenders and their crimes, irrespective of their status 
(known or unknown). 
4.4. Operationalization of the concepts used
4.4.1. Unknown offenders and unsolved crimes
In this dissertation, reference is often made to unknown offenders (as opposed to known offenders) and 
unsolved crimes (as opposed to solved crimes). Before explaining these terms, it is important to consider 
the distinction between the concepts identification and individualization, which are often used in forensic 
science. Identification refers to placing a trace in a restricted class (e.g., identifying a fluid as blood). 
Individualization refers to the person (or object) leaving this trace behind. According to Kirk, identification 
is not a goal as such, but it is a preliminary step to individualization (P. L. Kirk, 1963, p. 236).
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Taking this distinction into consideration, the concept of the unknown offender may have a different 
meaning depending on the reference frame: the NGDB or the Belgian General Police Database. A crime 
registered in the Belgian General Police Database committed by an unknown offender implies that the 
police could not individualize a single offender of that crime. The crime is detected by the police, but the 
offenders are not. As a result, no information is available about the offender(s) and the crime is unsolved. 
In other words, the name of the offender is not available. As soon as one offender has been detected 
and thus individualized, the crime will be referred to as a solved crime, even though there may be other 
unknown offenders involved.
Where in the Belgian General Police Database an unknown offender is the equivalent to the absence 
of an offender in the database, the NGDB contains information on unknown offenders. A DNA profile 
extracted from a sample found at a crime scene makes it possible to individualize an offender. This 
forensic profile is used to infer the presence of an undetected offender (Rossy & Morselli, 2018). So, 
even though the profile does not match with a reference profile of a previously convicted offender, for 
example, this unknown offender can still be individualized by his unique DNA profile. Although these 
unknown offenders can be linked to one or more crimes, these crimes remain unsolved as no offender can 
be arrested and prosecuted for the crime. 
4.4.2. Validity and representativity
Is the NGDB a valid source for studying unknown offenders and their crimes? Are the (unsolved) crimes 
stored in the NGDB representative of the (unsolved) crimes stored in the Belgian General Police Database? 
These are central questions in this dissertation. Therefore, it is important to clarify the concepts ‘validity’ 
and ‘representativity’.
Validity refers to the extent to which research actually measures what it intends to measure, and only 
that. It refers to the absence of systematic errors or bias (Golafshani, 2003; Pauwels, 2017). Validity can 
be seen as a measure of accuracy (Bloor & Wood, 2006). Translated to our research, the NGDB is a valid 
data source when it captures the unsolved crimes stored in the Belgian General Police Database. As 
will be demonstrated in the next part, different processes and actors influence the amount and type of 
forensic profiles stored in the NGDB. As a result, bias is not inconceivable.
Representativity is related to validity. The (unsolved) crimes stored in the NGDB are a sample of the 
(unsolved) crimes stored in the Belgian General Police Database. The question is whether the smaller 
sample (i.e., the NGDB) accurately reflects (represents) the larger population of interest (i.e., the Belgian 
General Police Database). 
— 34 —
4.4.3. Serial co-offending
Part 3 evaluates the NGDB’s usefulness for criminological research by studying serial co-offenders and 
their behaviour. Although one may intuitively have an idea of what serial offending and co-offending 
represents, a more detailed description is needed.
4.4.3.1. Serial offending
Research on serial offending is related to research on the criminal career. Criminal career literature 
approaches four components of offending behaviour longitudinally: the prevalence or the proportion 
of the population who commit crime, the frequency or the number of crimes an offender commits, the 
duration or the length of time between the first and last crime, and the seriousness of the crimes (Blumstein 
& Cohen, 1987; Piquero et al., 2003). Serial offenders are also called repeat offenders, persistent offenders or 
chronic offenders in the literature. Most research on serial offending relates to serial murder, serial rape 
and serial arson (Kocsis & Irwin, 1998).
Serial offending may be defined in relation to the number of victims of an offender, or the number of targets 
in the case of arson, for example. The minimum number of victims required varies across research, but 
three or four victims are common. Another way to define serial offending is by taking into account the 
number of crimes committed by a single offender (Kocsis & Irwin, 1998). Strictly speaking, an individual 
can be defined as a serial offender as soon as he has committed more than one crime. The higher this 
limit is, the lower the prevalence of serial offenders will be. Both these number-based definitions are 
influenced by a temporal criterion. Criminal career research indicates that a time lapse of even ten years 
without committing a crime is not exceptional, so the number of serial offenders will increase as the 
research period increases (Metcalfe & Baker, 2014). Short study periods may therefore underestimate 
the number of serial offenders. Many studies use a number-based definition of serial offending and 
conclude that only a relatively small proportion of offenders are responsible for a large share of all crimes. 
Finally, serial offending can be defined using a propensity approach. An offender may have psychological 
characteristics that drive him to re-offend. Therefore, offenders can be defined as serial offenders even if 
there is no evidence that they are responsible for more than one crime (Grapendaal & van Tilburg, 2002; 
Kocsis & Irwin, 1998; R. B. Santos, 2013).
In the context of this dissertation, a number-based definition of serial offending is applied: individuals 
committing more than one registered crime. These crimes may be limited to only one of the four selected 
crime types or may be a variety of these four types, committed in the time span of six years.
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4.4.3.2. Co-offending
According to van Mastrigt (2014), co-offending is not only a general but also a well-documented 
phenomenon, although most of the knowledge on co-offenders seems to be based on research on 
juvenile offenders (Felson, 2003). In the academic literature, there are several synonyms used for ‘co-
offending’, including accomplice offending, concurrent felonies, multiple offender crimes, companionate 
offences and joint offending (see for example Carrington, 2014; Cheatwood, 1980; DuRant, Cadenhead, 
Pendergrast, Slavens, & Linder, 1994; Juodis, Woodworth, Porter, & Ten Brinke, 2009; Reiss & Farrington, 
1991; Tontodonato, 1996; Wiles & Costello, 2000). Even ‘gangs’, ‘organized crime’ and ‘group offending’ 
are often cited in the context of co-offending, although there are some conceptual differences between 
those items (Carrington, 2014; Francis, Humphreys, Kirby, & Soothill, 2013; Reiss, 1988; Warr, 1996).
The most simplistic definition describes co-offending as more than one offender jointly conducting a 
crime at the same time and place (Carrington, 2014; Felson, 2003; Paternoster, 2014; Reiss, 1988; Weerman, 
2003; Weerman & Kleemans, 2002). Tremblay (1993, p. 20) defines co-offending more broadly: “The term 
co-offenders, … refers not only to the subset of an offender’s pool of accomplices but rather to all those other 
offenders he must rely on before, during and after the crime event in order to make the contemplated crime 
possible or worthwhile”. For example, advisers helping to prepare a burglary or buyers of the stolen goods 
are also co-offenders of the thief, according to Tremblay’s definition (Weerman, 2014). Furthermore, 
offenders do not always co-offend with all their delinquent acquaintances. Therefore, a distinction must 
be made between active ‘offending groups’ who have already committed crimes together and the broader 
‘accomplice networks’ consisting of potential co-offenders for future crimes (Warr, 1996).
In addition to the number of offenders, several other characteristics also define co-offending. Weerman 
described eight characteristics of co-offending (Weerman, 2003; pp. 399-401). First, there are three forms 
of offending: exclusive solo offending; mixed solo and co-offending; and exclusive co-offending. Most 
offenders can be classified in the second type, as they commit both joint and lone offences (Goldweber, 
Dmitrieva, Cauffman, Piquero, & Steinberg, 2011; Reiss, 1988; Reiss & Farrington, 1991; van Mastrigt, 2014). 
However, being a mixed offender does not mean they commit an equal amount of solo and co-offences. 
These offenders seem to have a preference, as they generally commit crimes either by themselves or 
with accomplices. Second, although most crime types can be committed by multiple offenders, the level 
of co-offending varies according to the type of offence. For example, burglary and robbery are typical 
co-offending crime types, in contrast to sex crimes (Carrington, 2014; Reiss & Farrington, 1991). Third, the 
prevalence of co-offending decreases with age, as it does for offending in general. This may be due to a 
change in the criminal population, with solo offenders carrying on and co-offenders stopping offending. 
Another explanation, which is confirmed by the research of Reiss & Farrington (1991), is that it is caused 
by a change in individual criminal careers: co-offenders act alone more as they get older. Fourth, co-
offending is usually incited by one of the co-offenders. Fifth, co-offending groups can range from clearly 
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defined criminal groups with a division of labour and different roles, to relatively loose alliances and 
networks (Weerman & Kleemans, 2002). However, more complex co-offending groups seem to be made 
up of more professional offenders. Sixth, the vast majority of co-offences are committed by offenders 
working in pairs (Carrington, 2014). Associations of four or more offenders is not rare in late childhood and 
early adolescence, but these groupings become smaller as the offenders get older (Warr, 1996). Seventh, 
co-offenders are relatively homogenous with regard to age, gender and crime experience (Carrington, 
2002; Reiss, 1988; Reiss & Farrington, 1991; van Mastrigt & Carrington, 2014; Warr, 1996). Eighth, the 
partnerships between different offenders can be temporary (only for one crime, for example) or more 
permanent in nature (Weerman & Kleemans, 2002). Except for more specialized groups, offenders do not 
usually commit multiple offences with the same co-offender (Reiss & Farrington, 1991). It is therefore not 
surprising that co-offenders often belong to multiple offending groups at the same time (Warr, 1996).
In this dissertation the basic definition of co-offending is used. A co-offender is defined as an individual 
who committed at least one registered crime together with one or more other offenders at the same time 
and place. The co-offenders in our research can therefore exhibit mixed solo and co-offending behaviour, 
or exclusive co-offending behaviour. Both the offending group and the accomplice network are taken 
into account. Taking both concepts – serial offending and co-offending – together, a serial co-offender is 
defined in this dissertation as an individual who has committed more than one registered crime, of which 
at least one crime was committed with another offender at the same time and place.
4.5. Methods
The various methods used in this dissertation are briefly explained below. All statistical analyses were 
performed using the R software environment (R Core Team, 2018). A detailed description of the statistical 
methods is provided in the relevant chapters of Parts 2 and 3. However, the method of ‘observations 
and interviews’ is only discussed in this introduction because of its importance throughout the entire 
dissertation.
4.5.1. Descriptive statistics
Basic descriptive statistics such as the sample size (in subgroups) and measures of dispersion and 
central tendency such as the mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation were computed in this 
dissertation. In addition, several other descriptive statistics were computed: the Jaccard index, normalized 
diversity indexes, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient.
Both the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient were developed to measure inequality of income or 
wealth but can be applied to any distribution (Bernasco & Steenbeek, 2017), including crime concentration 
across judicial districts, as in this dissertation (Chapter 7). The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz 
curve, which graphically presents the concentration of crime. A Gini coefficient of 0 indicates that every 
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judicial district has the same crime level (i.e., complete equality) and a value of 1 indicates that all crime 
is concentrated in only one district (i.e., complete inequality) (Bernasco & Steenbeek, 2017; Eck, Lee, O, 
& Martinez, 2017).
Normalized diversity indexes were computed to assess the spatial and temporal variability within the 
crime networks obtained in Chapter 9. The indexes range between 0 and 1. A value of zero indicates that 
there is no diversity as all crimes are committed within the same district/year. A value of one indicates 
that all crimes are evenly spread over the different possible districts/years (Mazerolle, Brame, Paternoster, 
Piquero, & Dean, 2000, pp. 1153-1154).
The Jaccard index measures similarity between two datasets. In this dissertation, the index is used to 
measure the similarity between crime networks present in the police-recorded crime data and crime 
networks present in an integrated dataset containing both police-recorded crime data and DNA data 
(Chapter 9). The minimum index is 0 (or 0%), which means that both datasets have no data points in 
common. The index reaches a value of 1 (or 100%) when there is perfect overlap of the two datasets 
(Simpson, Lyday, Hayasaka, Marsh, & Laurienti, 2013). 
4.5.2. Spatial point pattern test
The non-parametric spatial point pattern test (SPPT) was developed by Andresen (2009) specifically to 
test the similarity between the spatial point patterns in two datasets – a base dataset and a test dataset 
– within specified spatial units of analysis. In criminology, an SPPT is used to study the similarity of 
spatial crime levels at different spatial units (e.g., de Melo, Matias, & Andresen, 2015), over different 
time frames (e.g., Andresen, Linning, & Malleson, 2017), and/or between different crime types (e.g., 
Andresen & Linning, 2012). Several authors have also used an SPPT to evaluate spatial similarity between 
different data sources. Hibdon, Telep, and Groff (2016), for example, used an SPPT to study the spatial 
concentration and stability of drug activity in Seattle in police and emergency medical services data. 
Tompson, Johnson, Ashby, Perkins, and Edwards (2014) used an SPPT to study the spatial accuracy of open 
crime data compared with police-recorded crime data. In this study, the SPPT is used to examine spatial 
similarity between the crimes registered in the DNA dataset and the police dataset over the 27 judicial 
districts (Chapter 7). For every judicial district, a pairwise comparison is made of the percentages of 
crimes in the police dataset (i.e., the base dataset), and the DNA dataset (i.e., the test dataset). Therefore, 
the SPPT allows a validation of the representativeness of the unsolved crimes stored in the NGDB.
A fictional example illustrates the SPPT: 35% of all crime recorded in the police dataset was committed in 
Antwerp. According to the DNA dataset, 12% of all crime was committed in Antwerp. The SPPT compares 
these two relative frequencies with each other and indicates by means of a local S-index whether the 
difference between the two frequencies is significant. A local S-index is calculated for every judicial 
district or spatial unit. These local S-indices indicate whether the point count in a specific judicial district 
— 38 —
is lower in the base dataset (S-index = +1), higher (-1) or similar (0) compared to the test dataset. A global 
S-index provides insight into the similarity across all spatial units. The global S-index represents the 
percentage of judicial districts that have a similar spatial point pattern (local S-index = 0).
4.5.3. Social network analysis9
In their seminal work, Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 20) defined a social network as “a finite set or 
sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them”. These actors can be very diverse: individuals 
like school children or members of an activist group, but also companies, countries, websites, etc. The 
relations between these actors can be any type of tie that connects these actors: friendship, kinship or 
business transactions, for example. Translated to criminological research, the actors can be offenders 
linked by a co-offending relationship. In social network analysis (SNA) the focus is rather on the study of 
the relationships between the actors than on the characteristics of the actors themselves (e.g., gender 
or age).
Social network analysis can be used in two distinct ways: a formal approach or a structural approach 
(Rossy & Morselli, 2018; Vlaemynck, 2014). In the formal approach, the network is the dependent 
variable. The aim of the analysis is to describe the network structure and the position of the nodes in the 
network. Most network researchers apply this formal approach by describing the structure of various 
criminal groups, such as street gangs (McGloin, 2005) or the Hell’s Angels motorcycle club (Morselli, 
2009), for example. A formal social network analysis can also be applied to assess the characteristics that 
distinguish criminal networks from non-criminal networks (Papachristos, 2011).
In the structural approach, the network is the independent variable. The starting point of this approach 
is the interdependencies among actors, which have a significant impact on the behaviour of the actors. 
As such, the aim is to explain how groups relate to crime and criminal behaviour (Papachristos, 2011). 
The occurrence of crime can be explained by the characteristics of the individual actors (e.g., gender or 
age), and also by the relationships between the actors (Rossy & Morselli, 2018, p. 192). Or, as Papachristos 
(2011, p. 107) stated: “Gender might exert a direct effect on crime simply because women commit less crime 
than men, but the network approach would also be interested in how gender influences patterns of social 
relationships that, in turn, are responsible for the gender effect in crime”. The impact of groups on crime 
is also reflected in a number of criminological theories, such as the differential association theory by 
Sutherland (Sutherland & Cressey, 1960) and the self-control theory by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). 
In a nutshell, the differential association theory states that criminal attitudes, behaviours, values and 
motives are learned from associations with criminal others. According to the self-control theory, self-
9 For a general overview of SNA, see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Scott (2013). Bouchard and Malm (2016) and McGloin 
and Kirk (2010) described the use of network approaches in criminology. 
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control restrains people from committing crimes, and is learned from others.
In this dissertation, the formal approach to social network analysis is applied, as the aim is not to explain 
crime. Social network analysis is used to study the changes crime networks undergo when DNA data are 
integrated with police-recorded crime data (Chapters 9 and 10).
4.5.4. Observations and interviews
Knowledge about forensic DNA and the role that DNA plays in police research was limited at the start 
of this study. Studying the available (foreign) scientific literature, legislation or any other form of public 
information was not enough to fully understand the subject. For example, it soon became clear that 
the ‘theory’ that is publicly available is not always in line with what happens in ‘practice’ (for example, 
because of limited resources and time), or that there are differences between judicial districts regarding 
DNA retention policies. For these reasons, various observations and interviews were carried out.
A (descriptive) observation is extremely suitable for collecting information about a topic for which little 
knowledge is available or for collecting information that is not available in any other form (Mason, 2003; 
Zaitch, Mortelmans, & Decorte, 2009). In addition, an observation allows a multi-method strategy to be 
used: the observer can conduct interviews during the observations. These interviews can be scheduled 
but also spontaneous (Mason, 2003). A spontaneous interview allows researchers to respond to what 
they observe and offers the opportunity to immediately respond to issues that are unclear to them. 
Interviews can also be applied as a separate technique to gain insight into the knowledge, experiences 
and interpretations of people. As with the observation, by conducting an interview, information can be 
obtained that is difficult or impossible to obtain via another technique, such as surveys.
Various actors operating within the domain of forensic DNA were identified and contacted, and were 
asked to provide an explanation of their organization and operation, and the possibilities and limitations 
they experience during the performance of their duties, through an interview and/or observation. Five 
different DNA actors were selected who were involved in the process from the inclusion of DNA traces 
















Figure 4: Actors involved in the forensic DNA process
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The Central Directorate of the Technical and Scientific Police (DJT), the National DNA Cell, and the 
DIS service of the NICC/INCC were questioned using unstructured interviews (between October 2014 
and January 2015).10 Unstructured interviews are more informal than (semi-)structured interviews. The 
interviewers had no predetermined list of questions.11 Each interview started with the interviewee 
introducing their organization. The interviewee was given the opportunity to talk freely about what they 
thought was important about their organization (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The interviewers 
could ask additional questions during and after the presentation.
Two participant observations were conducted: one at the NICC/INCC’s DNA laboratory (27, 28 and 30 
October 2014), which is one of the seven accredited forensic DNA laboratory in Belgium,12 and one at 
the Laboratory of the Technical and Scientific Police (LTWP) of the judicial district of Ghent (2–15 March 
2015). A participant observer can adopt four different roles during an observation (Figure 5). These roles 
differ depending on whether or not the identity of the researcher is concealed and whether or not the 
researcher takes part in the activities of the setting that is being observed (Gold, 1958; Saunders et al., 
2009; Zaitch et al., 2009). During the observations at the DNA laboratory and the LTWP Ghent, the 
researcher took the role of observer as participant. The true identity and purpose of the researcher was 
known to all concerned. However, the role of the researcher was limited to observing the activities of 
the DNA laboratory and the LTWP Ghent, without taking part in the same way that the staff of these 
organizations did. In other words, the researcher did not carry out any crime scene investigation, or any 
other analysis in the DNA laboratory, for example. 
10 The DJT provide support to the LTWP, the magistrates and the police. For a description of the National Cell and the DIS 
service, see Chapter 6.
11 As these actors were relevant to all the partners of the Be-Gen project, the researchers of the VUB and the NICC jointly 
conducted the interviews.
12 There are seven DNA laboratories responsible for analysing reference profiles of suspects and crime scene profiles (traces) 
in Belgium. A German laboratory is responsible for analysing DNA from convicts and internees (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2017b).
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Figure 5: Typology of participant observation researcher roles (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 293)
The observations were limited to descriptive observations (as opposed to focused observations and 
selective observations, see Spradley, 2016). The short-term observations were no more than a first 
acquaintance with the DNA laboratory and the LTWP Ghent. It was important to understand their 
operation and organization as comprehensively as possible (Mortelmans, 2007; Spradley, 2016).
During the observation at the NICC/INCC laboratory, the researcher was able to observe the activities of 
the forensic experts: from investigating forensic physical evidence, to determining the DNA profile and 
its representation in a report. The observation at the LTWP Ghent offered insights into the work of the 
police during the following phases: (1) planning, organization and coordination of the work at the crime 
scene; (2) preservation of the crime scene and the evidence; (3) documentation of the crime scene, the 
evidence and activities at the scene; (4) recognition, recovery and preservation of physical evidence; and 
(5) transportation, storage and submission to the DNA lab (UNODC, 2009).
Although these observations are not recorded in this dissertation, these observations and interviews 
are considered necessary for answering the research questions. Both the interviews and observations 
broadened the knowledge of the researcher, and offered the context and background that are necessary 
for a thorough interpretation of the findings of this dissertation.
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5. Structure of this report 
This dissertation has four parts: an introduction, two empirical parts addressing the four research 
questions, and a conclusion. Part 1 (Chapters 1–5) has provided a description of the background of the 
study, the relevance of forensic intelligence, the resulting research objective and research questions, and 
the data and methods used in the dissertation.
The first two research questions, regarding the selectivity of the DNA data, are answered in Part 2 
(Chapters 6–7). Chapter 6 starts with some background information on forensic DNA and DNA databases 
before explaining the legal framework and other mechanisms and actors that all have an impact on the 
content, and thus selectivity, of the NGDB. Chapter 7 deals with the validity of forensic DNA data in the 
study of the (spatial) behaviour of unknown offenders, given the fact that DNA data are only a subset of 
the crimes committed by unknown offenders stored in police-recorded crime data. Therefore, a study is 
made of the concentration and spatial similarity of detected but unsolved crimes in police-recorded crime 
data (N = 181,483) and DNA data (N = 1,913) over 27 Belgian judicial districts for the four selected crime 
types. Spatial similarity is established for certain crime types in some districts. This offers opportunities 
for DNA data to be used to study unknown offenders’ spatial offending behaviour. 
Part 3 (Chapters 8–10) focuses on the advantages of using DNA databases to study and link unknown 
offenders and their crimes. The importance of a network approach in criminology is explained in Chapter 
8. The central question in Chapter 9 is whether unsolved registered crimes have different features from 
solved registered crimes. Therefore, both unsolved crimes from the DNA database and solved crimes 
from the police-recorded crime data are integrated to study serial co-offending behaviour. The focus is 
on the changes the networks of crimes that are obtained from police-recorded crime data undergo when 
integrated with data from unknown offenders in the DNA database. The results show that an integrated 
dataset reveals more and larger networks of crimes with a larger spatiotemporal spread, compared to the 
police-recorded crime data only.
Chapter 10 studies the possible difference between unknown and known offenders by assessing the 
missing data problem in criminal network analysis. Missing data are pertinent to criminal networks due 
to the hidden nature of crime. If one offender (i.e., ‘node’) or link between two offenders (i.e., ‘edge’) 
is missing, the picture of the network may be distorted. Generally, researchers evaluate the impact of 
incomplete network data by extracting or adding nodes and/or edges from a known network. Statistics 
on this reduced or completed network are then compared with the statistics from the true network. In 
this chapter, an important advancement over previous missing data studies is made by integrating police-
recorded crime data with DNA data. As a result, the network only containing known offenders from the 
police-recorded crime data is extended with unknown offenders from the DNA database. Statistics from 
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the integrated dataset (i.e., ‘true network’) are compared with the statistics from the police-recorded 
crime data, which only contain known offenders (i.e., ‘reduced network’). 
The fourth and final part (Chapters 11–17) presents the conclusions of the dissertation. The answers to 
each of the four research questions are summarized, and a broader discussion on the results is provided. 
Policy implications and future research opportunities are formulated, and the specific strengths and 
limitations of the dissertation are outlined.
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PART 2:  
THE SELECTIVITY OF  
DNA DATABASES
“Nonetheless, it is a fact that forensic data are collected at a minority of crime scenes, 
as shown in Williams (2004). To what extent could an accurate description of a popu-
lation be based on such a small sample? Of themselves, small samples are not much 
of a problem if the sample is representative […].”
(Tilley & Townsley, 2009, p. 375)
Part 2 reviews the impact of the selectivity of DNA databases on scientific research. The first chapter 
examines the actors and factors that may influence the composition of the NGDB. This chapter has a 
theoretical approach. These findings are empirically tested in the second chapter, and the validity of the 




PART 2: THE SELECTIVITY OF DNA DATABASES 
6. Forensic DNA and DNA databases
This chapter briefly explains forensic DNA and DNA databases. It gives an overview of the elements that 
make up DNA databases, and in particular the NGDB, both in terms of the nature and the number of the 
stored profiles. The aim is to answer the following research question:
Q 1: Which actors and factors have an impact on the selectivity of DNA databases?
6.1. Forensic DNA13 
“Nul ne peut agir avec l’intensité qui suppose l’action criminelle sans laisser des marques 
multiples dans son passage, tantôt le malfaiteur a laisse sur les lieux des marques de son 
activité, tantôt par une action inverse, il a emporté sur son corps ou sur ses vêtements les 
indices de son séjour ou de son geste.” (Locard, 1923)
Edmond Locard’s famous exchange principle dates from long before Alec Jeffreys discovered in 1984 
that each individual has a unique DNA pattern, a genetic fingerprint (Jeffreys, Wilson, & Thein, 1985). 
Nevertheless, DNA appears to be a textbook example for applying Locard’s principle, as everywhere 
people go they unknowingly and unintentionally shed hair, skin cells, saliva, and thus DNA. DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) comprises the hereditary material present in human cells. DNA is arranged in 
two connected chains (i.e., a double helix) containing four chemical bases: adenine (A), guanine (G), 
cytosine (C), and thymine (T) (Figure 6). The sequence of the bases determines how the human body is 
built and maintained. Except for identical twins, the genetic material is unique to each individual and 
remains unchanged throughout their life. Only a small percentage of DNA is responsible for hereditary 
properties (i.e., the genotype) such as hair and eye colour or disease patterns. The externally observable 
characteristics (e.g., black hair, blue eyes) corresponding to this genotype are called the phenotype.
In order to protect the privacy of those involved, only non-coding DNA or ‘junk DNA’ can be examined 
as part of a criminal investigation in Belgium. Non-coding DNA, according to current knowledge, does 
not determine hereditary properties. The only external feature that may be identified by DNA analysis 
is gender. The European Union recommends that member states use the European Standard Set (ESS) 
in forensic DNA analysis. This consensus makes it easy to compare DNA profiles at both national and 
international levels. The ESS comprises 12 specific particles of non-coding DNA that have to be tested, 
13 For more information on forensic genetics, see Meulenbroek (2009) (in Dutch) and Goodwin, Linacre, and Hadi (2007).
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called loci.14 An analysis of these loci results in a combination of numbers and letters, an alphanumeric 
code unique to a particular individual (Goodwin et al., 2007; Meulenbroek, 2009; Stappers et al., 2016).
 
If two genetic profiles are compared and the profiles are different, then it is certain that the profiles 
originate from different people. However, when two samples result in the same profile it is not absolutely 
certain that they originate from the same person. As more loci are examined, the probability that two 
individuals have the same DNA profile decreases rapidly (and also the number of false positive matches 
(van der Beek, 2011)). The probability is statistically calculated using population studies. The quality of 
the sample will influence the interpretation. For example, a match between a reference profile and a 
forensically simple profile (i.e., coming from only one offender) will yield a higher probability than when a 
match is found between a reference profile and a forensically mixed profile (i.e., coming from at least two 
individuals) (NICC/INCC, 2014). When a match is found between a reference profile and a simple profile, 
it is generally at least one billion times more likely that the profiles come from the same individual, than 
that the trace is from an unknown person randomly taken from the European population unrelated to the 
donor of the reference profile (Jeuniaux et al., 2015).
Figure 6: Structure of DNA (Genetics Home Reference, 2017)
14 Council Resolution C296/1 of 30 November 2009 on the exchange of DNA analysis results.
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6.2. DNA databases
DNA profiling techniques were first developed in the mid-1980s (Lynch, 2003), and in 1992 the European 
Council published a non-binding recommendation on the use of DNA analysis within the framework 
of the criminal justice system (Council of Europe, 1992). In 1995 the United Kingdom National DNA 
Database (NDNAD) was established, becoming the first national forensic DNA database in the world 
(Martin, Schmitter, & Schneider, 2001; Wallace et al., 2014). Since then, many countries have created their 
own national DNA database (Voultsos et al., 2011).15 According to the DNA Interpol Survey published 
at the end of 2012, however, only 63 countries had a national database for genetic profiles, whereas 
135 were already using DNA for judicial investigation (Hallauer, 2014). National legislation regarding 
the collection, storage and use of DNA samples and DNA profiles in criminal cases varies considerably 
(Bramley, 2009; F. Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013). For example, the NDNAD is one of the largest and 
most comprehensive DNA database, while the legislation of other countries such as Belgium, France or 
the Netherlands have more restrictive effects on their DNA databases (F. Santos et al., 2013).
The establishment of DNA databases means that, in addition to collecting DNA, the profiles are also 
stored for a specific time.16 The reasons for collecting DNA profiles may be different from the reasons 
why they are stored. GeneWatch UK 17 explains this as follows: “The purpose of entering an individual’s DNA 
profile on the Database is to see if they are a potential suspect for a past crime. … The purpose of retaining 
an individual’s DNA profile on a database is to treat them as suspects for any future crime” (GeneWatch UK, 
2006, pp. 2-3). When creating and expanding a DNA database, it is therefore important to always weigh 
up the rights and privacy of the individual against the need for crime prevention, crime detection and 
public protection (GeneWatch UK, 2006; Home Office, 2009; Kazemian et al., 2011; McCartney, 2004; 
Staley, 2005; Tseloni & Pease, 2011). In doing so, one should consider “the presumption of innocence; data 
protection principles; ethical issues; human rights arguments including the right to privacy, as well as concerns 
about overbearing surveillance powers and the ‘database state’ ” (McCartney, 2012, p. 257). Although the 
debate about the storage and retention regime mainly relates to reference profiles, similar questions can 
be asked for all types of profiles. Most DNA databases only store forensic profiles and reference profiles. 
However, other types of profiles may be included for different reasons. The DNA of those who are directly 
or indirectly involved in the detection, analysis and processing of traces found at crime scenes may be 
15 For an overview of the origins of the different national DNA databases, see the publications of Martin (Martin, 2004; 
Martin et al., 2001; Schneider & Martin, 2001). 
16 For further information and discussion on the debate about whose profiles (i.e., which specific crimes) should be stored 
in a DNA database and for how long, see for example Kazemian et al. (2011), Tseloni and Pease (2011), M. E. Smith (2006) and 
Chapter 15 discussing future research possibilities. 
17 GeneWatch UK is a not-for-profit policy research and public interest group that monitors developments in genetic 
technologies. See: http://www.genewatch.org.
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stored in order that they can be excluded as donor of a forensic profile. Profiles of missing persons or 
their blood relatives and unidentified bodies may be included in a (separate) DNA database in order to 
try to identify bodies and remains.
6.3. The Belgian National Genetic Database
Before the Belgian National Genetic Database (NGDB) can be evaluated as a data source, it is important 
to understand the relevant legal framework, how it operates and what it contains (see for details Jeuniaux 
et al., 2015; Renard, Duboccage, Jeuniaux, & Vanvooren, 2013).
6.3.1. Legal framework
This section elucidates both national and international legislation that influence the creation, operation 
and content of the NGDB. 
6.3.1.1. National legislation 
Although DNA was used in criminal cases in Belgium during the 1990s, DNA testing was only legally 
regulated on 22 March 1999 by the law on the identification procedure via DNA research in criminal 
cases. This law adds a new article to the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that comparative DNA 
research may only compare the DNA profiles of detected or acquired human cell material in order to 
directly or indirectly identify persons involved in a crime (Art. 44ter. § 1., Belgisch Staatsblad, 1999).
It is noteworthy in the framework of this comparative DNA research that the law established two DNA 
databases within the NICC/INCC: the ‘criminalistics’ database, and the ‘convicted offenders’ database 
(Belgisch Staatsblad, 1999, 2011a). Together they form the NGDB. Traces found when a crime is being 
investigated are stored in the criminalistics database. The convicted offenders database contains the DNA 
profiles of individuals convicted or interned for the offences defined by law (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2011b). 
Therefore, the database includes both identified profiles (i.e., profiles of offenders) and unidentified or 
unknown profiles (i.e., profiles of traces found at crime scenes).
In 201118 the legislation was comprehensively amended to improve and simplify the use of DNA in 
criminal cases. In addition, the conditions under which DNA profiles can be stored and compared were 
extended. First, the list of crimes for which an offender’s DNA profile can be stored in the database 
was supplemented with a number of new crimes, such as terrorist crimes and genocide. Second, this 
list was expanded to include crimes that regularly lead to links with the profiles in the criminalistics 
database. Examples include crimes related to criminal organizations or gang formation. Following these 
18 This new DNA law came into effect on 1 January 2014 (“Omzendbrief DNA: identificatieprocedure via DNA-onderzoek in 
stafzaken,” 2013).
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changes, and under certain circumstances,19 the profiles of suspects could be drawn up and systematically 
forwarded to the NGDB for a one-off comparison. When a match is obtained, suspect profiles can also 
be stored in the criminalistics database (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2011b; Jeuniaux, Duboccage, Renard, Van 
Renterghem, & Vanvooren, 2016; Renard et al., 2013). The identity of the suspect or convict is stored by 
means of a DNA code number. The National Cell, established under the 2011 Act and part of the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office, assigns, manages and centralizes DNA code numbers. This unique code links a DNA 
profile to a suspect or convicted person without storing any information about the person’s identity in 
the NGDB (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1999, 2017a).
A third database, for missing persons, was established under the Act of 21 December 2013 amending the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act of 22 March 1999 concerning the identification procedure for 
DNA research in criminal cases (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2013b, 2017c). This database stores DNA profiles 
of the remains of unidentified bodies, DNA profiles of samples (e.g., teeth, blood) and/or from personal 
items (e.g., hairbrush) belonging to a missing person, and finally reference profiles of blood relatives of 
missing people. Previously, these traces were stored in the criminalistics database.
In 2017 a new law created a fourth database, the ‘elimination’ database (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2017d). 
Individuals who come into contact with crime scenes and the broader forensic tracing investigation, such 
as emergency services, the police or public prosecutors and lab technicians, can unknowingly leave their 
DNA at the scene and thus contaminate DNA traces. Storing these DNA profiles allows the authorities 
to identify possible contamination at an early stage and prevent the investigation from following a false 
lead. This dissertation could not take into account possible contamination that was brought to light 
by the introduction of the elimination database, as the data extraction was carried out before it was 
introduced.
6.3.1.2. Transnational context and the Prüm Convention 
In the last decade, not only have the number of national DNA databases increased but the exchange of 
DNA data and the cooperation between different countries has also been strengthened. In 2005 seven 
European countries20 signed the Prüm Convention on the improvement of cross-border cooperation, 
in particular to combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. The parties stated that 
they would create and manage national DNA databases for the purpose of detecting criminal offences 
(Council of the European Union, 2005, Chapter 2, Article 2). This network of national DNA databases 
should make it possible (and easier) to identify offenders who are responsible for multiple crimes in 
different countries (Martin et al., 2001). The goal is to link unsolved crimes in one country with (un)solved 
19 Art. 44quinquies SV and Art. 90undecies SV 
20 Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria.
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crimes in another country (Prainsack & Toom, 2013).
In 2008 the Convention was converted into EU legislation (Council of the European Union, 2008a, 
2008b) stating that all EU members must create a database for DNA, fingerprints and traffic data. These 
databases must be searchable by other EU members via automated searches on a ‘hit/no hit’ basis – 
meaning that anonymous data are compared, and the relevant data about the case and the person can 
only be exchanged between the countries involved if there is a match (van der Beek, 2011; Voultsos et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the Prüm Treaty does not create a central European DNA database, but works with 
national DNA databases and a national contact point per EU member. The NICC/INCC is the national 
contact point for Belgium (Duboccage, 2008).
In addition to the 28 EU member countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland were also 
admitted to the convention. In 2014 only 20 countries complied with the convention. Belgium integrated 
the implementation of the Prüm Treaty into the DNA law of 7 November 2011. By June 2018, Belgium 
was automatically exchanging DNA data daily with 10 countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, Austria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Estonia and Spain. This will soon be 
extended to include Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland. The ultimate goal is the automatic exchange of DNA 
data with all Prüm member states.
6.3.2. Selection mechanisms and actors
Storing DNA profiles in a database is based on the assumption that offenders will commit other crimes in 
the future, so that links can be made between offenders / suspects and traces, between different traces 
or between different offenders / suspects, eventually leading to identification. Two central questions 
arise: (1) Which profiles are included in the database? In other words, which (offenders of which) crimes 
are included in the database? (2) How long are the profiles stored in the database?
The content of the database at a given moment, in terms of type and number of profiles, is thus determined 
by, on the one hand, the profiles that are stored in the database and, on the other hand, the profiles that 
are removed from the database (Figure 7). Moreover, every actor within the criminal justice chain has an 
impact on the content of the database, whether consciously or not.
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NGDB
‘IN’ ‘OUT’
Figure 7: Schematic representation of the contents of the NGDB
Profiles stored in the criminalistics database
The criminalistics database21 contains (unidentified) DNA profiles collected at crime scenes. In contrast 
to the convicted offenders database, the legislator has not drawn up an exhaustive list of crimes that can 
be included in the criminalistics database. In principle, every crime type is eligible. In practice, however, it 
includes crimes that have a specific crime scene and where it is likely that there has been physical contact 
between the offender and the victim, or with the crime scene, making it possible that the offender has 
left DNA behind.
A number of actors are significant when storing DNA profiles of traces in the criminalistics database. 
First of all, there is the offender. Not all offenders leave their DNA, for example in the form of skin cells, 
hair or saliva, at the scene of a crime (Develtere, 2014). Offenders are often aware of the traces they may 
leave behind during their offence. This ‘forensic awareness’ ensures, for example, that offenders wear 
gloves to limit DNA traces (Beauregard & Bouchard, 2010).
The offence must, of course, be reported to, or discovered by, the police. In view of the large ‘dark number’ 
of unreported crimes, this is perhaps the most important factor in determining which profiles are stored 
in this database (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). Moreover, the Laboratory of the Technical and Scientific Police 
(LTWP) or another police service collect these traces not simply because a crime is known about and 
is likely to contain DNA traces. Four levels of knowledge play a role in the decision of the police to 
visit a crime scene and to collect traces: the strategic, the criminal, the immediate and the physical 
environment (Ribaux, Baylon, Lock, et al., 2010). The strategic environment is shaped by the priorities set 
out in the Belgian National Security Plan, for example, as well as (limited) budgets and resources. The 
criminal environment is constituted by knowledge about previous similar cases or criminal phenomena 
such as organized crime (i.e., forensic intelligence). This knowledge is important to be able to detect 
21 Only the criminalistics database is discussed, as it is directly relevant to this research. For further information about the 
missing persons and elimination databases see Renard et al. (2018).
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all possible (relevant) traces. Knowledge about previous, similar crimes, for example, can increase the 
chance of finding traces, and the importance of the case can also be higher, given that the offender 
is possibly a multiple offender. The immediate environment will also determine whether traces are 
collected. Where, when and how exactly did the crime happen? The modus operandi and the seriousness 
of the crime are important when assessing the immediate surroundings. For example, a first study by 
the medical examiner on the crime scene could provide information about whether or not the victim 
died a natural death. In the event of a natural death, the crime scene investigation (and thus, also, the 
safeguarding of possible DNA carriers) will be much more limited. Crime scene investigators are often 
most familiar with the physical environment of the crime scene. For example, public places such as bars 
are less suitable for collecting DNA traces because of the high number of DNA traces that will be present 
and the risk of contamination (Ribaux, Baylon, Lock, et al., 2010). Of course, in addition to these four 
levels of knowledge, the experience and training of police officers will also influence the number and type 
of traces collected at crimes scenes.
Once the DNA traces have been collected, the authorized magistrate must mandate a certified DNA 
laboratory to examine them. The traces that have been collected are not all analysed by default; the 
magistrate often makes a selection. In addition to operational motives such as whether or not the police 
advise or request that they be tested (using model 1422), budgetary restrictions are often the decisive 
factor for whether certain DNA samples are analysed. DNA analyses are expensive, which means that 
some screening takes place. At the end of 2015 both the rates and the description of DNA research 
in criminal cases were determined in accordance with regulations defined by Royal Decree (Belgisch 
Staatsblad, 2015). At the same time, the cost of DNA analysis has considerably reduced. On average, the 
analysis of a trace profile now costs 273 euro.23 Before the 2015 Royal decree it was twice as much. Not 
only has the cost fallen in recent years, it is also striking that magistrates often do not know how much 
analysis costs, or greatly overestimate the cost (Stappers, 2018).
The process that recognized DNA laboratories use has three phases. The first phase investigates whether 
the pieces of evidence will contain sufficient DNA traces to be useful for carrying out DNA analysis. So 
far, it is not known whether useful DNA traces are present on the pieces of evidence. Assuming they are, 
the second phase involves extracting and quantifying the DNA and the creation of the DNA profile. The 
third and final phase consists of interpreting the DNA profile that has been obtained, and drawing up an 
22 Standard table for the selection and arrangement of trace carriers for possible DNA research, added to the Royal Decree of 
2013 (COL21/2013, revised version 8 June 2017). See Appendix 1.
23 This price includes: examination of pieces of evidence and taking samples: 30 euro (Art. 4); extraction and quantification 
of DNA (Art. 6): 49 euro; creating the genetic profile (Art. 7): 194 euro. The price for drawing up a genetic profile of a reference 
sample has been 60 euros since the 2015 Royal Decree, which is also a decrease compared to the old rate of 430 euros.
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expert report.24
The DNA profiles are then forwarded to the NICC’s DNA Index System (DIS) service. DIS is the final step 
before the profiles are stored in the database. The only samples stored in this database are forensically 
simple profiles originating from one person, or forensically mixed profiles of a maximum of two people. 
DIS uses the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) developed by the US FBI to manage, store and 
compare DNA profiles.
The number and quality of the DNA profiles obtained can be affected at each stage by human error 
(Ribaux & Talbot Wright, 2014). Figure 8 summarizes this process schematically.
Offender/crime Police/LTWP Magistrate DNA Laboratory DIS
Number of DNA profiles
Figure 8: Selection mechanisms and actors involved, from collection to storage of forensic DNA in the NGDB
Profiles removed from the database
For practical and financial reasons it is likely that some DNA profiles will need to be removed from the 
database. The management of a database in which profiles are added and never deleted would be a heavy 
burden. In addition, an unlimited storage period would not seem to comply with the aforementioned 
human rights. Substantive arguments also play a role in limiting the retention period. For example, 
Walsh, Curran, and Buckleton (2010) state that solving old offences has a lower priority and is often more 
difficult than solving more recent offences. Moreover, offenders will no longer be criminally active in the 
course of time, whether that is because they stop committing crime, die or are taken prisoner; keeping 
track of their profiles will then no longer be useful. Another reason can be found in Belgian law, which 
limits the term for which data can be stored to thirty years for both databases (Belgisch Staatsblad, 
2011b). This period corresponds to the statute of limitation for each crime type (the maximum period of 
time during which a conviction can be obtained), after which it is no longer appropriate to keep the data. 
6.3.3. Content NGDB
At the end of 2017 the NGDB stored about 100,000 profiles, crime scene profiles and reference profiles 
24 For more information on DNA analysis, see Butler (2010).
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(i.e., convicted offenders and suspects) in total (Table 7). Figure 9 shows that the annual number of stored 
profiles has steadily increased since the NGDB database was implemented in 2002. 







< 2002 1,020 1,020
2002 1,938 4 1,942
2003 3,563 448 4,011
2004 5,398 2,001 7,399
2005 7,752 4,536 12,288
2006 9,945 8,570 18,515
2007 12,671 1,4442 27,113
2008 15,933 15,596 31,529
2009 19,032 18,003 37,035
2010 22,493 20,774 43,267
2011 26,016 22,861 48,877
2012 30,480 25,333 55,813
2013 34,725 27,710 62,435
2014 39,339 30,724 636 70,699
2015 45,534 34,695 1,330 81,559
2016 47,374 39,538 1,975 88,887
2017 50,788 44,698 2,553 98,039
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Figure 9: Number and type of DNA profiles in the NGDB per year
6.4. Conclusion
Before a forensic DNA profile is stored in the NGDB, it has already gone through several crucial phases. 
At each of these phases there is a chance of dropout. As a result, the NGDB, like any other DNA database, 
is only a selection of all crimes registered in the police database. The impact of this selection is also 
closely related to the crime type – for example, DNA profiles from contact crimes, where the offender 
makes physical contact with the victim or with an object at the crime scene, are more likely to be present 
as there is a much better chance that DNA profiles will be found.
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7. The validity of DNA databases in studying the spatial behaviour of un-
known offenders
The previous chapter explored why the NGDB only contains a minority of all the crimes stored in the police 
database. It can thus be regarded as a sample of the police-recorded crime data. But is it a representative 
sample? And, more specifically, can the NGDB be used to study unknown offenders and their behaviour? 
(The validity of police-recorded crime data is a discussion in itself, but falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation.) The central research question in this chapter is therefore formulated as follows:
Q 2: Are DNA databases less valid than police-recorded crime databases for the study of  
unsolved crimes?
The criminographic data available in the NGDB are limited. This also applies to the unsolved crimes 
registered in the police database. The place (i.e., judicial district) and time (i.e., year) of unsolved crimes 
are the only data registered in both databases. Therefore, this is the only information that can be used to 
evaluate the representativity of the DNA data compared to the police-recorded crime data. The present 
study, which is a further elaboration of De Moor et al. (2018a), uses only the geographical information. A 
comparison was made of the spatial concentration and distribution of unsolved crimes stored in the two 
separate databases.
7.1. Introduction
Recently, scholars have argued in favour of using forensic DNA databases to study offenders’ spatial 
behaviour. For example, as mentioned in the introduction, Wiles & Costello (Costello & Wiles, 2001; 
Wiles & Costello, 2000) used DNA database hits in addition to geocoded police-recorded crime data 
and offender interviews in their seminal study on the mobility of high-volume offenders in and around 
Sheffield. They used DNA data to study the travel patterns of offenders, irrespective of whether they 
were known to the police or not. All three data sources revealed that most offender movements are 
relatively short. Lammers (Lammers, 2014a; Lammers & Bernasco, 2013) used Dutch DNA data to study 
the influence of the spatial dispersion of serial offenders’ crime location on their probability of arrest. 
In order to do so, Lammers compared the spatial behaviour of known and unknown offenders stored in 
the DNA database. She concluded that offenders with a greater geographical offending range, measured 
as the number of police regions in which the offenders committed their crimes, were less likely to be 
arrested and therefore had a lower probability of featuring in police-recorded crime data (Lammers & 
Bernasco, 2013). However, the average distance between crime locations was unrelated to the probability 
of arrest (Lammers, 2014a).
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Despite the successes of applying DNA data in criminological research and the potential to study 
unknown offenders, DNA data remain subject to selection biases. Discussing the potential problems 
of selectivity in DNA data, Tilley and Townsley (2009, p. 375) question whether accurate descriptions of 
populations can be based on small samples, but add that “of themselves, small samples are not much of a 
problem if the sample is representative”. Similar concerns were raised by Lammers (2013) and Wiles and 
Costello (2000). By comparing crime levels across the police and DNA data, Wiles and Costello (2000, pp. 
25-26) concluded that DNA data are representative of the overall crime level in England and Wales. They 
evaluated the representativeness of the DNA database against all registered crimes, solved or not. No 
scholars, however, have specifically evaluated the representativeness of DNA data in unsolved crimes.
The study presented in this chapter was designed to address this lack of knowledge and evaluate the 
validity of DNA data for criminological research on unknown offenders and their crimes. The spatial 
distribution of unsolved crimes stored in the police-recorded crime data is compared with the spatial 
distribution of unsolved crimes stored in the DNA data. As such, the concentration and spatial similarity 
of the two sets of data is studied. Three important advancements over prior work are introduced. First, 
this is the first study to explicitly examine the validity of DNA data in the study of the behaviour of 
unknown offenders. Second, this study uses and compares two different data sources (i.e., DNA data 
and police-recorded crime data) to study the same phenomenon: unsolved registered crimes. In prior 
research, different databases have been used to complement each other: each data source contained 
information on unique crimes – police-recorded crime data have been used to study (the offending 
behaviour of) known offenders and DNA data or self-report data were used to study (the offending 
behaviour of) unknown offenders. Third, the present study also contributes to criminological research 
based on DNA data, which remains limited. 
7.2. Data
7.2.1. Study area and spatial unit of analysis
The spatial units of analysis are Belgium’s 27 judicial districts, which cover on average 1,136 square 
kilometres (min. = 511.98 km², max. = 2,507.32 km², S.D. = 410.58 km²). According to the NUTS classification 
(nomenclature of territorial units for statistics), a Belgian judicial district is smaller than a NUTS 2 region 
but larger than a NUTS 3 region. Belgium counts 11 NUTS 2 regions (10 provinces and Brussels-Capital 
Region) and 44 NUTS 3 regions (arrondissements).
Judicial districts are meaningful units of analysis when comparing data from the police dataset and the 
DNA dataset. Judicial districts can set their own priorities in the types of crimes that the police have 
to respond to, and in the DNA retention policy, and these factors will influence the spatial pattern of 
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registered crimes in each judicial district. Although using the judicial district level as the spatial unit of 
analysis can obscure the concentration and also the variability that would be found in smaller spatial 
units (Andresen & Malleson, 2011; Hibdon et al., 2016; Ratcliffe, 2010), this geographic scale is suitable for 
our purposes as it is not our intention to make statements about crime levels and dispersion at different 
geographical levels.
7.2.2. Police-recorded crime data and DNA data
As the focus of this research is not on the spatial stability/variability of crime over time (see for example 
Andresen et al., 2017) but on the spatial similarity between the Belgian General Police Database and 
the Belgian National Genetic Database, only data from one calendar year was analysed. The year 2014 
was chosen for no substantive reason. The analyses concerning the other calendar years are included in 
Appendix 2. All other years yielded comparable results.
Crimes of aggravated burglary, violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences committed in 2014 
were selected from both databases. Crimes with no identified offenders were selected from the Belgian 
General Police Database (i.e., the ‘police dataset’). Only crimes without reference profiles were selected 
from the NGDB so that no known offenders were involved (i.e., the ‘DNA dataset’). This approach ensured 
that only unsolved crimes were selected from both databases and resulted in a police dataset of 181,483 
crimes and a DNA dataset of 1,913 crimes, all committed by unknown offenders.
7.3. Methods
The suitability of DNA data for studying the offending behaviour of unknown offenders on different 
levels is assessed. In addition to some descriptive statistics, the crime concentration and the similarity 
between the spatial points patterns in the police and DNA datasets is studied.
7.3.1. Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient
The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient are used to analyse the crime concentration in the judicial 
districts in each dataset. The Lorenz curve (see Figure 10) plots the relationship between the cumulative 
percentage of the judicial districts, and the cumulative percentage of the crimes committed in those 
districts. The diagonal line with slope 1 represents perfect equality in the distribution of crime over the 
different judicial districts. The closer the Lorenz curve leans to the diagonal, the more the crimes are 
evenly distributed over the districts. In accordance with Bernasco and Steenbeek (2017, p. 4), the judicial 
districts are ordered from the highest crime level to the lowest crime level in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the curve. Each of the points of the curve can be interpreted as ‘Y per cent of all crimes 
occur in X per cent of the judicial districts’. Generally, the Lorenz curve is a smooth line. As there are 
only a limited number of judicial districts, it was decided to represent the curve by the 27 corresponding 
judicial districts. That allows the above-mentioned interpretation to be further simplified to the exact 
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number of districts.
The Gini coefficient (G) is calculated as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve (area A in Figure 10) 
and the line of perfect equality, and the area above the line of perfect equality (area A and B in Figure 10 ): 
G = A / (A + B). The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 1. In this study, a value of 0 indicates that every 
judicial district has the same crime level (i.e., complete equality) and a value of 1 indicates that all crime is 
concentrated in only one district (i.e., complete inequality) (Bernasco & Steenbeek, 2017; Eck et al., 2017).
An important drawback of the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient is that both measures may overestimate 
the level of crime concentration if there are fewer crimes than places (see Bernasco & Steenbeek, 2017). 
A (high) number of places with no crimes artificially increases the crime concentration. For example, 
five crimes committed in five different districts results in a higher Gini coefficient (and thus a higher 
concentration) when there are ten possible districts (G = 0.5) compared to only five possible districts (G 
= 0), although in both scenarios the five crimes are maximally spread. The generalized Gini coefficient 
(G’) proposed by Bernasco and Steenbeek (2017) is used to address this problem of overestimation of 
the concentration. The analyses were conducted in the statistical programming language R using the 
‘lorenzgini’ package (Steenbeek & Bernasco, 2018). G’ will be smaller than G if there are fewer crimes 
than places but G’ and G will have the same value if there are more crimes than places. In this study, the 
number of judicial districts outweighs the number of crimes only for lethal violence so the possible range 
of concentration for lethal violence is smaller than the range of the other three crime types. As such, 
there will only be a difference between the original Gini coefficient and the generalized Gini coefficient 
for lethal violence.
The Gini coefficient does not provide insight into the similarity between spatial point patterns in the 
police dataset and the DNA dataset—for example, whether the districts with the highest crime rates in 
the police dataset also have the highest crime rates in the DNA dataset. Therefore, a spatial point pattern 
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Figure 10: Graphical representation of the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient
7.3.2. Spatial point pattern test
This study uses the spatial point pattern test (SPPT) to examine the spatial similarity between the crimes 
registered in the DNA dataset and the police dataset over the 27 judicial districts. The SPPT is used to 
validate the representativeness of the unsolved crimes stored in the NGDB.
In the SPPT, a pairwise comparison is made of percentages25 of crimes (i.e., ‘points’) in two datasets – a 
base dataset and a test dataset – within specified spatial units of analysis. In this dissertation, the police 
dataset is used as the base, and the DNA dataset as the test. Instead of comparing the exact percentages 
of crimes per judicial district, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed to create a confidence interval 
for each of the 27 judicial districts in the test dataset. Random samples (with replacement) of the test 
dataset are undertaken 200 times, selecting 85% of the entire test dataset (for details, see Andresen, 
2016). When the percentage of crime in the base dataset falls within the confidence interval for the test 
dataset, then the specific judicial district has a similar proportion of crime in both datasets.
The SPPT generates two outputs: a local and a global similarity index. A local similarity index is computed 
for each judicial district separately. These local S-Indices indicate whether the point count in a specific 
judicial district is lower in the base dataset (local S-index = +1), higher (-1) or similar (0) compared to 
the test dataset. The output can be mapped in order to visualize the judicial district with significant 
difference. The SPPT also yields a global S-index indicating the overall similarity between the spatial 
25 As in much other research, the two datasets have different numbers of crimes or points: the police dataset includes far 
more crimes than the DNA dataset. Using the percentages instead of the exact number of points per judicial district makes it 
possible to compare datasets that are very different in size. 
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point patterns from the base dataset and the test dataset, ranging from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (perfect 
similarity). The mathematical form of the global S-index reads as follows:
n represents the number of spatial units and si is equal to 1 if the spatial pattern of both the base and 
test dataset are considered similar for the spatial unit i and zero otherwise. It represents the percentage 
of judicial districts that have a similar spatial point pattern (local S-indices = 0). A global S-index of .80 
(80%) or above is generally considered to be the threshold for spatial similarity (Andresen, 2009, 2016). 
In our research, this means that the local S-index must be 0 for at least 22 of the 27 judicial districts 
before the police and DNA dataset can be considered to be spatially similar at country level.
The SPPT is summarized in the following eight steps and Figure 11:
1) Identify a base dataset and count the number of ‘points’ inside each spatial unit. 26 Repeat this 
step for the test dataset. 
2) Randomly sample (with replacement) 85%27 of the points from the test dataset and count for 
each spatial unit the number of points.
3) Repeat step 2 200 times.28
4) For each of the 200 samples, calculate the percentage of points in each spatial unit. Rank for 
each of the spatial units these 200 values from lowest to highest.
5) Obtain a non-parametric 95% confidence interval for each spatial unit by removing the top and 
bottom 2.5% observations (i.e., the top and bottom five observations of the 200 observations in 
each spatial unit).
6) Compare within each spatial unit the percentage of points in the base dataset with the  
corresponding confidence interval generated from the test dataset. The spatial unit has a  
similar proportion of points in both datasets if the percentage of the base dataset falls within 
the confidence interval. If not, both datasets exhibit a significant different spatial pattern.
7) Map the output in order to visualize the spatial units with significant difference. 
8) Calculate the global S-index to indicate the overall similarity between the spatial point patterns 
from the base dataset and the test dataset. (Andresen, 2009, p. 336; Andresen & Linning, 2012, 
p. 277; Andresen & Malleson, 2011, p. 64) 
26 The choice of which dataset is used as the base and which is used as the test is arbitrary (Andresen, 2009). 
27 Andresen (2009) relied on the research of Ratcliffe (2004a) to define the 85% boundary.
28 Although research demonstrates that 50 or even 20 repeated samples would already provide good results, Andresen 
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Figure 11: Illustration of an SPPT
Judicial districts with no crimes for both the test and base dataset will also yield a local S-index of zero. 
This indicates a similar point pattern, although there is no point pattern at all. Therefore, if many spatial 
units contain no crimes, the global S-index is inflated. In that case, Andresen and Malleson (2011) suggest 
conducting a sensitivity analysis (see also Vandeviver & Steenbeek, 2017). This involves a SPPT with only 
non-zero spatial units: spatial units with at least one crime in either dataset. For all the different SPPTs 
conducted in this study, nearly all judicial districts have registered crimes in at least one of the datasets 
under consideration. Only one judicial district had zero registrations for lethal violence in both the police 
and the DNA dataset. Therefore, no such sensitivity analysis was needed in this study.
However, as will be demonstrate in the results section, many judicial districts in the DNA dataset (i.e., 
test dataset) have no or only a low number of crimes, which may severely influence the outcome of the 
SPPT (see Wheeler, Steenbeek, & Andresen, 2018). Judicial districts with no crime in the DNA dataset 
have a confidence interval from 0% to 0%. As a result, the SPPT will always indicate that the spatial 
pattern between the police data and DNA data is different for these districts, even if the proportion 
of crimes in the police dataset is only very small. Judicial districts with small crime proportions in the 
DNA dataset have larger confidence intervals, resulting in more similar spatial patterns (Wheeler et al., 
2018). To meet these two limitations, Wheeler et al. (2018) suggest an SPPT based on the difference 
in proportions (hereafter ‘adapted SPPT’) in each spatial unit of analysis. In this study, the Chi-Square 
approach with Yates’s correction with p-value adjustment for multiple comparisons present in the R 
package ‘sppt’ is used (Steenbeek, Vandeviver, Andresen, Malleson, & Wheeler, 2018).
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7.4. Results
7.4.1. Descriptive statistics
Aggravated burglary is by far the most common crime type category in both our datasets: 85.90% (N 
= 155,894) in the police dataset and 81.02% (N = 1,550) in the DNA dataset. The second, much smaller, 
category is violent theft: 9.62% (N = 17,453) in the police dataset and 12.55% (N = 240) in the DNA dataset. 
The prevalence of sexual offences is 4.22% (N = 7,659) in the police dataset and 5.18% (N = 99) in the DNA 
dataset. Lethal violence is the smallest category in both the datasets: only 0.26% (N = 477) in the police 
dataset and 1.26% (N = 24) in the DNA dataset (see Table 8). Many judicial districts contain only few or 
even no crimes in the DNA dataset. Fifteen districts contain no lethal violence, eight districts contain no 
sexual offences, five contain no violent theft and two districts contain no aggravated burglary. For the 
police dataset, only one district contains no lethal violence crimes.
A chi-square goodness of fit test was calculated comparing the crime levels in the DNA dataset with 
those in the police dataset. Although the ranking of the four crime types in the DNA dataset is the same 
as in the police dataset, there are differences between the two datasets (χ2 = 98.08, df = 3, p < 0.05). 
The observed frequency of aggravated burglary in the DNA dataset (N = 1,550) is lower than would be 
expected (N = 1,643) based on the frequency in the police dataset (z = -6.13, p < 0.05). The reverse applies 
to the other three crime types: fewer crime counts of violent theft (z = 4.35, p < 0.05), lethal violence (z = 
8.47, p < 0.05), sexual offences (z = 2.08, p < 0.05) were expected in the DNA dataset. 
Table 8: Description of datasets 




Violent theft 17,453 9.62 240 12.55
Aggravated burglary 155,894 85.90 1,550 81.02
Lethal violence 477 0.26 24 1.25
Sexual offences 7,659 4.22 99 5.18
7.4.2. Crime concentration
Figure 11 displays the Lorenz curve for both the police and the DNA datasets. The cumulative percentage 
of crimes, aggregated over the four crime types, is plotted against the cumulative percentage of judicial 
districts. When the two Lorenz curves do not cross, there is more inequality in the distribution of the 
crimes over the different districts in the upper curve. However, in this case, the Lorenz curves intersect 
at about 30% of the places, which makes the interpretation of the Lorenz curve ambiguous without the 
(generalized) Gini coefficient (Davies & Hoy, 1994).
Neither of the curves approximates the diagonal, which indicates that in both datasets crime is not evenly 
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distributed over the 27 judicial districts. In contrast, crime is concentrated in a limited number of districts 
in both datasets. For the police dataset, about half of the judicial districts (N = 14) account for about 87% 
of all crimes, and about 50% of all crimes occur in fewer than four judicial districts. This corresponds to a 
(generalized) Gini coefficient for the police dataset of 0.56. The (generalized) Gini coefficient for the DNA 
dataset is comparable (0.54, p = 0.45). For the DNA dataset, about half of the judicial districts (N = 14) 
account for about 90% of all crimes, and about 50% of all crimes occur in fewer than five judicial districts. 
The analysis illustrates that crime is concentrated in a limited number of districts, in both the police and 
the DNA dataset. Comparable results were obtained when studying the crime concentration of the four 
crime types separately. Violent theft and aggravated burglary have comparable high (generalized) Gini 
coefficients in the police data and the DNA data (Table 9). Lethal violence29 (p < 0.001) and sexual offences 
(p < 0.001) are more concentrated in the DNA dataset than in the police dataset as the (generalized) Gini 
coefficients are significant higher for the DNA dataset than for the police dataset.
Table 9: Generalized Gini coefficients for different crime types 
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.56 0.070801 0.4430009  0.6874887 0.54 0.05011042 0.447
Violent theft 0.70 0.07486759 0.5827504  0.8259792 0.62 0.05616732 0.287
Aggravated burglary 0.55 0.06931802 0.4371281    0.6799810 0.55 0.05262794 0.341
Lethal violence 0.54 0.06620676 0.4419252    0.6596354 0.67 0.1011423 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.43 0.05244886 0.3444948  0.5447375 0.64 0.06190071 < 0.001
Figure 13 plots the districts according to their ranking in crime rates, aggregated over the four crime types, 
in the police and DNA dataset. All districts above the diagonal have a higher proportion in the DNA 
dataset than in the police dataset. The opposite is true for the districts below the line: these districts 
have a higher proportion in the police dataset than in the DNA dataset. The districts with the highest 
percentages of crimes are different for both datasets. Only two districts appear in the top five of both 
datasets. Antwerp (AN) has the highest crime rate in DNA dataset, and the second position in the police 
dataset. Brussels (BR) has the highest crime rate in police dataset, and the third place in the DNA dataset. 
Only two districts are located at the diagonal, having the same ranking in both datasets. Other districts 
seem to differ more in rank order between the two datasets. For example, the Hasselt district (HA) has 
a high ranking in the DNA dataset, but an average ranking in the police dataset. The Mons district (MO) 
29 As the number of this crime type outweighs the number of judicial districts, the original Gini coefficient differs from 
the generalized Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient for lethal violence dropped from 0.70 to 0.67 to compensate for the 
overestimation of the level of crime concentration.
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shows the opposite picture: a low ranking in the DNA dataset but a high ranking in the police dataset. 
Behind a difference in ranking, however, there can be a small difference in crime rate, so in itself the 
comparison of the rank order only gives an indication of the difference between the two databases with 
regard to the concentration (and spread) of crime over the 27 judicial districts. Further analysis needs to 
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Figure 13: Rank order crime rates in 27 judicial districts in the police dataset plotted against rank order in the 
DNA dataset (high to low)
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7.4.3. Spatial similarity
The adapted SPPT is used to compare the spatial distribution of the four crime types separately in the 
two datasets. When spatial patterns are similar in both datasets, the DNA dataset adequately reflects the 
spatial distribution of the unsolved crimes present in the police dataset. 
Figure 13 maps the spatial similarity at judicial district level between the police dataset and the DNA 
dataset. Districts with a local S-index of +1 (i.e., black districts) have a higher crime proportion in the DNA 
dataset than in the police dataset. This means that in these districts there is an over-representation of 
the number of unsolved registered crimes in the DNA data. In districts with a negative local S-index (i.e., 
grey districts) the police dataset has a higher crime proportion than the DNA dataset. In these districts 
there is an under-representation of the number of unsolved registered crimes in the DNA data. Districts 
with similar percentages of crime in both datasets have a local S-index of 0 (i.e., white districts). 
With a value of 0.22, aggravated burglary has the lowest global S-index resulting from the adapted SPPT 
for of all four crime types (Table 10). In contrast to the southern part of the county (Wallonia), most 
districts in the north (Flanders) have a higher percentage of unsolved aggravated burglaries in the DNA 
dataset than in the police dataset (Figure 14(2)). This clear distinction between Flanders and Wallonia says 
nothing about a difference in crime level or a difference in the clearance rate in both parts of the country, 
as only unsolved registered crimes were studied. For the other three crimes types, the global S-indices 
resulting from the adapted SPPT are all above the 0.80 threshold. Spatial similarity (white districts) is 
observed in 24 judicial districts for violent theft (Figure 14(1)), in all 27 judicial districts for lethal violence 
(Figure 14(3)) and in all but one judicial district for sexual offences (Figure 14(3)). 
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Figure 14: Local S-indices for violent theft (1), aggravated burglary (2), lethal violence (3) and sexual offences (4)
7.5. Conclusion and discussion
It is obvious that data on unknown offenders is difficult to collect. DNA databases do allow unsolved 
registered crimes and their unknown offenders to be studied based on the DNA traces they leave behind 
at crime scenes, and some authors have already successfully made use of DNA data to study the spatial 
behaviour of unknown offenders (see e.g., Lammers, 2014a; Wiles & Costello, 2000). As DNA databases 
only store a subset of all unsolved registered crimes, it is important to assess the accuracy of the DNA 
data in representing the spatial behaviour of unknown offenders. This will allow an evaluation of whether 
general statements based on DNA data can be made about unsolved crimes and unknown offenders, and 
whether there are differences between the spatial offending behaviour of known and unknown offenders.
In this study the spatial distribution of unsolved crimes committed in 2014 from two datasets were 
compared: the Belgian General Police Database and the Belgian National Genetic Database. Results 
from the Lorenz curves and the generalized Gini coefficients, aggregated over the four crime types, 
show that in both datasets crime is unevenly distributed over the 27 judicial districts and is concentrated 
in only a few districts. Both datasets show a similar degree of crime concentration: 50% of all crimes 
occur in fewer than five of the 27 judicial districts, although these are not the same five districts in both 
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datasets. Comparable results were obtained when studying the crime concentration of the four crime 
types separately.
A spatially similar pattern between unsolved registered crimes in the police database and the DNA 
database is an important prerequisite for using DNA data to study the spatial behaviour of unknown 
offenders. A different spatial pattern in the DNA database, whether caused by an overestimation or 
under-estimation of crimes in certain districts, would lead to confounding results concerning the spatial 
distribution of registered crimes committed by unknown offenders. An adapted SPPT based on the direct 
differences in proportions (Wheeler et al., 2018) assessed the spatial similarity between the two datasets. 
Three important findings emerged from the adapted SPPT test. First, spatial similarity is different for 
each of the four crime types studied. Second, spatial similarity is (very) high for three of the four crime 
types: violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences. Third, both an over-representation and an 
under-representation of the number of unsolved registered crimes in the DNA database was found for 
aggravated burglary.
It is important to take a closer look at where these distinct spatial patterns may originate. If the crime type 
alone had caused the difference between the two datasets, the same local S-index would be expected 
in every district. For example, the crime scenes of aggravated burglary may be more conducive to the 
collection of DNA samples. This could lead to an over-representation of this type of crime in the DNA 
database in all 27 judicial districts (i.e., 27 black districts in Figure 14). However, this is not the case. If 
the district alone had caused the difference between the two datasets, the same local S-index for every 
crime type per district would be expected. Only five of the 27 judicial districts have a local S-index of 
0 (resulting from the adapted SPPT) for each of the four different crime types. None of the 27 judicial 
districts has a negative local S-index or a positive local S-index for all four different crime types. It seems 
more likely, however, that both the crime type and the DNA retention policy of a district may have an 
impact. Certain judicial districts may have a more active DNA retention policy, focusing on all crime 
types or only on specific ones. Districts can give a different priority to DNA as an investigative method 
or have a different budget for DNA analysis. For example, aggravated burglary shows a higher number of 
districts with an over-representation of crimes in the DNA dataset, mainly districts located in Flanders. 
Aggravated burglary crime scenes in Flanders may be systematically searched for DNA, resulting in a 
higher relative crime count in the northern part of Belgium. In which case, even a lower S-index may be 
valuable for spatial crime research.
By integrating information on law enforcement priorities or DNA retention policies, for example, insight 
is obtained into the (lack of) representativeness of the DNA data. The opposite is also true: an evaluation 
of the spatial similarity between the police and DNA data can provide insight into the DNA retention 
policy of the different districts. So even though no global spatial similarity was obtained for all crime 
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types, this study has its value. First, conducting an SPPT offers an opportunity to evaluate the policy. 
Generally, Belgian DNA retention policies are not publicly available and it may be difficult to point out 
differences between the policies of different judicial districts. Indeed, the only information available on 
DNA retention policies comes from interviews with police officers, forensic experts and magistrates 
involved in collecting and analysing DNA traces. Moreover, the experience of the police in detecting 
DNA traces or limited budgets may also play a role in the nature and extent of the DNA profiles that are 
included in the database, regardless of the prescribed policy. Second, there are (many) districts in which 
the spatial pattern is similar to the police dataset. Although there may be more crime records available 
in the police data, the use of DNA data would be preferred since these data also contain information on 
unknown offenders. This is the reason why Lammers (2013) and Wiles & Costello (Costello & Wiles, 2001; 
Wiles & Costello, 2000) used DNA data in their spatial research. DNA databases allow us to study the 
spatial behaviour of serial (co-)offenders since a distinct unknown profile can be linked to different crime 
scenes and other (known and unknown) offenders. The fact that the offenders of unsolved crimes may be 
serial offenders or have co-offenders cannot be taken into consideration when relying solely on police-
recorded crime data. This is a major drawback since research indicates that committing crime is not 
only a group behaviour, but also that a relatively small proportion of offenders is responsible for a large 
share of all crimes (Farrington et al., 2006; Felson, 2003; Lantz & Ruback, 2016; Reiss, 1988; Warr, 2002). 
However, some caution is needed when interpreting these high global S-indices as an indication for the 
validity of the DNA database as data source. After all, the high similarity between the spatial patterns of 
lethal violence and sexual offences is caused by the zero crime count in the DNA data (in combination 
with a low crime count in the police dataset). Therefore, there would be no unknown offenders to study 
in these districts.
This study provides a starting point for further research. As already mentioned, this research offers 
insights into the differences between the policies at the judicial district level, influencing the type and 
amount of profiles stored in the DNA database. Taking this a step further, these insights could help to 
equalize and improve policy decisions on the collection of forensic DNA across the different judicial 
districts. Second, in addition to crime type and DNA retention policy there may be some other, perhaps 
even more relevant, factors influencing the spatial similarity between police-recorded crime data and 
DNA data. For example, media coverage of crimes may increase offenders’ awareness about the risk 
of leaving DNA traces, resulting in fewer DNA traces being found at crime scenes. Further research 
could identify those factors. Finally, the most pertinent research opportunity with DNA data lies in the 
study of unknown offenders and their behaviour. In this research, individual crimes were studied, but 
DNA databases are even better suited to study links between crimes committed by the same unknown 
offender and between different unknown offenders committing crimes together. This enables serial and 
co-offending behaviour of unknown offenders to be studied, which is difficult if not impossible with 
police-recorded crime data. In contrast, police-recorded crime data are more appropriate as a data 
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source to study known offenders, as not all known offenders are stored in DNA databases (i.e., reference 
profiles). Taking both police-recorded crime data and DNA data together not only allows researchers 
to study and compare the criminal behaviour of known and unknown offenders but also allows them to 
make links between known and unknown offenders.
In summary, studying the spatial similarity between the two sets of data establishes how representative 
the DNA data is at a local level, keeping in mind the possible low or even absent crime counts for 
certain crime types in the DNA data, and taking into account different factors that may influence its 
representativeness. Once it is established how representative the DNA data is, it may then be used 
to contribute to an analysis of unsolved crimes and their offenders. The study of unsolved crimes and 
unknown offenders is an important issue in geospatial criminology, as it furthers the understanding of 
crime in general, and of the entire offending group. Therefore, used in context, DNA data could lead not 
only to new theoretical insights, but also to better detection and crime prevention strategies.
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PART 3:  
NETWORKS OF UNKNOWN 
OFFENDERS AND THEIR 
CRIMES
“One of the questions still to be answered by network researchers is whether, and to 
what extent, the patterns in co-offending found in official data translate to  
undetected crimes.” 
(Bouchard & Malm, 2016, p. 15)
In Part 3 of this dissertation, the focus is on the possibility of studying unknown offenders and their serial 
and co-offending behaviour using DNA data. The first chapter explains the importance of a network 
approach within criminological research. In the two subsequent chapters, this network approach is 
tested empirically on an integrated dataset of police-recorded crime data and DNA data.
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8. Serial co-offending and the network approach
Committing crime is a group behaviour (De Moor et al., 2018b). At least half of all crimes involve more 
than one offender (Andresen & Felson, 2010; Felson, 2003; Lantz & Ruback, 2016; Warr, 2002) and about 
two-thirds of all offenders commit their crimes with others (Reiss, 1988). Generally, offenders do not have 
long-term co-offending partners (Reiss & Farrington, 1991) and most offenders commit joint offences as 
well as lone offences (Goldweber et al., 2011; Reiss, 1988; Reiss & Farrington, 1991; van Mastrigt, 2014). 
Burglary and robbery are the typical co-offending crime types (van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009). Young 
offenders in particular are more likely to commit crimes in the company of others. Although serial 
offending and co-offending are generally studied separately, there is an import link between the two 
offending types: co-offenders often show higher crime rates than solo offenders (Andresen & Felson, 
2010; Tontodonato, 1996). In other words: “persistent deviance typically is not a solitary enterprise; rather it 
best flourishes when it receives group support” (Matza, 1967, p. 63). Moreover, only a relatively small number 
of offenders is responsible for a substantial portion of all crimes (Everson, 2003; Farrington et al., 2006; 
Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003; Staley, 2005; Thornberry & Krohn, 2000).
Offenders also learn how to commit crimes from others: criminal behaviour is learned behaviour. This is 
illustrated in a German study on the effect of popular TV crime series on criminal behaviour (i.e., the ‘CSI 
effect’). The researchers found that convicted offenders considered friends and acquaintances to be the 
best source of information on how to commit a crime, whereas students and pupils preferred to obtain 
this information from the internet (Baranowski, Burkhardt, Czernik, & Hecht, 2017). The social aspect 
of criminal learning is also reflected in a number of criminological theories including the differential 
association theory by Sutherland (Sutherland & Cressey, 1960) and the self-control theory by Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990). Warr (2002, p. 4) perfectly summarizes the social nature of criminal behaviour – it “is 
not merely an incidental feature of crime, but is instead a potential key to understanding its etiology and some 
of its most distinctive features”.
It is therefore not surprising that Papachristos (2011) vigorously defended the network perspective in his 
article entitled ‘The coming of a networked criminology?’ Criminologists use many network concepts 
that relate to interdependence between actors, such as peer influence (McGloin, 2009) or social bonding 
(Hirschi, 1969). Furthermore, social network analysis (SNA) is a methodological approach based on graph 
theory and is used to mathematically and visually analyse social networks. Papachristos stated that 
criminological theories could be evaluated and reworked using SNA (2011, pp. 102-103). The same is true 
for Bouchard and Malm (2016, p. 1), who stated that network methods can improve the study of criminal 
behaviour because they take into account the impact of the social environment on crime. 
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In this part of the dissertation, police-recorded crime data is supplemented with DNA data and then, 
based on a network approach, links are identified between both known and unknown offenders, and 
their crimes. This creates a one-to-one match between DNA data and police-recorded crime data on the 
same crime cases. To date, very few studies have used DNA data to study the co-offending behaviour of 
unknown offenders. Jeuniaux and colleagues (2016), for example, studied the links between known and 
unknown offenders within the same crime cases, but only used a DNA database. The problem with this 
approach is that not every offender registered in police-recorded crime data is stored in the DNA database, 
and many known offenders are therefore omitted from the analysis. However, if known offenders from 
police-recorded crime data are combined with unknown offenders from DNA data associated with the 
same crime case it is possible to detect previously unidentified co-offenders. These offenders can, in 
turn, be linked to additional crimes committed with (other) co-offenders. Unknown offenders in the 
DNA database could also demonstrate a previously unidentified link between other known offenders 
in the recorded crime data. Therefore, combining police-recorded crime data and DNA data could help 
to answer the pertinent question of Bouchard and Malm (2016, p. 15): “whether, and to what extent, the 
patterns in co-offending found in official data translate to undetected crimes”.
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9. Integrating police-recorded crime data and DNA data to study serial 
co-offending behaviour
The central research question in this chapter reads as follows:
Q 3: To what extent does the crime picture change when unsolved crimes  
are included in a network analysis?
Is the picture of serial co-offending behaviour qualitatively different when police-recorded crime data are 
enriched with DNA data, or do they just corroborate what is already known? To answer this question the 
spatiotemporal distribution of crimes committed by serial co-offenders stored in the NGDB is compared 
with the spatiotemporal distribution of crimes in an integrated dataset of both police-recorded crime 
data and DNA data. To this end, a network analysis was carried out with the crimes recorded in the 
police-recorded crime data and the DNA data as nodes. The analysis is explained below and is a further 
elaboration of De Moor et al. (2018b). The spatiotemporal data used to answer the second research 
question was also used for the third research question, because this is the only common information 
available in the two databases.
9.1. Introduction
Studies on the spatial and temporal dispersion of crimes are predominantly limited to known serial 
offenders registered in police-recorded crime data. Johnson (2013), for example, studied the space–time 
behaviour of serial burglars. Lundrigan, Czarnomski, and Wilson (2010) studied the spatial distribution 
of crimes committed by serial sexual offenders. van Sleeuwen, Ruiter, and Menting (2018) studied the 
temporal distribution of various crimes committed by serial offenders. All these, and many more, studies 
determined that the crimes committed by serial offenders are spatially and temporally clustered. If the 
behaviour of unknown offenders is also taken into account, a different picture could be revealed (see e.g., 
Lammers, 2013), although some studies have found little support for different spatiotemporal behaviour 
by known and unknown offenders (see van Sleeuwen et al., 2018).
Does this spatiotemporal clustering also apply to co-offenders? To date, the spatiotemporal behaviour of 
unknown serial co-offenders has not been studied. Information on where and when unsolved crimes are 
committed is registered in the police database, but they are seemingly independent crimes committed 
by different offenders. In contrast to the unsolved crimes stored in the DNA database, these crimes 
cannot be linked to each other due to the lack of a known offender. In this chapter a first step into this 
unexplored area is taken by combining spatiotemporal offending data from known and unknown serial 
co-offenders. This study takes a more methodological perspective. The prevalence and characteristics of 
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serial co-offences obtained from the police-recorded crime data and the DNA data are used to evaluate 
differences between the networks obtained from both datasets. No statements are made about the 
offending behaviour of ‘the’ serial co-offender because the focus of this chapter is on the changes the 
networks obtained from police-recorded crime data undergo when integrated with data from unknown 
offenders in the DNA database. The research is therefore not limited to certain types of serial and co-
offenders but preferred a broad conceptualization of serial co-offenders: offenders who committed at 
least two crimes, of which at least one crime committed in company of another offender.
9.2. Data 
The study uses six years of recorded crime data (2010 through 2015) relating to the four selected crime 
types from both the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database: aggravated burglary, violent theft, 
lethal violence and sexual offences. 
In order to study the added value of the NGDB, a selection of the available data was made. First, to 
ensure that the offenders in the DNA dataset were different from those selected from the police-
recorded crime data, only crimes committed by one or more unknown offenders were selected from the 
NGDB.30 The reverse selection mechanism was applied to the Belgian General Police Database: only 
crimes committed by one or more known offenders were retained. Second, only crime cases that were 
present in both databases were selected. Not every crime in the Belgian General Police Database is 
registered in the NGDB – some crime scenes are simply not inspected for DNA traces, and in other crime 
scenes no suitable DNA traces may be found – but every crime registered in the NGDB is registered in 
the Belgian General Police Database, with or without known offenders. Third, only crimes involving serial 
offenders (i.e., offenders who committed at least two crimes in the six years under study) were selected 
from both databases. This resulted in a police dataset of 121 crimes committed by 71 serial co-offenders 
and a DNA dataset of 544 crimes committed by 232 serial co-offenders. As these figures indicate, the 
DNA dataset contains far more crimes and offenders than the police dataset, primarily due to the low 
clearance rates typical of recorded crime data. Finally, both datasets were integrated into a single dataset 
so that those crimes only committed by co-offenders (i.e., offenders who committed at least one of their 
crime in the company of another offender) could be selected. An extra selection criterion was adopted 
for this integrated dataset, because combining the two datasets creates an uncertainty about whether 
an unknown offender in the DNA dataset is the same person as a known offender from the police 
dataset. Therefore, networks that were composed of only two offenders of which one originates from 
the DNA dataset and the other from the police dataset were excluded. Thus, all remaining networks in 
the data definitely included crimes committed by serial co-offenders. The hypothetical example in Figure 
30 As mentioned in the introduction, offender profiles are stored in the NGDB using a code. The corresponding identity of the 
offender is managed by a third party, the National DNA Cell. As scientific researchers have no access to these data, it was not 
possible to check for possible matches between unknown DNA profiles and known offenders stored in the police dataset. 
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15 illustrates this. Suppose that unknown offender A from the DNA dataset and known offender B from 
the police-recorded dataset are actually the same person. If the offenders were incorrectly identified as 
two different offenders, a supposed network would be analysed that had actually been created by the 
researchers themselves.
The integrated dataset is more than the sum of the number of crimes and offenders from both datasets. 
Serial offenders who are not co-offenders in the police dataset or the DNA dataset can become co-
offenders when both datasets are integrated. Looking at Figure 15, when only studying the police dataset 
data about offender B and his crimes would not be retained, as he did not commit any of his crimes with 
another known offender in the police dataset. The same is true for offender A from the DNA dataset. 
However, as Figure 15 illustrates, when the police dataset and the DNA dataset are integrated, offenders A 
and B become co-offenders. Applying the selection process to the integrated dataset, data on 654 crimes 





Known offender stored in police-recorded crime data
Unknown offender stored in DNA database
Figure 15: Hypothetical example of three crimes and two offenders
Notes: A and B become co-offenders when the police dataset is integrated with the DNA dataset. A prerequisite is that A and 
B are two different offenders, and not the same offender stored in both datasets.
9.3. Methods 
9.3.1. Social network analysis
Graph-based techniques are used for studying pairwise relationships among the actors (Rossy & Morselli, 
2018). The relationships between the actors are described in terms of vertices and edges. Vertices V (or 
nodes) are the individual actors within the network G, and edges E represent the links between the 
actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Figure 16 illustrates a hypothetical network G(V,E) of six offenders 
(A–F) responsible for six crimes in total (1–6). The bipartite graph represents a two-mode network, as 
there are two different nodal types: a set of actors (offenders) and a set of events (crimes). Non-directed 
lines connect actors on one side of the graph to the events on the other side of the graph.31 Lines, or 
edges, between one offender and another or between one crime and another are not possible. Offenders 
31 Lines can be directed or non-directed in social networks. For example, in a one-mode network of people who live in a city, 
lines between siblings are non-directed (V is a sibling of W and vice versa) whereas lines representing parenthood are directed 
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are only linked to each other through a common crime, and crimes are only linked to each other when 
they have offenders in common (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). One-mode network 
data can be derived from this two-mode network data, one for each set of nodes. In the one-mode 
network of offenders, for example, the nodes are offenders and the offenders are linked through their 
joint participation in different crimes (Marin & Wellman, 2011). Figure 17 represents the one-mode network 
of offenders obtained from Figure 16. 
In the one-mode network G there are two components or sub-networks: component 1 consisting of 
offenders A, B and C; and component 2 consisting of offenders D and E. Only offenders and their other 
co-offenders who commit a crime together are part of the same component. A component consists of 
at least two offenders connected to each other, directly or indirectly, but the offenders within a sub-
network have no links with other offenders outside the sub-network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Node F 
is called an isolate as this offender has no adjacent nodes and is thus disconnected from the other nodes 
in the network.
The R packages ‘igraph’ (Csárdi & Nepusz, 2006) and ‘Matrix’ (Bates & Maechler, 2017) were used to 














Figure 16: Bipartite graph of a hypothetical two-mode network of six offenders and six crimes
A B C D E F
 
Figure 17: One-mode networks of offenders obtained from the bipartite graph in Figure 16
(X is a parent of Y but Y is not a parent of X). In two-mode networks, lines are always non-directed.
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9.3.2.  Jaccard similarity index 
The Jaccard similarity index is a measure of similarity between two sets of data. The Jaccard index can be 
calculated as the number of data points the two datasets have in common, divided by the total number 
of different data points in the two datasets (Jaccard, 1912):
J(X,Y) = | X | Y | / | X U Y |
The minimum index is 0 (or 0%), which means that there is no overlap as both datasets have no data 
points in common. When the data points in both datasets are the same, the index reaches a value of 1 
(or 100%), which is a perfect overlap of the two datasets (Simpson et al., 2013). A simple example can 
illustrate the index. Dataset X has five data points: X = {a, b, c, d, e} and dataset Y has eight data points: Y 
= {a, b, e, f, g, h, i, j}. As both datasets have three data points in common and there are ten different data 
points in total, the Jaccard similarity index is equal to 3/10 or 30%.
In this study, the Jaccard similarity index is used to determine the similarity between networks (Figure 18). 
The similarity index is then based on the number of edges two networks have in common, the number of 
edges in each network and the total number of edges (Fuxman Bass et al., 2013).
Edge Network 1
A - B 1 1






A - C 1 1
A - D 0 1
B - C 1 0
B - D 0 0
C - D 1 1
Figure 18: Illustration of the Jaccard similarity index (Fuxman Bass et al., 2013, p. 1174)
9.3.3. Normalized diversity index
Diversity indexes were computed to assess the spatial and temporal variability within the obtained crime 
networks. In our study, the temporal diversity index reflects the probability that any two offences 
drawn randomly from a network are committed in different years. The spatial diversity index reflects 
the probability that any two offences drawn randomly from a network are committed in different judicial 
districts (Mazerolle et al., 2000, pp. 1153-1154). 
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The diversity index di is computed as follows:
where pm is the proportion of crimes registered in a specific year or district m (Mazerolle et al., 2000, 
pp. 1153-1154). M represents the total number of categories or the number of possible years and districts, 
which is six for the temporal diversity index as there are crime data on six different years, and 27 for the 
spatial diversity index as all crimes are registered in one of the 27 judicial districts. 
The minimum of the diversity index is zero, and this indicates that all crimes were committed in the same 
year/district. The maximum depends on the number of categories M or the number of possible years (six) 
and districts (27): dmax = (M-1)/M. A maximum spread of the crimes in time/place is obtained when every 
category entails an equal number of offences. This is illustrated by the network of six crimes committed 
in four years and in three districts presented in Figure 19, provides the following indexes:
dyear = 1 – { (0/6)² + (1/6)² + (0/6)² + (1/6)² + (1/6)² + (3/6)²} = 0.6667
ddistrict = 1 – { (3/6)² + (1/6)² + (2/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² 
+ (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² +  (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + 
(0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² + (0/6)² } = 0.6111
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A A AB B B C DC D
Figure 19: Fictional example of six crimes committed in four years and in three districts
The index as calculated above depends on the number of categories M. A network A with three crimes 
spread over three districts will have a lower index (ddistrict = 0.6667) than a network B with nine crimes 
spread over nine districts (ddistrict = 0.8889), as only three of the 27 districts (categories) are involved in the 
network. However, a network with three crimes can only be spread over a maximum of three different 
districts. Network A and network B would have the same diversity index when the index is based on the 
number of crimes n in the network. 
To be able to interpret the diversity index independently of the number of categories, a normalized 
diversity index with dmin = 0 and dmax = 1 was calculated by the formula: dNorm = di / (n-1)/n. A value of 
zero indicates that there is no diversity in the network because all crimes are committed within the 
same district/year. A value of one indicates that all crimes in these networks are evenly spread over 
the different districts/years present in the network. For the network in Figure 19, this results in dNorm, year 
= 0.80004 and dNorm, district = 0.73332. Both the dNorm for year and district are high, as the network is spread 




The police dataset consists of 121 crimes committed by 71 known serial co-offenders. There are 168 edges 
between pairs of crimes in this dataset. With only 30 networks, the police dataset has the lowest number 
of networks. The average network size is 4.03 crimes (min = 2, max = 10, S.D. = 2.14). The DNA dataset 
consists of 232 unknown serial co-offenders responsible for 544 offences. The offences are spread over 
93 networks with a mean size of 5.85 crimes (S.D. = 6.11). All networks consist of between 2 and 24 crimes. 
Only one network contains 51 crimes. There are 1,496 edges visible in the DNA dataset, which is about 
nine times more than in the police dataset (Table 11).
By integrating the police dataset and the DNA dataset, a dataset of 654 crimes committed by 372 offenders 
was obtained: 102 known offenders and 270 unknown offenders. There are 1,699 edges between two 
crimes, spread over 108 networks with an average size of 6.06 crimes (S.D. = 6.38). As in the DNA dataset, 
the network size is between 2 and 24 crimes. Only one network contains 55 crimes. Combining the two 
datasets allows new links between crimes from each dataset to be identified. 1.85% (N = 2) of the networks 
are the result of the expansion of an already existing DNA network with additional crimes from the police 
dataset and the DNA dataset, as new links between crimes from both databases are made. 12.04% (N = 
13) of the networks are the result of a combination of networks already present in the police dataset and 
the DNA dataset. 5.56% (N = 6) of the networks are new and could only be identified by combining both 
databases. In 2.78% (N = 3) of the networks the DNA dataset allows for an extension of the networks of 
crimes that were already present in the police dataset. Only 9.26% of the networks (N = 10) have the same 
crime composition as observed in the police dataset alone. Combining the police dataset and the DNA 
dataset has no consequences on the appearance of these networks in terms of crimes, compared with 
the police dataset alone. In some of these ten networks, the DNA dataset adds some extra offenders, but 
no extra crimes. The remaining 79.92% of the networks (N = 74) are composed of the same crimes as in 
the DNA dataset only. Fifty-seven of them are exactly the same as in the DNA dataset. No information 
from the police dataset is integrated in these networks. One network of three crimes can be found in the 
two separate datasets, though with different offenders. Since the crime networks, and not the offender 
networks, are studied, the DNA dataset has no added value in this network. In another 16 networks 
previously visible in the DNA dataset, the police dataset adds new offenders, but no new crimes.32 To 
conclude, 89.81% of the crime networks (N = 97) from the integrated dataset clearly benefit from the 
integration of the two separate datasets compared with the police dataset alone.
32 The two-mode network of offenders and crimes is used for the integrated dataset to make this evaluation.
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Table 11: Description of the three datasets under study
Police dataset DNA dataset Integrated dataset
Number of nodes (crimes) 121 544 654
Number of edges 168 1,496 1,699
Number of networks 30 93 108
Mean network size in number of crimes 4.03 5.85 6.06
9.4.2. Jaccard similarity index
The overlap between the different datasets is quantified in terms of shared edges. Both the number of 
shared edges and the Jaccard index (i.e., the proportion of shared edges relative to the total number 
of edges) are given in Table 12. Although all edges from the police dataset are present in the integrated 
dataset, the Jaccard index is very low, with a value of 0.10, as both datasets only share 168 of the 1,699 
edges in total. Nearly all edges from the DNA dataset (1,490 of 1,496 edges) 33 are present in the integrated 
dataset of 1,699 edges. This results in a much higher Jaccard index of 0.87. In other words, the DNA 
dataset and the integrated dataset have 87% of all their edges in common, indicating that both datasets 
are very similar. 
These two indexes provide an indication of how much the police dataset and the DNA dataset separately 
contribute to the integrated dataset. However, they give no indication of how big the overlap between 
the two separate datasets is. The same edge can be present in both the police dataset and the DNA 
dataset. Also, as illustrated above, a new link can be made between a crime from the police dataset and 
a crime from the DNA dataset. Therefore, the integrated dataset is not just the sum of the two separate 
datasets but includes, for example, an extra 35 edges. If the police dataset were to completely overlap 
with the DNA dataset, the resulting Jaccard index would be only 0.11. As both datasets only share 85 
edges, the Jaccard index is just 0.05, although about half of all edges present in the police dataset overlap 
with edges present in the DNA dataset. This low Jaccard index indicates that the separate datasets both 
make a contribution to the integrated dataset in terms of the number of unique edges.
33 One would expect this number to be 1,496. However, by excluding the networks composed of only two offenders of which 
one originates from the DNA dataset and the other from the police dataset, some crimes and related edges were removed 
from the integrated dataset (see 9.2).
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Table 12: Jaccard similarities between edges present in the three different datasets.
Police dataset DNA dataset Integrated dataset
Police dataset 1.0  (168) 0.05 (85) 0.10 (168)
DNA dataset 1.0  (1,496) 0.87 (1,490)
Integrated dataset 1.0  (1,699)
Notes: Number of edges between brackets.
9.4.3. Spatiotemporal distribution
Studying the spatiotemporal distribution of the networks in the datasets allows us to evaluate whether 
the three networks differ not only in size, but also in their characteristics. In ten networks present in the 
police dataset, all crimes were committed in only one year. Obviously, this has an impact on the average 
temporal distribution measures of the 30 networks in total. Focusing instead on the 20 networks active 
in more than one calendar year, the mean temporal diversity index increases from 0.44 to 0.65, the mean 
timespan increases from 2.23 to 2.35 years and the average network size is now 4.75 crimes (S.D = 2.20). 
A similar phenomenon was found relating to the spatial distribution. Over half of all (N = 17, 56.67%) 
networks in the police-recorded crime data were only active within one district, as indicated by the low 
overall average spatial diversity index of 0.37. When only the 13 networks with different crime locations 
are taken into account, the average diversity index increases to 0.85, indicating a high chance that two 
random crimes from one of these 13 networks are committed in different districts. These networks are 
on average active in 3.38 different districts and have an average network size of 4.54 crimes (S.D. = 2.79).
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Table 13: Temporal and spatial spread of the three datasets under study
Police dataset DNA dataset Integrated dataset
Mean (median – S.D.) timespan in 
number of years 2.23 (2 - 1.22) 2.61 (2 - 1.37) 2.64 (2 - 1.46)
Mean (median – S.D.) unique 
number of years 1.9 (2 - 0.80) 2.22 (2 – 0.99) 2.26 (2 – 1.10)
Number of networks only active 
in one year 10 (33.33%) 26 (27.96%) 30 (27.78%)
Mean (median – S.D.) temporal 
dNorm 
0.44 (0.50 – 0.35) 0.48 (0.60 – 0.34) 0.49 (0.63 – 0.34)
Mean (median – S.D.) unique 
number of districts 2.03 (1 – 1.77) 2.65 (2 – 2.04) 2.6 (2 – 2.08)
Mean (median – S.D.) spatial dNorm 0.37 (0 – 0.45) 0.50 (0.6 – 0.39) 0.49 (0.5 – 0.39)
Number of networks only active 
in one district 17 (56.67%) 29 (31.18%) 34 (31.48%)
The identified networks in the DNA dataset have a larger spatial and temporal spread than in the police 
dataset (Table 13). The measures for spatial and temporal distribution in the integrated dataset are similar 
to those of the DNA dataset separately. This is not surprising since 74 of the 108 networks (79.92%) are 
composed of the same crimes as in the DNA dataset only. In the integrated dataset, the average diversity 
index for time is 0.49, compared with 0.44 in the police dataset. This already represents a 11.36% larger 
temporal spread, although the difference is not significant (p = 0.41).34 The timespan is extended from 
2.23 to 2.64 years and the crimes are spread over more years (from 1.9 to 2.26 years on average) (p = 
0.08). The proportion of networks only active in one year decreases from 33.33% in the police dataset to 
27.78% in the integrated dataset. The decrease is even greater for the number of networks only active in 
one district: from 56.67% to 31.48%. The networks from the integrated dataset are spread across more 
districts than the police dataset (2.6 versus 2.03) and also the mean spatial diversity index increases 
significantly to 0.49 (p<0.01).35 The spatial dispersion of the crimes at network level is visually displayed in 
Figure 20 and Figure 21. For example, network X in the plot of the networks in the integrated dataset is the 
biggest, with 55 crimes spread over 14 different districts. Only one crime was committed in two of these 
districts, and between two and seven crimes were committed in each of the other districts. This results 
in a high normalized spatial diversity index of 0.93. Network Y, in contrast, is composed of four crimes, all 
committed in the same district. The normalized spatial diversity index of this network is zero. 
34 The one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was significant at 0.05 level (V = 119).
35 The one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was significant at 0.05 level (V = 119.5).
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Figure 20: Spatial dispersion of crimes at network level for the police dataset
Notes: The districts Arlon (AR), Dinant (DI), Mons (MO), Neufchâteau (NE), Nivelles (NI), Tongeren (TG), Tournai (TN) are 
absent in the police recored crime data.
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Figure 21: Spatial dispersion of crimes at network level for the integrated dataset
Notes: The district Arlon (AR) is absent in the integrated dataset.
9.5. Conclusion and discussion
Serial co-offenders are particular difficult to study because police-recorded crime data underestimate 
the true magnitude of crime, and also because arrested offenders are not willing to inform on potential 
accomplices or report additional offences (Alarid et al., 2009). The use of DNA databases makes it possible 
to study unknown offenders of detected crimes, and multiple offences by the same unknown offender can 
be linked. In this chapter the NGDB was used to study serial co-offences. The central question is whether 
and how the picture of offending networks is different in a dataset that integrates police-recorded crime 
data and DNA data on the same cases, compared to the police-recorded crime data only.
The DNA dataset was found to be an important quantitative enrichment for the police dataset. A low 
Jaccard index illustrates that the two datasets only have a small overlap, indicating that both contain 
different information. Indeed, combining both datasets on the same crime cases made it possible to 
study five times more crimes than would have been possible with just the police dataset, and the offences 
and offending behaviour of unknown offenders could be studied. In addition, links were made between 
crimes committed by known offenders from the police dataset and crimes committed by unknown 
offenders from the DNA dataset. As a result, four times more networks were identified, which involve on 
average 1.5 times more crimes than those in the police dataset. A high number of these networks only 
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consisted of crimes committed by unknown offenders from the DNA dataset. Moreover, less than 10% of 
the crime networks in the integrated dataset have exactly the same crime composition as those in the 
police dataset alone.
This research confirms the findings of Lammers (2013) that police-recorded crime data underestimates 
the spatial dispersion of serial offenders. Both the spatial and temporal distribution of the networks of 
crimes is lower in the police dataset than in the integrated dataset. The networks from the integrated 
dataset have a longer time span and the crimes are committed in more distinct years and districts: on 
average, the offending networks have about 12% larger temporal spread and 15% larger spatial spread 
than the networks identified in the police dataset. However, some caution is needed in interpreting the 
results, especially as small sample sizes are involved. For example, the larger temporal spread in the 
integrated dataset was not significant. Integrating police-recorded crime data with DNA data did not 
have a substantial impact on the temporal spread of the networks found. Nevertheless, these findings 
provide additional empirical support to the previously mentioned statement that police-recorded crime 
data only represent a proportion of the total offender population. Disregarding unknown offenders may 
mean that a substantial number of crimes are ignored, and this may result in a considerable loss of 
spatiotemporal variation.
The proposition to integrate police-recorded crime data and DNA data is important for both theoretical 
and operational research. As has already been mentioned, DNA databases have an added value in the 
study of serial co-offenders, especially when combined with police-recorded crime data. In particular, the 
results of this research indicate that known and unknown offenders may have different offending patterns. 
New theoretical insights into offending behaviour will follow from the use of a SNA on an integrated 
dataset. Police forces can also benefit from the new insights obtained from an integrated dataset, both 
to prevent and solve crimes. First, a social network analysis of the integrated dataset can also help to 
discover networks and, ultimately, to prevent crime. Our analysis illustrates that the integration of the 
police-recorded crime data and the DNA data not only expands the networks visible in police-recorded 
crime data, but also reveals crime networks that were not visible in the police-recorded crime data. 
As a result, offenders who appeared to be of marginal importance in the police database may have a 
central role in the integrated database, or vice versa. This new information may guide the police in their 
investigation. Arresting those key offenders may result in a disruption of the network (Berlusconi, 2017). 
This may also prevent other actors from committing new crimes as they may have lost their ‘partner in 
crime’. Second, an integrated dataset increases the opportunities for crime ‘scenario building’ (van der 
Hulst, 2009) – reconstructing what might have happened and identifying who was involved. For example, 
identifying unknown offenders becomes more feasible when it is discovered that they have committed a 
crime with a known offender. Unknown offenders present in DNA databases could also resolve a missing 
link between other known offenders in police-recorded crime data. Offending groups (i.e., ‘Who offends 
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with whom?’) become visible, as do the broader accomplice networks of offenders indirectly connected 
to each other (i.e., ‘Who (probably) knows whom?’) (Chattoe & Hamill, 2005). Studying a pattern of crimes 
committed by an unknown offender may also create new leads. Furthermore, the fact that offenders 
are committing their crimes in more districts and time periods than previously thought means that the 
police should look beyond the crime case that is initially brought to their attention, to a broader time 
scope, but also a broader geographic area. Thus cooperation between police forces from different judicial 
districts will be needed before the benefits of an integrated dataset can be fully exploited.
Two limitations mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation specifically apply to this study. First, 
the identified networks may have been even larger and more dispersed if other crime types represented 
in the NGDB, such as drug use or organized crime, had been integrated into the analysis. This seems 
likely, as most offenders are generalists and do not limit themselves to committing only one type of 
crime (Leary & Pease, 2003; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2011; Piquero et al., 2003). The second potential limitation 
concerns the aggregated spatial level used in the study. The information that was made available was 
restricted to the district level due to privacy concerns, and it was therefore not possible to detect spatial 
variation between two crimes committed in different cities within the same district. The geographic 
dispersion could be much higher than was found in this study. The same is true for an aggregated 
temporal level. In this study, only variations between different years, but not within one year, could be 
made visible. However, the problem of aggregated data should not be exaggerated. The added value of 
an integrated dataset for criminological research was demonstrated simply by observing a difference 
between the temporal and spatial dispersion at the aggregate level between the police dataset and the 
integrated dataset.
This study is only a first exploration of the potential of a dataset that integrates police-recorded crime 
data and DNA data by means of one-mode crime networks. Although this perspective was clearly 
valuable, the necessary next step seems to be to study the one-mode network of offenders, especially 
in the light of research on hidden populations, of which criminal networks are an example. This missing 
data problem will be addressed in the next chapter by using networks of offenders that include both 
known and unknown offenders.
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10. Assessing the missing data problem in criminal network analysis 
using DNA data
The research question to be answered in this chapter reads as follows:
Q 4: To what extent does the offender profile change when unknown offenders 
are included in a network analysis?
The chapter explores whether and how the picture of offender networks in police-recorded crime data 
differs from the picture of offender networks in a dataset that integrates this data with DNA data. The 
chapter takes a first step into the unexplored area of DNA datasets to search for an answer to the missing 
data problem in criminal network analysis by comparing relevant network statistics.
10.1. Introduction
It is not easy to map criminal networks. They have fuzzy boundaries and dynamic relationships (Sparrow, 
1991). The partnerships between different offenders can be temporary (only for one crime, for example) 
or more permanent in nature (Weerman & Kleemans, 2002), although offenders do not usually commit 
multiple crimes with the same co-offender, except in more specialized groups (Reiss & Farrington, 1991). 
As a result, co-offenders often belong to multiple offending groups at the same time (Warr, 1996). But 
perhaps the main obstacle to the study of criminal networks is the incompleteness of the available 
network data. Unlike social networks such as friendships or working relationships, criminal ties are less 
visible, as offenders try to conceal their crimes and ties with criminal friends. Consequently, criminal 
networks are incomplete and both nodes and edges are missing (Sparrow, 1991; Xu & Chen, 2005).
Depending on the data collection method, missing data in networks can have multiple causes: the 
boundary specification problem (BSP), respondent inaccuracy and non-response in network surveys or 
interviews and the study design. For example, the study design can create a fixed choice effect, where 
bias is caused by limiting respondents to naming, say, three friends when in reality they have at least ten 
friends (Kossinets, 2006). The BSP is the most important factor in this dissertation. The BSP refers to the 
impact that the non-inclusion of actors or nodes and the different affiliations between those actors can 
have on the network (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1987). The BSP is of particular interest in the study 
of criminal networks, as only detected offenders and their crimes can be integrated in the network. In 
other words: the external boundaries of the network lie where the police and court files end (Berlusconi, 
2013, p. 63; Campana & Varese, 2011, p. 20). However, these boundaries can be very restrictive, as in many 
Western countries the clearance rate of registered crimes is very low (De Wree et al., 2006; Lammers & 
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Bernasco, 2013). Unknown offenders and their offences, and the unknown crimes of known offenders, 
remain out of reach to those studying offending behaviour, and as a result criminal network data is 
incomplete as part of the existing nodes and/or links are not visible (Coles, 2001).
Criminological researchers have used several sources to extract network data: surveillance data from 
communications using telephone, e-mail or personal contact (e.g., Campana & Varese, 2011), interview 
data with offenders (e.g., Vlaemynck, 2016), experiential knowledge of police officers and other criminal 
justice agencies (e.g., McGloin, 2005), police crime reports (e.g., Papachristos & Wildeman, 2014), 
transcripts of court proceedings (e.g., Reid, Tayebi, & Frank, 2013) and open source media reports (e.g., 
Burcher & Whelan, 2015; Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007). In recent years, a number of researchers have 
evaluated (the completeness of) these different data sources for use in network analysis. D. A. Bright, 
Hughes, and Chalmers (2012) recommended the use of judges’ sentencing comments. The researchers 
admitted that these data might not provide as valuable information as that gained from other sources, 
but highlighted that, in contrast to offender databases or wire taps for example, judges’ sentencing 
comments are free of charge, publicly available and concise.
Other researchers have focused on methodological issues and the impact of incomplete data on criminal 
networks. Malm and Bichler (2011) concluded that the use of multiple data sources can provide a more 
comprehensive picture of drug market networks. Berlusconi (2013) used wire taps, arrest warrants and 
judgment data on groups operating in an Italian province. She noted that the number of nodes and ties 
present in the data decreases from wire taps to arrest warrants to judgment data, although the statistical 
measures that describe the position of an actor within a network (degree and betweenness centrality) 
remain quite robust.
A more systematic way of evaluating the impact of incomplete network data is by simulating network 
errors in an observed network: nodes and/or edges are extracted from or added to a known network. 
Statistics on this reduced or completed network are then compared with the statistics from the true or 
real-world network (Borgatti, Carley, & Krackhardt, 2006; Kossinets, 2006; J. A. Smith & Moody, 2013; J. A. 
Smith, Moody, & Morgan, 2017; Xu & Chen, 2008). This allows the different error types that are possible 
in network data to be assessed. For example, the impact of false negative nodes and false negative edges 
can be studied by deleting nodes or edges in criminal offending networks. A false negative node refers 
to the absence of a person in the network who should be present as he is an offender. A false negative 
edge means that the relation between two offenders is not observed in the network. The two offenders 
are not registered as co-offenders even though they actually are. The impact of false positive nodes 
and false positive edges can be assessed by adding nodes or edges in criminal offending networks. A 
false positive node refers to a person registered as an offender who is not the offender of the crime and 
should therefore not be part of the network. False positive edges appear when relationships between 
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offenders are incorrectly present in a network: two offenders are registered as co-offenders, but have 
not committed any crimes together (Frantz, Cataldo, & Carley, 2009; Wang, Shi, McFarland, & Leskovec, 
2012). A less commonly studied measurement error is false aggregation and disaggregation. Two nodes 
are falsely aggregated when they are wrongly regarded as one node. The opposite applies to false 
disaggregation: one node is wrongly regarded as two separate nodes in the network. The impact of these 
errors is assessed by aggregating or disaggregating nodes. In the former, edges of node A are connected 
to node B and node A is removed afterwards. In the latter, node A is split into two nodes A and B. Some 
of the edges of node A are randomly removed and added to the new node B (Wang et al., 2012).
 
Most researchers using simulated network errors apply random errors to real-world (i.e., observed) 
networks (e.g., Huisman, 2009; J. A. Smith & Moody, 2013; Wang et al., 2012) or to simulated, random 
networks (e.g., Borgatti et al., 2006; Frantz et al., 2009) to assess the impact on centrality measures 
(see 10.3). In a recent study, J. A. Smith et al. (2017) applied non-random errors to 12 real-world networks 
by removing nodes proportional to their centrality. Most of these studies simulating network errors 
conclude that the effect of missing data depends on a number of factors (J. A. Smith et al., 2017). First, 
the lower the sample coverage, the more the network estimates are corrupted (Galaskiewicz, 1991). The 
nature of the missing data is a second factor. For example, bias is worse when more central nodes are 
missing. In other words, non-random missing data cause a higher bias. Third, missing data do not have the 
same effect on every network statistic (Costenbader & Valente, 2003). Centrality measures seem to be 
more robust against missing network data than other network statistics (J. A. Smith et al., 2017). Finally, 
the characteristics of the network will also influence the effect of missing data. Smith & Moody (2013), 
for example, found in their research on random missing nodes in different empirical networks that larger, 
more centralized networks are generally more robust to missing data. Borgatti et al. (2006) concluded 
that, except for edge deletion, centrality measures of dense networks are the most robust against random 
errors in network data. Frantz et al. (2009) also found that network errors may have a different impact on 
centrality measures, depending on the network topology (uniform random, small-world, core-periphery, 
scale-free or cellular networks). Table 14 gives an overview of the main characteristics and results of the 
studies discussed above.
Current research on imperfect or missing data in networks has an important limitation. Generally, random 
errors are applied to real-world or generated networks. However, as in many other network contexts, 
missing data are non-random in criminal networks (Sparrow, 1991). Some offenders may be more likely 
than others to be absent in police-recorded crime data. The non-random removal of central nodes, as 
performed in the study by J. A. Smith et al. (2017) also doesn’t seem an adequate answer, as the missing 
of nodes and edges may be related to features other than the position one takes in a network. Although 
not in a network context, Lammers et al. (2012), for example, found that unknown (i.e., not arrested) 
offenders may differ from arrested offenders as the latter have a longer criminal career (i.e., commit 
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multiple crimes) and have a more versatile offending pattern (i.e., are not limited to only one crime type). 
Moreover, in light of the low clearance rates, the most central nodes in police recorded crime data may 
not be the main offenders in the network. Indeed, Sparrow (1991, p. 256) stated that “the determination of 
centrality will depend upon who you know most about, rather than who is central or pivotal in any structural 
sense” (italics in reference).
The central question in this chapter is whether the offender profile changes when unknown offenders 
are included in a network analysis. Do known and unknown offenders differ in network measures? In 
other words, are unknown offenders random missing nodes or not? To assess these questions, police-
recorded crime data are used to construct the ‘reduced network’ and the integrated dataset of police-
recorded crime data and forensic DNA data is used to construct the ‘real-world network’, combining DNA 
data on unknown offenders and police-recorded crime data on known offenders. By comparing network 
measures of both networks, the effect of missing data (i.e., unknown offenders) in police-recorded crime 
data can be evaluated. 
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Table 14: Overview of main characteristics and results of studies on missing data in networks illustrated in the 
text
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The study makes use of both the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database. The dataset contains 
six years of recorded crime data (2010 through 2015) relating to the four selected crime types (i.e., 
aggravated burglary, violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences). All known offenders involved in 
crimes that matched these criteria were selected from the Belgian General Police Database, resulting in 
a police dataset of 73,837 known offenders.
The police dataset was enriched with offender data from the DNA dataset to construct a dataset with 
both known and unknown offenders. Some precaution is needed when combining data from the Belgian 
General Police Database and the NGDB. The same person may be registered in both as a known offender. 
Profiles of known offenders (i.e., suspects or convicted offenders) are stored in the NGDB using a DNA 
code number (see 6.3). However, possible matches between known DNA profiles and known offenders 
stored in the police dataset could not be checked because access to the corresponding identity of the 
offender is prohibited for scientific research. This could lead to what Wang et al. (2012) define as false 
disaggregation in network data. To avoid this type of false disaggregation, only unknown offenders were 
selected from the NGDB.
Table 15 illustrates the process used to select unknown offenders from the NGDB. The same DNA profile 
can be linked to different crimes, whether it is a reference profile and/or a forensic profile. For example, 
the DNA profile of offender O5 is found at a crime scene, and a reference profile is obtained from the 
same offender O5 in the context of crime C4. Offender O5 is therefore a known offender and would not 
be included in the analysis. In another example, although two offenders are related to crime C6, only O6 
would be retained in the analysis as the other offender, O7, is a known offender. This selection procedure 
resulted in a DNA dataset of 16,092 different unknown offenders. 
Table 15: Data selection of unknown offenders from the NGDB
Crime Offender
C1 Forensic profile O1
C1 Reference profile O2
C2 Forensic profile O3
C3 Forensic profile O4
C4 Reference profile O5
C5 Forensic sample O5
C6 Forensic profile O6
C6 Reference profile O7
C7 Forensic profile O6
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10.3. Methods
10.3.1. Network analysis
As in the previous chapter, a social network analysis was performed making use of the R packages ‘igraph’ 
(Csárdi & Nepusz, 2006) and ‘Matrix’ (Bates & Maechler, 2017) to identify different components in the two 
datasets. An important variance with the previous research question is that in this chapter the analysis 
was carried out at the level of the offender and various network measures were used, which are explained 
below.
The size of a network is equal to the number of nodes or links (Rossy & Morselli, 2018). The geodesics is 
the shortest path between a pair of offenders. The geodesic distance is equal to the length of the shortest 
path (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The average path length is the average length of the shortest paths for all 
possible pairs of nodes. Density describes the network cohesion. It is the proportion of the actual present 
edges to all the possible edges. A network containing all possible edges is a clique (Rossy & Morselli, 
2018). Size, geodesics and density are illustrated by a small network in Figure 22.
Size Geodesics
















Figure 22: Network illustrating the concepts size, geodesics and density (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 111)
This study was limited to two centrality measures (i.e., degree and betweenness) for substantive reasons. 
Not all centrality measures are meaningful for disconnected networks composed of several distinct 
components like the network data in this study (e.g., closeness, see Haythornthwaite, 1996; Prell, 2013; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994).36 The degree refers to the number of direct links an offender has with other 
36 In addition, an analysis on a network composed of 73,837 known offenders and 16,092 unknown offenders demands 
significant computational power. To illustrate, an undirected network with n nodes can contain a maximum of n(n-1)/2 distinct 
edges (Scott, 2013). In theory, in the integrated network with 89,929 known and unknown offenders, in total 4,043,567,556 
distinct edges are possible between two offenders
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offenders by committing a crime together (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The minimum 
degree is 0 (or 0%), which means that the offender committed all his crimes without any co-offender. 
An offender with degree 0 is called an isolate. The maximum degree is equal to the number of nodes in 
the network minus 1 (or 100%). Offenders with a maximum degree committed at least one crime with 
every single other offender in the network. The degree only takes the local positon of the actor into 
account, as it is not concerned by how the other offenders are connected in the network (Morselli, 2009, 
p. 39; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Betweenness centrality is the proportion of times an offender is located 
along the geodesics between any two other offenders. In other words: to what extent is an offender 
the direct link between two other offenders? Unlike degree, the quantity of contacts is not important, 
but the quality of the connections is. An offender with a relatively low degree may play an important 
‘intermediary’ role and so be very central to the network (Scott, 2013, p. 87). As such, a network can 
easily be disrupted when an offender with a high betweenness centrality is arrested and thus removed 
from the network. Prell (2013, p. 107) describes the differences between these two centrality measures as 
degree centrality, emphasizing activity, and betweenness centrality, emphasizing potential control over 
information flow. An offender with many co-offenders will be central according to the degree centrality 
measures. However, offenders with fewer contacts may become more central when the betweenness 
centrality is measured. These two centrality measures are illustrated by a small network in Figure 23 and 









Figure 23: Network G(V,E)
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Figure 24: Betweenness centrality of each node coloured from least (red) to greatest (blue) (Rocchini, 2007)
10.3.2. Monte Carlo simulation
Previous research on the effect of missing data in networks, or network errors in general, usually 
performed Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate bias. This procedure entails six steps: (1) Identify or 
simulate a real-world network G(V, E). This network is assumed to be complete. (2) Calculate the network 
measures of interest for this real-world network. (3) Apply (random or non-random) network errors to 
the real-world network by adding or deleting a certain fraction of nodes and/or edges. The result is the 
distorted or reduced network G’(V’, E’). (4) Calculate the network measures of G’(V’, E’). (5) Repeat step 
3 and 4 to obtain distributions and confidence intervals of the network measures. (6) Compare network 
measures of G(V, E) with those of G’(V’, E’) to assess the impact of the different error levels (Kossinets, 
2006; J. A. Smith & Moody, 2013; J. A. Smith et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012).
In this study, three (instead of two) network types were identified: a real-world network (G(V,E)), a 
real-reduced network (G’(V’,E’)) and different simulated-reduced networks.37 The real-world network 
is composed of known offenders from the police database and unknown offenders from the DNA 
database. Based on the police database, the real-reduced network is created. It is a real network as it 
can be observed, but it is reduced because a lot of unknown offenders are missing. Finally, the simulated-
reduced networks are obtained by randomly removing a certain percentage of nodes from the real-world 
network. Eleven different levels of missingness were applied to the real-world network by randomly 
37 The VSC (Flemish Supercomputer Center) provided the computational resources (Stevin Supercomputer Infrastructure) 
and services to compute the simulated-reduced networks and the corresponding network measures. The VSC is funded by 
Ghent University, the Hercules Foundation and the Flemish Government – department EWI.
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removing 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70% of the nodes of the real-world network. Each error level 
was repeated 999 times.
Generally, the impact is assessed by calculating the correlation between the network measure in G(V,E) 
and G’(V’,E’) at the network level (e.g., Costenbader & Valente, 2003) or at the individual node level. 
In the latter case, only nodes present in both the real-world network and the reduced network can be 
taken into account (e.g., Wang et al., 2012). In this study, the networks with the random generated errors 
(i.e., simulated-reduced networks) are compared with the real-reduced network G’(V’,E’). This allowed 
the impact of random missing nodes versus non-random missing nodes to be assessed by measuring 
the degree and betweenness for each of the different error levels. Furthermore, the network measures 
were evaluated at the network level in this study. Correlations at the individual node level would only 
take the known offenders into account, as only these nodes are present in both the reduced and the real 
world network. As the goal of this study is to assess whether and how the network measures change 
when integrating unknown offenders, the analysis was done at the global (i.e., network) level. The two 
centrality measures are averaged across the 999 replications for each error level, generating one value 
for each of the two measures for each of the eleven error levels.
10.4. Results
10.4.1. Descriptives
The characteristics of the real-world network and real-reduced network are summarized in Table 17. The 
real-reduced network is composed of known offenders derived from the police-recorded crime data. 
The real-world network contains 16,092 more nodes (21.79%) than the real-reduced network. All these 
additional nodes are unknown offenders from the DNA data. An extra 21,329 edges (43.83%) between 
offenders are created by integrating unknown offenders in the network. These edges can be between 
an unknown offender and a known offender who have committed a crime together, but also between 
unknown co-offenders. Almost half of all the components have a size of only one node (i.e., isolates), 
both in the real-world network and the real-reduced network (43.36% versus 45.41%). These offenders did 
not commit any crime with another offender.
The previous chapter showed that existing components can be supplemented with additional crimes, or 
several components could be merged, when DNA data is integrated with police data. The same applies to 
offenders. This means that the composition of the 44,743 components in the real-reduced network may 
have changed after the integration of DNA data. Moreover, the real-world network contains 8,305 more 
components (18.56%) than the real-reduced network. These components are composed of only unknown 
offenders.
The average path length is around 17 for both network types. This is quite large, given the average degree is 
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below 2. However, this mean value can be distorted as both the real-world network and the real-reduced 
network contain one huge component, respectively 5,838 and 5,282 nodes. The second largest component 
contains only 144 and 136 offenders respectively. The density or network cohesion, by contrast, is low, 
caused by the high number of components in both the real-world and real-reduced network. 





Police data and DNA data Police data 
Nodes 89,929 73,837
Edges38 69,995 48,666
Average degree 1.56 1.32
Number of components 53,048 44,743
Size of largest component 5,838 5,282
Size of smallest component 1 1
Number of isolates 38,989 (43.36%) 33,531 (45.41%)
Density 1.731021e-05 1.785309e-05
Average path length 17.44058 17.50912
10.4.2. The effect of missing data on degree and betweenness
Table 18 gives an overview of the impact of missing nodes on the degree in network analysis. Results on 
the degree for the real-world network, the different simulated reduced networks and the real-reduced 
network are summarized in the table. Obviously, the real-world network has an error level of 0%. This 
network contains almost 90,000 nodes or unknown and unknown offenders and almost 70,000 links 
between these offenders. On average, every offender in the real-world network has 1.56 co-offenders. At 
the bottom of the table, the values for the real-reduced network, which only includes known offenders 
from the police-recorded crime data, are presented. The average degree (1.32) is lower than in the real-
world network (1.56), which includes both known and unknown offenders. In other words, integrating 
unknown offenders also revealed more co-offending relationships in the real-world network. 
When comparing the number of nodes, the real-reduced network has an error level of about 18% compared 
to the number of nodes in the real-world network. Table 18 also presents the results of the eleven different 
error levels applied on the real-world network, ranging from 2% to 70% of the nodes being randomly 
38 The number of edges corresponds to the number of edges present in the simplified networks. Simplified networks do not 
contain multiple edges between two nodes. In a simplified network, only one edge between two offenders is possible, even if 
these offenders may have committed multiple crimes together.
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removed. Removing nodes clearly has an impact on the average degree: the degree decreases as the 
error percentage increases. For example, an error percentage of 40 or higher corresponds with a mean 
degree below one, illustrating that this reduced network contains many isolates (i.e., offenders who did 
not commit any crime with another offender). Logically, the number of edges also decreases with an 
increasing error level. 39
A simulated error level of 15% results in the same value for degree as the 18% error level in the real-
reduced network.40 Randomly removing 15% of the known and unknown offenders from the real-world 
network results in the same degree as non-randomly removing only the unknown offenders from the 
real-world network. This can also be deduced from Figure 25, representing the 95% confidence intervals 
for degree of the 11 simulated reduced networks. The vertical dotted line on the left represents the mean 
degree of the real-reduced network (1.32) and the vertical dotted line on the right represents the mean 
degree of the real-world network (1.56). The mean degree of the real-reduced network falls within the 
95% confidence interval of the 15% error level network.
Taking into account that known and unknown offenders have a similar impact on the mean degree 
centrality and that the average degree increased in the real-world network, this means that integrating 
unknown offenders also changed (i.e., increased) the degree of the known offenders. In other words, 
co-offending relationships between known and unknown offenders become visible when DNA data and 
police data are integrated. 
39 As different Monte Carlo simulations were performed for degree and betweenness centrality, the number of edges for the 
different error levels in Table 18 is different from the number of edges for the different error levels in Table 19.
40 There is a significant difference between the degree of the real-reduced network and the other ten simulated error levels.
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Table 18: Degree of real-world network and reduced networks
Network type Error 
percentage
Mean degree Nodes Mean 
edge count
Real-world network G(V,E) 0 1.56 89929 69995
Simulated-reduced networks 2 1.53 88130 67223
5 1.48 85433 63181
10 1.40 80936 56697
15 1.32 76440 50584
20 1.25 71943 44793
25 1.17 67447 39369
30 1.09 62950 34304
40 0.93 53957 25206
50 0.78 44965 17492
60 0.62 35972 11200
70 0.47 26979 6305








Figure 25: Forest plot 95% confidence interval for degree of simulated-reduced networks
The mean betweenness scores across the real-world network, the different simulated-reduced networks 
and the real-reduced network are presented in Table 19. It is remarkable that the betweenness centrality 
of the real-reduced network with a non-random error level of about 18% is about the same as the 
betweenness in the real-world network (3723.58 and 3715.44 respectively). The integration of unknown 
offenders seems not to have affected the betweenness in the real-world network.
Randomly removing a number of nodes, both known and unknown offenders, has a clear impact on 
the average betweenness centrality of the offenders. Figure 26 illustrates that the mean betweenness 
decreases as the error level increases. Furthermore, the dotted line representing the mean betweenness 
— 109 —
PART 3: NETWORKS OF UNKNOWN OFFENDERS AND THEIR CRIMES 
of the real-world network (3715.44) is not within the 95% confidence interval of any simulated-reduced 
network.41 Therefore, the results for betweenness centrality are totally different to those for degree 
centrality. Removing about 15% of the offenders randomly would result in a much smaller average 
betweenness (1328.99) than removing the same percentage non-randomly (i.e., 3723.58 in the real-
reduced network). Even randomly removing only 2% of the known and unknown offenders from the 
real-world network results in a lower betweenness centrality than the 18% error level in the real-reduced 
network with only known offenders (p = 0.01). Known and unknown offenders have a different impact on 
betweenness centrality. 
Table 19: Betweenness of real-world network and reduced networks






Real-world network G(V,E) 0 3715.44 89929 69995
Simulated-reduced networks 2 3368.27 88130 67238
5 2845.52 85433 63194
10 2029.64 80936 56702
15 1328.99 76440 50606
20 815.97 71943 44811
25 464.79 67447 39403
30 241.46 62950 34336
40 51.83 53957 25208
50 10.30 44965 17462
60 2.00 35972 11219
70 0.42 26979 6317
Real-reduced network G’(V’,E’) 17.89 3723.58 73837 48666
41 As the mean betweenness of both the real-reduced network (3723.58) and the real-world network (3715.44) are similar, the 








Figure 26: Forest plot 95% confidence interval for betweenness of simulated-reduced networks
10.5. Conclusion and discussion
Criminal networks are a textbook example of hidden networks, as many registered crimes are unsolved 
and the offenders remain unknown. In order to assess the validity of research on criminal networks it is 
therefore important to assess the robustness of basic network measures under the condition of missing 
data (Borgatti et al., 2006). As far as is known, this is the first study to integrate forensic DNA data on 
unknown offenders with police data on known offenders in order to study the missing data problem in 
criminal networks. The DNA data provides a unique opportunity to integrate missing data into police 
networks and is an important advancement over prior research.
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This study confirms the findings from previous research. First, the higher the error level in the simulated 
networks, the more the network estimates are affected. This applies both to the degree and to the 
betweenness centrality. Second, the impact of the error level is not equal for both centrality measures. 
Betweenness centrality seems to be more affected by an increasing error level than does degree centrality. 
Third, the nature of the missing data is an important factor to consider. Although there does not seem 
to be much of a difference for degree centrality, there is a difference in randomly and non-randomly 
removing offenders from the network for betweenness centrality.
The central question in this chapter is whether and how the picture of offender networks is different in a 
dataset that integrates police data and DNA data, compared to the police data only. Offender networks 
with both known and unknown offenders may not only be bigger but also have a different structure to 
networks with only known offenders. The results of this study show that integrating unknown offenders 
has an impact on the degree, but not on the betweenness centrality. The degree is higher in the real-world 
network, which means that many offenders stored in the DNA database could be linked to the known 
offenders in the police data or to other unknown offenders. As such, the degree of the known offenders 
also increased by integrating the data. Removing only unknown offenders from the real-world network 
(i.e., real-reduced network) had no impact on betweenness. On the contrary, when known offenders 
are also removed from the network (i.e., simulated-reduced networks), betweenness decreases. In other 
words, known offenders may be more central nodes than unknown offenders in relation to betweenness.
These research findings have implications for both theory and practice. Including the unknown offenders 
stored in the NGDB in the database resulted in not only about 22% more offenders (i.e., nodes) but 
also about 44% more co-offending relations (i.e., edges), in comparison with a database solely based on 
police-recorded crime data. Therefore, the generally accepted assertion in criminology that at least half 
of all crime involves more than one offender (Andresen & Felson, 2010; Felson, 2003; Lantz & Ruback, 
2016; Warr, 2002) and that about two-thirds of all offenders commit their crimes with others (Reiss, 
1988) is probably an understatement. Furthermore, this research provides a unique view of the position 
these offenders may take in the whole offending network. Unknown offenders may be more peripheral 
nodes in the network. Illustrated in Figure 24, a blue or green node may represent a known offender and 
a red or orange node may represent an unknown offender. The question therefore arises as to whether 
the unknown offenders remain unidentified by the police because of their peripheral position, or is it, 
as Sparrow (1991, p. 256) states, just because they stay unidentified by the police that they have a more 
peripheral position in the network, although they may be more central in reality? This is an important 
nuance, as in the first case the integrated dataset would give an accurate picture of the centrality of the 
unknown offenders, whereas in the latter case the picture would be distorted. It is important to be aware 
of this uncertainty, because it could mean that arresting unknown offenders has a bigger impact on crime 
prevention than would be assumed based on their peripheral position in the network.
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Some potential limitations of this study need to be acknowledged. First, it is important to bear in mind 
that the real-world network is unlikely to include all unknown offenders from police-recorded crime data. 
It is, however, an approach that cannot be achieved with any other data. Second, both the real-world and 
real-reduced networks contain many isolates and small components, which limits the network research 
possibilities but also has an impact on the mean degree and betweenness at network level. Third, as 
stated in the introduction to this dissertation, it is not possible to be certain that all profiles stored 
in the database belong to offenders and not to victims, for example. The impact of this possible error 
differs according to the research point of view: operational or criminological research. For example, in 
operational research, an unknown victim connecting two known offenders can provide new investigative 
leads. For criminological research, this only distorts the results. Finally, false disaggregation could also 
apply to a known offender from the police dataset and an unknown offender from the DNA dataset. 
However, according to the Belgian DNA law of 2011, offenders of a crime or attempted crime mentioned 
in a restrictive list of crimes have to provide their DNA profile upon conviction (Art. 14 DNA law 2011, 
Belgisch Staatsblad, 2011a). As the four crime types selected for this study are part of this list, an unknown 
DNA profile will become ‘known’ when there is a match with the DNA profile of a convicted offender. 
Consequently, except for administrative delays in taking reference samples of convicted offenders or not 
being able to find the convicted offender to take a reference sample, for example, this problem does not 
apply to the current study.
Future research might progress the work developed here. In this study only two centrality measures were 
taken into account. Future research could explore the possibilities to measure the impact of missing data 
on other network measures. The present study could also be replicated using the traditional approach 
in missing data research by studying the correlations of the centrality measures at individual node level 
in networks with different error levels. Finally, to address the limitation of the high degree of isolates 
mentioned above, future research could focus on only the biggest component(s) present in the real-
world network. All these suggestions for future research could foster the theoretical insights on known 
and unknown offenders.
In summary, this study emphasized the importance of integrating unknown offenders in criminological 
research and gave further insights into the difference between known and unknown offenders. As in the 
previous chapter, this study illustrated that the difference between unknown and known offenders is 
not straightforward. The implications of this are further discussed in the conclusion of this dissertation 
(Chapter 13).
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CONCLUSION
The most important research findings are summarized in this final part of the dissertation. In addition, 
the specific advantages and disadvantages of the research are described, as well as the implications of 
the findings for both theory and practice. Finally, an ethical reflection is provided.
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11. Context
Do known and unknown offenders exhibit similar characteristics and offending behaviour (De Moor 
et al., 2018a)? This question is pertinent for both criminological theory and the development of crime 
policies. It is frequently asked in criminology, but to date research on unknown offenders has been 
limited because of the difficulty of studying them. This dissertation examined how DNA databases can 
contribute to the study of unknown offenders and their behaviour. The implications of the dissertation 
are threefold: methodological, as the validity of the DNA database is assessed and discussed; theoretical, 
as it provides more information about the behaviour of unknown offenders; and practical, as guidelines 
for crime prevention and control can be derived from the methodological and theoretical insights.
Literature on forensic science and forensic intelligence was studied to obtain a broader context on the 
use and content of DNA databases. As illustrated in Chapter 2, DNA databases have been the subject of 
many different studies on a range of issues, from the legal and ethical concerns surrounding their use 
and expansion, to the opportunities they provide for operational policing. Their use in criminological 
research to learn more about criminal behaviour and the broader criminal context is still limited (De 
Moor et al., 2017; De Moor et al., 2018b). However, DNA databases have, as a source of criminological 
research, three major advantages over the commonly used police databases. First, unknown offenders 
are stored in DNA databases as DNA profiles that are collected at crime scenes. Second, different crimes 
can be linked to the same unknown offender when their DNA profile is found at different crime scenes. 
Third, several unknown offenders can be linked to each other if their DNA profiles are found at the same 
crime scene. This makes it possible to study the behaviour of serial offenders and of co-offenders without 
these individuals being known to the police.
In other words, DNA databases provide – at least in theory – a unique data source for studying unknown 
offenders and their behaviour. Police data do not offer this opportunity. However, the police do not 
examine every crime scene for DNA traces, and not every crime scene provides suitable DNA profiles. 
Crimes such as money laundering or phishing, for example, are generally not represented in the DNA 
database. DNA databases therefore only comprise a proportion of all crimes stored in the police database.
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The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the use of DNA databases for scientific research, 
taking into consideration their unique advantages and disadvantages. The central research question 
underpinning this dissertation was:
How can DNA databases contribute to the study of unknown offenders and  
their criminal behaviour?
This research question was further operationalized in four sub-questions. The first two deal with the 
selectivity of DNA databases and the last two focus on the advantages of the DNA database:
Q 1: Which actors and factors have an impact on the selectivity of DNA databases?
Q 2: Are DNA databases less valid than police-recorded crime databases for the study of  
unsolved crimes?
Q 3: To what extent does the crime picture change when unsolved crimes  
are included in a network analysis?
Q 4: To what extent does the offender profile change when unknown offenders 
are included in a network analysis?
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12. Summary of research findings
This chapter summarizes the main findings of this dissertation. Each of the four research questions 
is discussed. First, the selectivity of DNA databases is reviewed as a (possible) disadvantage for 
criminological research (Q1 and Q2). Next, the advantage of the DNA database, being the ability to study 
unknown offenders and their behaviour, is considered (Q3 and Q4).
12.1. Selectivity
Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation considered whether the selectivity of DNA databases is a limitation 
to their use as a source for scientific research. First, an answer was sought to the question, Which actors 
and factors have an impact on the selectivity of DNA databases (Q1), and in particular on the forensic 
profiles stored in the criminalistics database of the NGDB? These are the profiles that will enable us to 
study unknown offenders and their behaviour. On the basis of a literature study of both scientific sources 
and legislation, and observations on relevant actors involved in the process that a DNA trace profile 
passes through before it reaches the database, various selection mechanisms were defined:
• An offender may or may not leave DNA traces at a crime scene (often depending on the type of 
crime).
• The police may or may not be aware of the crime.
• The crime scene may or may not be investigated for DNA traces, for example by the LTWP.
• A magistrate may or may not instruct a DNA laboratory to examine a piece of evidence for DNA 
traces.
• A DNA laboratory may or may not find DNA profiles on a piece of evidence.
• The DNA profile drawn up by the DNA laboratory may or may not be of sufficient quality to be 
stored by DIS in the NGDB.
From the list above two cases can be concluded. First, a number of these selection mechanisms are 
general in nature and therefore will be valid in every context and in every country. For example, some 
types of crime do not have a clear crime scene where DNA traces can be found (e.g., phishing). However, 
other mechanisms are country or region specific. Each judicial district in Belgium can set its own policy 
priorities for investigation and DNA retention – for example, judicial districts can opt to have every 
crime scene examined for DNA traces. Second, the overview shows that both conscious and unconscious 
processes have an impact on the content of the DNA database. The most difficult selection mechanism to 
control is when an offender leaves no DNA at the crime scene, or when there is no clear crime scene. This 
and other selection mechanisms mean that the DNA database contains far fewer crimes than the police 
database. The datasets made available for this dissertation have illustrated this. The police dataset used 
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in this study contains far more crimes (N = 1,186,061) than the DNA dataset (N = 25,492), although the 
same inclusion criteria were used for both. The research used data on the four most-recorded forms of 
crime in the NGDB – aggravated burglary, violent theft, sexual offences and lethal violence – committed 
between 2010 and 2015.42
What does this mean for the validity of DNA databases as a source for criminological research? Tilley 
and Townsley (2009, p. 375) suggested that “of themselves, small samples are not much of a problem if 
the sample is representative”. In this study, all crimes stored in the DNA database are also stored in the 
police database (but not vice versa), and so the representativeness of the DNA database was evaluated 
by making a comparison with the police database. The following research question is central: Are DNA 
databases less valid than police-recorded crime databases for the study of unsolved crime (Q2)? 
Police-recorded crime data are frequently used in scientific research, even though this source also has 
a high degree of selectivity (e.g., the dark number of crime). However, this dissertation has sought to 
compare the validity of two data sources, and does not address the validity of police data per se; hence 
the term ‘less’ was included in the research question.
In comparison with police data, DNA data have (to date) only been used to a limited extent in criminological 
research. Nevertheless, some ground-breaking studies have made use of DNA data, for example Lammers’ 
(2013) study on the probability of arrest and Wiles and Costello’s (Costello & Wiles, 2001; Wiles & Costello, 
2000) research into offender mobility. Wiles and Costello used DNA data to supplement police data 
in order also to study unknown offenders and their behaviour. Like other researchers making use of 
DNA databases, they were particularly interested in the benefits the database offers and they often did 
not pay sufficient attention to the validity of the data source. This dissertation is therefore unique with 
respect to previous research, as the validity of the DNA database was explicitly studied.
To answer the second research question, and thus to evaluate the representativity of the DNA data in 
relation to the police data, the concentration and spread of crimes across the different judicial districts 
between the two databases were compared. Only unsolved crimes were studied, because the specific 
added value of the DNA database lies in being able to study unknown offenders and their behaviour. The 
analyses show that in both the police dataset and the DNA dataset crime is concentrated in a limited 
number of districts. In the DNA dataset about 50% of all crimes occur in fewer than five judicial districts; 
in the police dataset about 50% of all crimes occur in fewer than four judicial districts. However, the rank 
order of crime percentages over the different judicial districts differs between both datasets. The districts 
42 It is important to mention here that the datasets that were supplied contain both solved and unsolved crimes. Specifically 
regarding the DNA dataset, this means that it includes crimes that are linked to both forensic profiles and/or reference 
profiles. To answer research questions 2, 3 and 4, a specific selection was made from these datasets.
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with the highest number of registered crimes in the police-recorded crime data do not necessarily have 
the highest number of registered crimes in the DNA data. For example, only two judicial districts appear 
in the top five of both datasets.
An SPPT allowed a further validation of the representativeness of the unsolved crimes stored in the 
NGDB. Three of the four crime types studied (i.e., violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences) 
show a high spatial similarity between the two databases. In only a limited number of districts there is 
an over-representation or under-representation of the number of unsolved crimes in the DNA database. 
Although the spatial pattern may be the same between the police-recorded crime data and the DNA data 
for violent theft, lethal violence and sexual offences, many judicial districts have a crime count of zero for 
these crime types in the DNA dataset. In other words, no crimes or (unknown) offenders are registered 
in these districts on which further analyses can be carried out. Aggravated burglary, on the contrary, 
exhibits a low spatial similarity. However, there is a strikingly higher proportion of crimes of this type 
registered in the DNA database than in the police database.
It is difficult to come to an overall conclusion regarding the spatial similarity between the two databases. 
The results depend on the type of crime and the judicial district level. This highlights the conscious and 
unconscious selection that came to light when considering the first research question. In addition to 
providing insight into representativeness, the test also made the different policies between districts 
tangible, which was not the original aim of the study. For example, the over-representation of aggravated 
burglary in the DNA database in the (most) Flemish districts corresponds with these districts’ more 
active policy in investigating an aggravated burglary crime scene.
What do these results mean for the representativeness of DNA databases and their use in criminological 
research? Their use is clearly limited by the low number of crimes registered in the database, although 
the most frequently registered crimes in the DNA database were studied in this study. A study that only 
uses a DNA database will provide very little information about some crime types (e.g., lethal violence). It 
is important to keep this drawback in mind; but simply rejecting DNA databases as a possible data source 
is a bridge too far. The next section shows that the added value of DNA databases lies in combining them 
with police databases.
12.2. Studying unknown offenders and their crimes
Several authors point out that the use of network methods is a logical choice, given the influence of 
relationships on criminal behaviour. Network analysis could also evaluate current theories and insights 
or even supplement them (Bouchard & Malm, 2016; Papachristos, 2011). However, network analysis 
has only been used to a limited extent in criminological research, and its use is often limited to known 
offenders. This is because the ability to link offenders and their crimes is a prerequisite for network 
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analysis, and police-recorded crime data does not contain information on unknown offenders. In this 
dissertation, police-recorded crime data was supplemented with DNA data to study (the behaviour of) 
serial co-offenders via network analysis.
The third research question focused on the behaviour of serial co-offenders: To what extent does the 
crime picture change when unsolved crimes are included in a network analysis (Q3)? Therefore, 
the prevalence and characteristics of serial co-offences obtained from the police-recorded crime data 
and the DNA data (i.e., known and unknown offenders) were compared with those obtained from the 
police-recorded crime data (i.e., known offenders) only. More precisely, the differences between the size 
and spatiotemporal distribution of crime networks from both datasets were evaluated. Three important 
findings emerged from this research. First, both the number and size of the networks is larger in the 
integrated dataset than in the police dataset alone. The larger networks in the integrated dataset mean 
that more crimes were committed by serial co-offenders than one can determine only on the basis of the 
police-recorded crime data. Combining the two datasets allows new links to be identified between crimes 
from each dataset: serial offenders who are not co-offenders in the police dataset or the DNA dataset 
can become co-offenders when both datasets are integrated. Second, both the spatial and temporal 
distributions of the networks in the integrated dataset are greater. On average, the crime networks in 
the integrated dataset had about 12% larger temporal spread and 15% larger spatial spread than the 
crime networks identified in the police dataset. Third, only a small minority of the crime networks in the 
integrated dataset appear to have the same composition as in the police dataset alone or in the DNA 
dataset alone. In other words, the merging of the police-recorded crime data and the DNA data did not 
change the composition of these crime networks, although in most cases extra offenders were added to 
the network. This last observation also implies that although the network analysis was carried out only 
at the crime level, it may also be important to take the offender level into account.
In summary, disregarding unknown offenders means that a substantial number of crimes will be ignored, 
with a considerable loss of spatiotemporal variation in criminal behaviour as a result. The crime picture 
that can be derived from the behaviour of known offenders differs from the crime picture of unknown 
offenders. Knowing that the DNA database is selective, it is even more striking that the crime picture 
changes significantly when integrating DNA data with police-recorded crime data. Moreover, this analysis 
only concerns four offence types. There are no immediate reasons why the crime picture of some other 
offence types would not change in the same way if unknown offenders were taken into account.
The final research question focused on the impact on the offender network of integrating DNA data 
with police recorded crime data. To what extent does the offender profile change when unknown 
offenders are included in a network analysis (Q4)? This research question was approached from the 
perspective of missing data in network analysis. Generally, random or non-random network errors are 
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applied to a real-world network G(V, E) by deleting a certain fraction of nodes and/or edges. This creates 
a reduced network G’(V’, E’). By comparing network measures (often centrality measures) of G(V, E) with 
those of G’(V’, E’), the impact of missing data can be assessed (Kossinets, 2006; J. A. Smith & Moody, 2013; 
J. A. Smith et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012). In this dissertation, the real-world network consist of known 
offenders from the police-recorded crime data and unknown offenders from the NGDB. By randomly 
deleting a certain percentage of the nodes (i.e., known and unknown offenders) from this real-world 
network, eleven reduced networks were obtained. However, the network that only uses police-recorded 
crime data is also a reduced network compared with the real-world network. Unknown offenders were 
non-randomly deleted from the real-world network, resulting in a real-reduced network with an error 
level of about 18% missing nodes. This enabled the impact of random missing nodes versus non-random 
missing nodes to be assessed by measuring the degree and betweenness centrality for each of the 
different error levels. The centrality measures are evaluated at the global (i.e., network) level, as the goal 
of this study is to assess whether and how the picture of offender networks is different in a network that 
integrates police-recorded crime data and DNA data, compared to one that is based solely on police-
recorded crime data.
Two important findings emerged from this missing data research. First, the real-world network with both 
known and unknown offenders contains more co-offending relationships compared to the network that 
only contains known offenders. New links (i.e., edges) become visible between known and unknown 
offenders, and also between unknown offenders. Therefore, there may be more co-offenders than can be 
deduced from police-recorded crime data alone. Second, integrating unknown offenders from the DNA 
database with the police-recorded crime data on known offenders has an impact on the degree but not 
on the betweenness centrality of the resulting network. On the contrary, compared with the error level 
in the real-reduced network, randomly removing the same percentage of known and unknown offenders 
from the real-world network results in much lower levels of betweenness. In other words, known offenders 
may be more central nodes than unknown offenders, as far as betweenness is concerned.
In summary, offender networks made up of both known and unknown offenders may not only be bigger 
but may also have a different structure from networks that only include known offenders. As was the case 
in the network study on crime level, this network study on offender level emphasized the importance of 
integrating unknown offenders and their crimes in criminological research.
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13. DNA as the silver bullet?
The DNA database was used as a data source to answer the research questions in two different ways: as 
a separate data source to study unsolved crimes (Q2); and as a supplement to the police-recorded crime 
data in order to study both known and unknown offenders and their behaviour (Q3 and Q4). In summary, 
two important general findings can be deduced from these studies. First, there is clear selectivity 
in the DNA database that limits its use as the only data source for scientific research. Although the 
most-registered offence types in the DNA database were studied in this dissertation, the prevalence of 
unsolved crimes in the database was sometimes too low to carry out meaningful analysis, especially for 
lethal violence and sexual offences. Second, the DNA database clearly offers added value when it is used 
in addition to the police-recorded crime data. The combination of the police-recorded crime data and the 
DNA data makes it possible to study more crimes and offenders in comparison with the police-recorded 
crime data alone. Links can be identified between the two datasets that are not visible in each of the two 
separate databases. Moreover, there are not only more crimes and more offenders to study, but also the 
characteristics of the offending behaviour changes when both known and unknown offenders are taken 
into account.
The general public often see DNA as ‘the silver bullet’ to solve crime (Dahl, 2010). Popular TV shows like 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation have undoubtedly reinforced this view (Ley, Jankowski, & Brewer, 2012). But 
can we conclude that it is also the silver bullet for criminologists who want to overcome the limitations of 
traditional data sources? In other words: How can DNA databases contribute to the study of unknown 
offenders and their criminal behaviour? The answer to this question is threefold, as this dissertation 
clearly illustrated – the use of DNA databases in criminological research is of methodological, theoretical 
and practical importance. 
13.1. Methodological importance
Although many researchers use official recorded crime data, these data have significant limitations. Self-
report studies do not always offer a solution, as both over-reporting and under-reporting can occur, 
when compared to the official recorded crime data. Occasionally, researchers combine different data 
sources. Wiles and Costello (Costello & Wiles, 2001; Wiles & Costello, 2000), for example, integrated 
three different data sources in their study on the mobility of high-volume crime offenders in and around 
Sheffield: geocoded police-recorded crime data, DNA database hits and offender interviews. They used 
the DNA database to study the travel patterns of offenders, irrespective of whether they were known 
to the police or not. There was no one-to-one match between the police-recorded data, the DNA data 
and the interviews. The data related to different periods (police data were from 1995 to June 1996, 
and DNA database hits were from June to December 1997) and referred to different offenders. The 
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analyses of the datasets were made separately and integrated afterwards in a general conclusion. This 
dissertation used a combination of different data sources, and the DNA data supplements the missing 
data in police-recorded crime data. It used an integrated dataset in which the information about the 
same crimes from the Belgian General Police Database and the NGDB were linked one-to-one. This is 
unique in comparison with previous research in which various data sources are combined without a 
one-to-one link. This approach enables more offenders (i.e., unknown offenders) and their behaviour 
to be studied, and also supplements the available information about the offenders stored in the police-
recorded data. The network analysis used in this dissertation further emphasized the advantages of an 
integrated dataset of both police-recorded crime data and DNA data. It makes it possible to study the 
serial and co-offending behaviour of both known and unknown offenders. It therefore makes significant 
methodological advancements over previous research on serial and co-offending behaviour.
13.2. Theoretical importance
By including unknown offenders, this study contributes to research into the ‘dark figure’ of offenders. 
But the integration of police-recorded crime data and DNA data not only provided a larger sample of 
(linked) offenders and their crimes. Principally, the DNA data contributed to the research into registered 
unsolved crimes, as the findings derived from this larger sample also deviated from the findings based 
only on police-recorded crime data. This dissertation is therefore in line with earlier research that pointed 
to the difference between known and unknown offenders (Lammers, 2013; Lynam, Piquero, & Moffitt, 
2004). However, it also encourages further reflection on the role and impact of unknown offenders and 
their behaviour in criminological research.
It is indeed difficult to study unknown offenders and their behaviour, but this dissertation has demonstrated 
that it is certainly possible if DNA databases are used. Although the selectivity of DNA databases limits 
the number and types of crimes that can be studied, common crimes such as burglaries can be studied. 
But does this selectivity also have an impact on the findings on unknown offenders and their unsolved 
crimes? In other words, do the unknown offenders contained in DNA databases differ from the unknown 
offenders that are not contained in DNA databases? It is difficult to answer this question. However, 
offenders are often generalists and it seems unlikely that all the crimes committed by the offenders 
registered in the police data are known. As with co-offending, a mixed known and unknown offending 
behaviour seems likely. This dissertation also showed that known and unknown offenders are not two 
totally isolated groups. Statements can be made about the difference between known and unknown 
offenders, and the findings about known offenders (may) change when unknown offenders are included 
in a study. The research demonstrated not only the difference, but also the relation, between known and 
unknown offenders. Known and unknown offenders do not seem to have mutually exclusive features. 
Taking this a step further, perhaps the most relevant question is not the one that gauges the difference 
between known and unknown offenders, but the one that gauges the difference between solved and 
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unsolved crimes.
This dissertation also clearly demonstrated the (importance of the) link between forensic science and 
forensic intelligence, and between operational and strategic or scientific research. In terms of forensic 
science and intelligence, the research showed that DNA profiles can only be obtained at a minority of 
crime scenes (forensic science), leading to selectivity in the DNA database that may have an impact 
on what can be studied and the findings based on the DNA database (forensic intelligence). In terms 
of operational and strategic/scientific research, the findings from the SPPT performed in Chapter 7 of 
this dissertation (i.e., forensic intelligence) provided insights into Belgian DNA retention policies (i.e., 
forensic science) (Figure 27). This awareness is important for all researchers making use of forensic DNA 
data.
Forensic intelligence Forensic science
e.g., SPPT e.g., DNA retention policies
Figure 27: The relation between forensic intelligence and forensic science
13.3. Practical importance
This dissertation is also of practical importance, as guidelines for crime prevention and control can 
be derived from the improved insights on unknown offenders. The lower betweenness centrality of 
unknown offenders (Chapter 10), and offending networks having a larger spatial and temporal spread 
when unsolved crimes are integrated (Chapter 9), have implications for prevention and law enforcement 
strategies. Some specific guidelines were formulated above (see for example p. 91). However, the 
implications go far beyond this. The integration of police-recorded crime data and DNA data may also 
have an impact on how operational research can be organized. This is further discussed in Chapter 16 on 
the policy implications that follow from this dissertation. 
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14. Limitations
No study is without its limitations, and a dissertation is subject to that general rule. Limitations 
encountered in answering the different research questions were described in the relevant chapters. In 
addition, various limitations of the two data sources used in this study, namely the NGDB and the Belgian 
General Police Database, were discussed in Chapter 4. Conceivably, the most important limitation of both 
data sources is that they only include registered crimes. Crimes must be detected by or reported to the 
police before they can be registered in the NGDB and/or the Belgian General Police Database. However, 
this limitation is not unique to this dissertation. Any other research making use of official recorded crime 
data encounters this problem. On the contrary, this research was able to limit this limitation, as more 
offenders and their crimes became visible. Using DNA data enabled meaningful analyses to be carried 
out on both unsolved crimes and unknown offenders.
This dissertation also has a number of more specific limitations. First of all, this is a Belgian story, which 
may limit the external validity of the research. Almost one in three countries has an operational national 
DNA database (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative) storing unknown forensic profiles extracted from 
biological samples found at crime scenes (e.g., a drop of blood), and/or reference profiles obtained from 
samples taken directly from known individuals (e.g., a buccal swab from a suspect or victim) (Home 
Office, 2014). Many of these countries also follow the previously mentioned European Standard Set when 
analysing forensic DNA samples. Although the main lines are the same, the way in which a national 
DNA database is interpreted can differ from country to country. Different inclusion criteria (especially 
regarding the reference profiles) and retention periods have an impact on the size and composition of 
the DNA database. Consequently, the representativeness of registered crime in a DNA database can 
vary from country to country. However, the same remark can be made with regard to police-recorded 
crime data. These databases also differ from country to country, although the external validity of 
police-recorded crime data is hardly questioned. Nevertheless, to meet this potential limitation of DNA 
databases, a clearly stated explanation of how and when DNA traces are collected at crime scenes, which 
profiles are (not) stored in the DNA database and under what circumstances a match can be concluded, 
may help to interpret and compare the findings from criminological research based on DNA data and to 
prevent false conclusions (De Moor et al., 2017).
A second limitation concerns not being able to involve known offenders stored in the NGDB in this 
investigation. The identity of the donor of a reference profile stored in the NGDB is managed by the 
National Cell. The legislator has consciously created a third authority as administrator to protect the 
privacy of suspects and offenders. It is therefore not possible to access these data for scientific research, 
and consequently it was not possible to check whether a known offender from the Belgian General Police 
Database and a known offender from the NGDB is one and the same person. A link between the entire 
— 128 —
NGDB and the entire Belgian General Police Database always means an uncertainty. Therefore, the 
DNA dataset in this dissertation was limited to (crimes committed by) unknown offenders. Since the 
focus of this dissertation was on unknown offenders (and their crimes), this is not necessarily a problem. 
However, as links are formed between unknown offenders from the NGDB and known offenders from the 
Belgian General Police Database, it seems obvious that links can be made between known and unknown 
offenders within the NGDB. The involvement of known offenders from the NGDB would obviously 
have no influence on our research into the validity of the NGDB in representing unsolved crimes per 
se (Chapter 7), but could have supplemented, changed or reinforced the findings about (the difference 
between known and) unknown offenders and their crimes (Chapters 9 and 10).
A final limitation is inherent in the status of an unknown offender, namely that the DNA database 
contains only limited information available about unknown offenders. The ability to study the 
characteristics and behaviour of unknown offenders is limited. Except for gender, for example, no personal 
data are available in the DNA database. Only non-coding parts of DNA may be analysed in a forensic 
context. Characteristics about the behaviour of the unknown offenders, as applied in this dissertation, 
are derived from the information available about the crimes: the location and time of the crime. Other 
information, such as the age of the offender (which may be relevant in the context of studying the 
criminal career), is not (yet?) available. Nevertheless, the NGDB remains the only database containing 
information about offenders of unsolved crimes stored in the police-recorded crime data. Moreover, the 
‘limited’ information available in the NGDB already made it possible to compare (the criminal behaviour 
of) unknown offenders with (the criminal behaviour of) known offenders and to study both the offenders 
and their behaviour in a network context. 
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15. Future research
As has already been mentioned, to date little criminological research has been carried out using DNA 
databases as a data source. Following on from this study, there are opportunities for further research 
both from a methodological and theoretical point of view. Some of these are specifically related to the 
research questions and were discussed in the relevant chapters. This section deals with future research 
opportunities that transcend the various research questions.
15.1. Criminal career research and SNA
As criminal career research has, to date, mainly been based on (individual) known offenders, a first research 
path that results from this dissertation is to further consider the possibilities of social network analysis 
for the study of both known and unknown offenders in criminal career research. Two improvements can 
be made to the research conducted here. The first is to use a broader time frame and to include all offence 
types present in the DNA database. Research shows that a criminal career can be of long duration, and an 
interruption of several years does not necessarily mean the end of the career (Metcalfe & Baker, 2014). 
Various circumstances can cause a temporary hiatus, for example imprisonment or illness. Another 
finding from the literature is that many offenders are generalists rather than specialists and therefore 
commit various types of crimes (Guerette, Stenius, & McGloin, 2005; Townsley et al., 2005).
Second, future criminal career research might build on the work presented here by applying a structural 
approach. This dissertation used the formal approach of SNA. Only the network structure is described, 
and not the impact the relation between offenders may have on the occurrence of crime, for example. 
A structural approach would enable the impact of the interdependencies among known and unknown 
offenders on the four key dimensions of a criminal career (i.e. prevalence, frequency, specialization, and 
desistance; see Piquero et al., 2003) also to be studied. More insights into the difference between the 
behaviour of known and unknown offenders could then be obtained. 
15.2. Prüm and the international context
As mentioned when discussing the limitations of this dissertation, this is a Belgian story using Belgian 
data sources. However, crime is not a phenomenon that stops at national borders. It is therefore 
important to look beyond national borders, and in this context the earlier mentioned Prüm Convention 
and the transnational exchange of forensic data between Prüm member states is of great importance. The 
network of national DNA databases makes it possible to link an offender to different crimes, regardless 
of the country in which the crimes were committed. In addition, unsolved crimes committed in one 
country can be linked to (un)solved crimes in another country (Prainsack & Toom, 2013). This could result 
in breakthroughs in previously unsolved crimes such as drug cases and murder cases (NICC/INCC, 2018). 
— 130 —
It also offers some interesting research opportunities for criminologists. For example, several authors 
have already studied cross-border offending based on the results of the exchange of forensic DNA 
data between Prüm members (see for example F. Santos & Machado, 2017; Taverne & Broeders, 2017). 
However, the studies are often limited to descriptive analyses. For example: which (regions of which) 
countries provide the most mutual matches? Again, an SNA could provide a different view of offending 
behaviour and whether or not there are differences between offenders who are internationally active and 
those who commit their offences within national borders.
15.3. Inclusion and retention criteria of DNA databases
The findings of this dissertation may stimulate the debate and scientific study on the inclusion and 
retention criteria of DNA databases. Many countries explicitly state in legislation which reference 
profiles are to be stored in their national DNA database, and for how long. For crime scene profiles, this 
is often limited to the retention period and no other retention criteria. But how do authorities determine 
whose DNA profile should be stored in their DNA database, and for how long? After all, there is a broad 
continuum between ‘no DNA database’ and a ‘universal DNA database’ (Figure 28).
At birth?
From / to a certain age?
Limited to specific 
crimes?
Nobody Convicts Arrested ‘Active criminal group’ Everybody
Limited in time?
Limited to specific 
crimes?
Limited in time?
Limited to specific 
crimes?
Limited in time?
Limited to specific 
crimes?
Figure 28: Spectrum of possible target groups stored in DNA databases
In order to decide which DNA profiles should be stored, the purposes of such databases must be 
considered. The primary aim of a DNA database is usually to solve and prevent crimes, taking into account 
the recidivism of offenders, as is the case in Belgium (Belgische Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers, 
1998). Research into, among other things, recidivism, criminal careers and the age–crime curve often 
provide guidance in determining (and extending) the inclusion conditions of a DNA database (Kazemian 
et al., 2011; Tseloni & Pease, 2011). 43
Although research has already been conducted in this area, this dissertation may stimulate further the 
43 Although the ‘elimination’ and ‘missing persons’ databases have other purposes, a similar discussion can be held on the 
content of these DNA databases. Establishing a universal DNA database could also imply that both of these databases will 
become redundant. 
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debate on which type of DNA profiles should be stored and for how long, both reference profiles and 
forensic profiles. First, current research into recidivism, criminal careers and the age–crime curve is mainly 
based on known offenders and their crimes. Kazemian et al. (2011), for example, used data from convicted 
offenders participating in the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development. Tseloni and Pease (2011) also 
only used known (i.e., arrested) offenders to evaluate DNA retention policies. However, a difference in 
criminal behaviour between known and unknown offenders can shed a light on inclusion and retention 
policies. Second, current research only focuses on reference profiles. This dissertation has demonstrated 
the importance of crime scene profiles, for both operational and strategic research. Unknown offenders 
must therefore be included together with known offenders when assessing DNA retention policies of 
both reference profiles and crime scene profiles. This future research track is therefore in line with the 
future research track on criminal careers discussed above.
15.4. The impact of DNA policies and DNA databases
Several authors have highlighted the lack of systematic empirical research into the actual impact or 
effectiveness of forensic DNA (Murphy, 2018; F. Santos et al., 2013; Wilson, McClure, & Weisburd, 2010), 
although they acknowledge that such research is conceptually and methodologically complex (F. Santos 
et al., 2013). Indeed, there are different ways to interpret and evaluate the utility or impact of DNA 
databases. Once again, when evaluating the impact of DNA databases it is important to keep the purpose 
of the database in mind. In addition to the match rate, the deterrence effect on convicted offenders and 
the impact on the general crime level, the utility of DNA databases can also be assessed by their impact 
on public safety or by their cost efficiency (Bieber, 2006; p. 230; Doleac, 2017).
Currently, no utility research evaluating the NGDB has been conducted.44 In addition, it is not easy to 
generalize research results from foreign studies as the different inclusion and retention criteria can 
limit their external validity. Moreover, existing utility studies only take into account the DNA database. 
This dissertation showed that the link between the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database can 
identify links between unknown and known offenders, so that the NGDB can also indirectly contribute 
to crime solving. In addition to the match rate, this indirect impact must also be taken into account when 
evaluating the utility of the NGDB. Research specifically focused on the Belgian context is therefore 
urgently needed. New insights obtained from criminological research based on an integrated dataset 
of both the NGDB and the Belgian General Police Database could add weight to arguments about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the NGDB for crime prevention and law enforcement (De Moor et al., 
2018b). In other words: “In an environment of limited resources, knowing which technologies provide the 
biggest benefit for solving crimes provides policy-makers with knowledge to support the expansion of certain 
44 The research by Renard and Jeuniaux (2012) was limited to an evaluation of the court costs for DNA research over 11 years 
(2000–2010).
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practices or the reduction or elimination of others, as well as providing a base of information for criminal 
investigators weighing the opportunity costs of one choice over another” (Wilson et al., 2010, p. 468).
— 133 —
PART 4: CONCLUSION 
16. Policy implications
A number of policy implications arise from this dissertation. As the selectivity and representativity of the 
DNA data are not important for operational research, all the implications relate to identifying unknown 
offenders and endorsing the operational research. Figure 29 schematically represents the three proposed 
policy implications.
16.1. Reinforce information exchange ANG and trace databases
The Belgian government recognizes the importance of information exchange between judicial and 
administrative services. The Integral Security Framework Document (ISFD) for closer cooperation 
between the police and other government and security services, and the National Security Plan (NSP), 
the strategic policy plan of the integrated police, define ten security phenomena and seven cross-cutting 
themes to achieve an effective safety strategy in Belgium. One of the cross-cutting themes is enforcing 
administrative law intensively as part of the approach to tackle crime, while ensuring an efficient 
exchange of information with the various stakeholders (Federale Politie, 2016; Geens & Jambon, 2016). 
These stakeholders can be administrative enforcement bodies such as tax administration, or private 
actors such as energy companies, insurance companies or car repair services.
It is therefore surprising that the information exchange between the NGDB and the Belgian General 
Police Database is so limited. In the context of operational research, no one has used an integrated 
version of the two databases, as applied in this dissertation. The NGDB and the Belgian General Police 
Database are two separate databases and each has its own manager (respectively the DIS service of 
the NICC / INCC, and the DRI of the federal police), and access to the stored data is legally protected. 
This dissertation showed that by merging crime data from the NGDB with crime data from the Belgian 
General Police Database, links can be identified between offenders and between crime that are not 
visible in each of the individual databases. The integration of the unknown offenders stored in the NGDB 
makes it possible to make links visible between unknown offenders / unsolved crimes, and also between 
unknown offenders / unsolved crimes with known offenders / solved crimes. The latter gets closer to 
an offender, without knowing the identity of the offender (yet). From this perspective, Jeuniaux et al. 
(2016) studied co-offending networks present in the NGDB. They acknowledged the operational use 
of network intelligence from both the forensic profiles and the reference profiles, as the likelihood of 
identifying unknown offenders is increased when they are linked to known offenders. The authors only 
used the NGDB as the data source for their research, so not all information available within the police 
and judiciary was fully utilized. Other academics have also advocated the integration of different (trace) 
data sources to enhance the forensic intelligence process (Legrand & Vogel, 2014; Ribaux et al., 2003).
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In other words, strengthening the information exchange between the NGDB (or other trace databases) 
and the Belgian General Police Database can only enhance operational research. The terms in which this 
information exchange should ideally take place should be examined. The advantages and disadvantages 
of maintaining the databases or integrating the two databases into a single database must be weighed 
up. Consideration should also be given to the management of the databases. For example, the Fichier 
National Automatisé des Empreintes Génétiques (FNAEG), the French national DNA database, is 
managed by a sub-directorate of the technical and scientific departments of the French police force. 
French police officers can compare DNA profiles in the database (Ribbers, 2015). In the Netherlands, a 
special unit of the Dutch police receives weekly DNA-based network data from the Netherlands Forensic 
Institute. After adding further intelligence, for example fingerprints, the information is provided to all 
police forces in the Netherlands. As a result, connections between cases from different police forces can 
be made (Jeuniaux et al., 2016).
The current Belgian legislation will need to be to be adapted if an integrated database is to be used 
for operational police investigations, as different rules and laws apply to each database. The NGDB is 
managed by the NICC/INCC, and the National DNA Cell manages the DNA code numbers of the reference 
profiles – two separate agencies to protect the privacy of individuals whose DNA is stored in the NGDB. 
Access to the Belgian General Police Database is also legally restricted. The ministerial guideline MFO-
3 describes in detail the modalities for access to and consultation of databases accessible to members 
of the police services.45 Moreover, the protection of the privacy of those involved must also be taken 
into account when intensifying the exchange of information between the two different databases. This 
obviously has implications for the extent to which the police have access to the stored DNA data. For 
example, not all information stored in the NGDB is useful for operational research. Police officers, for 
example, should not have access to the DNA profiles, the actual genetic information. 
16.2. Link forensic science and forensic intelligence 
Intensifying the exchange of information, whether or not this results in a single database, raises three 
other issues. First, the integration of information from various databases implies making full use of the 
available data. This means that the raw data is used to extract information and knowledge. Second, an 
intensification of information exchange implies that the clear distinction between purely operational 
research and purely strategic research is weakened. Third, the exchange of information implies that the 
way in which the NGDB (as well as the Belgian General Police Database and the other traces databases) 
is fed needs to be re-examined. These three elements are inextricably linked.
45 Gemeenschappelijke richtlijn MFO-3 van de Ministers van Justitie en van Binnenlandse Zaken betreffende het 
informatiebeheer inzake gerechtelijke en bestuurlijke politie, BS 14 juni 2002
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Comparative DNA research in Belgium only focuses on the direct or indirect identification of a person 
involved in a crime, or on proving his innocence (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2011a). If the NGDB is to be 
optimally utilized, one should also consider the possibilities of the NGDB regarding orientation (e.g., 
mapping out the broader environment of a known or an unknown offender). Since the police currently 
have no access to the data concerning unknown offenders and their crimes that is stored in the NGDB, 
much information is lost. Indeed, this dissertation highlights the importance of integrating unknown 
offenders and unsolved crimes in network research. Orientation is best expressed when all available 
information is used, not only within a specific case but also in the context of forensic intelligence. After 
all, a thorough knowledge of crime phenomena or offender groups promotes operational research. The 
strict distinction between operational (case-based) and strategic research or forensic intelligence could 
disappear, and the importance and mutual influence of both dimensions should be recognized. This of 
course also requires an intelligence approach when the information is collected and registered in both 
the NGDB and other trace databases and the Belgian General Police Database. Specifically with regard 
to the trace databases, this coincides with a shift from crime scene investigation (CSI) to crime scene 
reconstruction (CSR). When carrying out CSR the central question is not what DNA traces are present, 
but what may have happened. Different scenarios are considered, and these guide the search for traces. 
Being able to rely on forensic intelligence is of course essential here. Within CSR, for example, DNA 
traces of the victim are also important to be able to reconstruct the crime. 
16.3. Awareness and education
Magistrates who cannot estimate the cost of a DNA analysis, or reports by DNA experts that are difficult 
for the police and judges to interpret (de Keijser, Malsch, Luining, Weulen Kranenbarg, & Lenssen, 
2016; Malsch, de Keijser, Luining, Weulen Kranenbarg, & Lenssen, 2016; Malsch et al., 2013), are just two 
examples that illustrate the need for information and education. But the need goes beyond this. Before 
there can be any question of developing thorough forensic intelligence and strengthening the exchange 
of information between the various databases, it is necessary to raise awareness of the importance of 
forensic trace research and appropriate training for all the actors involved. This applies both to the police 
and the magistracy. Actors within the police and judiciary must be informed about the possibilities of 
forensic science and forensic intelligence: what is possible with forensic DNA, but also, and perhaps 
especially, what is not. On the one hand, people in the field set high expectations in terms of DNA as 
forensic science to solve a specific crime, but on the other hand they do not or insufficiently acknowledge 
the possibilities for forensic intelligence (Renard et al., 2018). For example, the NGDB must, as it were, 
be regarded as the ‘LinkedIn for the criminal career’. People use LinkedIn, the online social network for 
professionals, to get in touch with others via their own network: a friend brings you into contact with the 
CEO of a company where you want to work, for example. Getting in touch with the CEO is much easier if 
you know his friends. So both the first and second line contact are of high value. The same principle can 
be applied for criminal networks: approaching unknown offenders and getting to know them becomes 
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Figure 29: Schematic representation of policy implications
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17. The ethics of forensic DNA and DNA databases
The many fascinating ‘cold hits’ and ‘exonerations’ cases that have been reported (see for example 
Hampikian, West, & Akselrod, 2011; Wade, 2015) encourage a belief in the importance and usefulness 
of forensic DNA and DNA databases, among both policy makers and the general public. This is often 
accompanied by a demand for more extensive DNA inclusion criteria and retention policies. However, 
forensic DNA databases are not free of controversy. In a dissertation that uses such a database, some 
attention should be paid to this. The debate goes far beyond what is described below, but this brief 
explanation begins to place DNA databases in a broader context of rights and freedoms.
The fault line between the defenders and the opponents of (extensive) DNA databases often coincides 
with political and judicial representatives on the one side, and academics on the other. This is an 
exaggerated black-and-white position, but actors within politics and justice often emphasize the benefits 
of DNA databases in the fight against and prevention of crime, while the academic world raises critical 
questions about such databases (Machado, Silva, & Cunha, 2012). In addition to the many proponents of 
DNA databases, critics also make their voices heard (Levitt, 2007; Wallace, 2006; Williams & Johnson, 
2004, 2005). Critics express their concern that an extension of DNA databases to include more reference 
profiles would be an example of excessive government control (Gamero et al., 2008; Williams & Johnson, 
2005). Moreover, it would create a list of suspects in a way that is discriminatory (GeneWatch UK, 
2006; McCartney, 2004; Wallace, 2006) and violates the presumption of innocence (De Gorgey, 1990; 
Machado et al., 2012). Thus (extended) DNA databases would pose a threat to human rights, in particular 
“liberty, autonomy, privacy, informed consent, moral and physical integrity and the presumption of innocence” 
(Machado & Silva, 2014; p.133), which are anchored in Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 6 (the 
right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (the right to respect for privacy) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The (long-term) storage of forensic profiles is also not without controversy. In addition, it 
is not always possible to identify whether the DNA profile is of an offender, a casual witness or a victim.
It is striking, however, that fingerprint databases generate much less controversy than DNA databases, even 
though fingerprints are often taken from broader target groups. In Belgium, for example, fingerprints are 
part of the so-called triptych of an arrestee, the other items being images and a description. Fingerprints 
are taken automatically from every arrestee, while a DNA reference profile of a suspect is only taken 
at the request of the public prosecutor. Both databases contain biometric information obtained from 
reference profiles or crime scene profiles, which leads to the individualization of a person (Stevens, 
2001). In contrast to a fingerprint, DNA also contains hereditary information from which all kinds of 
characteristics of the donor can be derived, but forensic DNA analysis is limited to the non-coding part 
of the DNA. A forensic DNA profile thus contains no more information than a fingerprint (Kaye & Smith, 
2003). Moreover, the implication of storing information is the same for both databases: the donor is 
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considered to be a potential offender of (future) crimes.
So it seems that the controversy is not so much about what one actually does with the biometric 
information, but what one could do with it. Indeed, although DNA laboratories only examine ‘junk DNA’ 
to draw up a DNA profile, some speculate on what would happen if, in the future, this junk DNA actually 
turned out to be coding DNA (Hochschild & Sen, 2012). Scientific developments also create pressure 
on the social, legal and ethical aspects of these innovations. Wienroth, Morling, and Williams (2014) 
have described four successive waves of technological innovation in forensic genetics: the use of DNA 
as evidence; the creation of DNA databases; analysis of the coding part of the DNA; and the search for 
genetic similarity in criminal cases. So-called predictive techniques and phenotypic DNA testing, where 
personal characteristics or medical data of a potential offender are drawn up only on the basis of a 
forensic DNA profile, do not seem very far off (Staley, 2005). In Belgium, KULeuven is already conducting 
research into visualizing a human face only on the basis of DNA (see for example Claes et al., 2014).
Will these developments lead to coded DNA also being analysed in the future, if their usefulness in the 
fight against crime is recognized? Will the samples also be stored (as they are in the UK), in addition to 
the profiles, so that they can be re-analysed later when techniques have evolved (Rothstein & Talbott, 
2006) or so that they can be checked for errors (Wallace, 2006)? Other developments, such as rapid 
forensic DNA analysis where a DNA profile can be produced from a sample in just a few hours (Hopwood 
et al., 2010), also seem to pave the way for an increase in DNA analysis. In the United States, for example, 
the Rapid DNA Act was signed into law in 2017, making it possible to carry out real-time searches of the 
national database using rapidly generated DNA profiles outside of the laboratory context (Murphy, 2018).
A specific recommendation is to open the debate about databases to all biometric information. Such 
debate should consider both the differences and the similarities between the various types of bio-metric 
information and should differentiate between the use of the information for forensic intelligence and for 
forensic science. The positive and useful aspects of DNA should not be lost because of the dangers of 
abuse. Increasing public awareness will be central to conducting a useful and well-founded debate.
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Appendix 1:  
Decision diagram for the selection and classification of trace carriers for possible DNA testing, 
and list of classification of the DNA carriers into categories (in Dutch)
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MODEL 14 – BESLISSINGSDIAGRAM VOOR DE SELECTIE EN RANGSCHIKKING VAN DE SPOREN
1.
DNA waarschijnlijk 
afkomstig van de dader/ 
slachtoffer *
2.
Afkomst DNA onbekend 
3.
DNA waarschijnlijk niet 




(bv. bloed, sperma, 
speeksel,..)
Grote kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel.
+
Grote kans op profiel 
dader/slachtoffer *
Grote kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel.
+
Kans op profiel onbeken-
de of mengprofiel
Grote kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel.
+





Kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+
Grote kans op profiel 
dader/slachtoffer *
Kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+
Kans op profiel onbeken-
de of mengprofiel
Kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+




(bv. door kort contact, 
DNA gedegradeerd door 
weersomstandigheden, 
water,…)
Weinig kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+
Grote kans op profiel da-
der/slachtoffer *
Weinig kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+
Kans op profiel 
onbekende of 
mengprofiel 
Weinig kans op bruikbaar 
DNA-profiel
+
Grote kans profiel 
niet-dader
X.
Geen codering mogelijk wegens het ontbreken van de nodige informatie 
i.v.m. sporenvrijwaring en oorsprong 
* schrappen wat niet past
Legende:
1 " 3: link met de op te sporen persoon (kan zowel de dader als het slachtoffer zijn) via de tactische 
gegevens
A " C: hoeveelheid/kwaliteit van DNA via wetenschappelijke en contextuele gegevens
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Lijst met indeling van de DNA-dragers in categorieën
Hoofdgroep Subgroep Categorie
Biologisch materiaal Bloed A
Biologisch materiaal Faeces C
Biologisch materiaal Haar (met wortel) B 
Biologisch materiaal Speeksel A




Contactsporen Oor / kaakspoor C









Kledij Handschoenen – rubber – latex A
Kledij Handschoenen – fleece – leder – 
wol 
B




Kledij Kledij (nat) C













Peuken Peuk (nat) C
Referentie Wangslijmvlies-Swab A
Voertuig Airbag B
Voertuig Dashboard passagierszijde C
Voertuig GPS C
Voertuig Handrem C
Voertuig Hendel motorkap C
Voertuig Nummerplaat C
Voertuig Portierkruk C




Voertuig Verstelhendel bestuurszijde C
Voertuig Verstelhendel passagierszijde C
Wapens Mes B
Wapens Pistool / revolver B
Wapens Andere B
Werktuigen





Additional analyses of data registered in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015
Table 20: S-index proportion difference test
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Violent theft 0.7777778 0.8518519 0.8148148 0.8888889 0.8518519 0.8518519
Aggravated burglary 0.4444444 0.3333333 0.1481481 0.1851852 0.2222222 0.4074074
Lethal violence 1 0.962963 0.962963 1 1 1
Sexual offences 0.962963 1 0.962963 0.962963 0.962963 0.962963
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Table 21: Description of datasets for 2010
Crime type Police dataset N %
DNA dataset 
N %
Violent theft 316 21.31 18,160 9.64
Aggravated burglary 1,033 69.66 162,862 86.42
Lethal violence 32 2.16 416 0.22
Sexual offences 102 6.88 7,010 3.72
Total 1,483 100 188,448 100
Table 22: Generalized Gini coefficients for 2010
2010
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.6012937 0.07905201 0.4629325  0.7308341 0.5836018 0.05318141 0.468
Violent theft 0.7267784 0.08394231 0.5821693  .8423719 0.6551805 0.05410582 0.361
Aggravated burglary 0.5949841 0.07756618 0.4636374   0.7248930 0.6100893 0.05670676 0.282
Lethal violence 0.5692664 0.05737039 0.4891034   0.6548383 0.7800926 0.16651 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.4463042 0.05601607 0.3556075   0.5715478 0.6746550 0.05943583 < 0.001
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Table 23: Description of datasets for 2011
Crime type Police dataset N %
DNA dataset 
N %
Violent theft 372 18.09 21,580 10.71
Aggravated burglary 1,547 75.24 172,009 85.40
Lethal violence 33 1.61 406 0.20
Sexual offences 104 5.06 7,418 3.68
Total 2,056 100 201,413 100
Table 24: Generalized Gini coefficients for 2011
2011
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.5853780 0.08169602 0.4399430  0.7180088 0.5812437 0.05514125 0.396
Violent theft 0.7465966 0.08803778 0.5929382   0.8586898 0.6716448 0.05368266 0.362
Aggravated burglary 0.5722758 0.07894417 0.4336265   0.7044098 0.5923532 0.06798178 0.265
Lethal violence 0.5714286 0.05693238 0.4842206  0.6744491 0.7003367 0.09071918 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.4456927 0.05787306 0.3531753   0.5783612 0.6737892 0.05658388 < 0.001
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Table 25: Description of datasets for 2012
Crime type Police dataset N %
DNA dataset 
N %
Violent theft 365 16.86 21,120 10.58
Aggravated burglary 1,646 76.03 170,659 85.49
Lethal violence 31 1.43 450 0.23
Sexual offences 123 5.68 7,390 3.70
Total 2,165 100 199,619 100
Table 26: Generalized Gini coefficients for 2012 
2012
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.5654806 0.07613442 0.4397684  0.6967595 0.5386708 0.05907063 0.48
Violent theft 0.7173295 0.09153266 0.5541703   0.8422600 0.6015221 0.04519617 0.277
Aggravated burglary 0.5538508 0.07266402 0.4396091   0.6838069 0.5372846 0.06888008 0.464
Lethal violence 0.5405761 0.05736531 0.4496932  0.6374776 0.7861410 0.1349444 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.4282163 0.0564156 0.3351881   0.5615682 0.6702800 0.06443557 < 0.001
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Table 27: Description of datasets for 2013
Crime type Police dataset N %
DNA dataset 
N %
Violent theft 267 13.17 18,366 9.78
Aggravated burglary 1,619 79.87 161,122 85.81
Lethal violence 34 1.68 428 0.23
Sexual offences 107 5.28 7,855 4.18
Total 2,027 100 187,771 100
Table 28: Generalized Gini coefficients for 2013
2013
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.5600502 0.07286328 0.4400864  0.6946747 0.5363153 0.05334956 0.493
Violent theft 0.7081523 0.0764994 0.5865243  0.8305804 0.6084062 0.05128875 0.237
Aggravated burglary 0.5508074 0.0710741 0.4365470  0.6861854 0.5367740 0.05523458 0.454
Lethal violence 0.5503634 0.06477753 0.4412698  0.6738913 0.7712418 0.2044554 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.4330056 0.05851932 0.3388157   0.5645880 0.6964348 0.06668315 < 0.001
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Table 29: Description of datasets for 2015
Crime type Police dataset N %
DNA dataset 
N %
Violent theft 140 12.95 14,851 11.16
Aggravated burglary 848 78.45 112,017 84.17
Lethal violence 19 1.76 443 0.33
Sexual offences 74 6.85 5,771 4.34
Total 1,081 100 133,082 100
Table 30: Generalized Gini coefficients for 2015
2015
Police dataset DNA dataset
G’ S.E. G’ Lower CI  Upper CI G’ S.E. G’ p
4 crime types 0.5583269 0.06972365 0.4461923   0.6908841 0.5786823 0.04755035 0.243
Violent theft 0.7206249 0.08128673 0.5838221   0.8361241 0.6380952 0.0602213 0.32
Aggravated burglary 0.5462193 0.06645975 0.4395158   0.6769351 0.5993187 0.05451599 0.088
Lethal violence 0.5494524 0.06572644 0.4384630  0.6676429 0.7423823 0.152775 < 0.001
Sexual offences 0.4241771 0.05589142 0.3354737   0.5531660 0.6516517 0.06562113 < 0.001
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Figure 34: Local S-indices for violent theft (1), aggravated burglary (2), lethal violence (3), and sexual offences (4) 
for 2015
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